Before the
UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE
Library of Congress

Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies

Docket No. 2014-07
Class 13: Unlocking—Mobile Connectivity Devices

COMMENTS OF GENERAL MOTORS LLC

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March 27, 2015
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COMMENTS OF GENERAL MOTORS LLC

I. SUMMARY OF OPPOSITION TO THE PROPOSED EXEMPTION

General Motors LLC ("GM") respectfully submits these comments in response to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ("NPRM") released by the United States Copyright Office ("Copyright Office") in the above-captioned proceeding. In the NPRM, the Copyright Office seeks comment on a number of proposed exemptions to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s ("DMCA") prohibition against circumvention of technological protection measures ("TPMs") that control access to copyrighted works.  

As discussed in more detail below, the Copyright Office should deny or at least narrow the proposed exemption for Class 13. The proposed exemption is overbroad, and its proponents have failed to establish a prima facie case that an exemption for Class 13 is or is likely to be non-infringing. The proponents have also failed to establish that the challenged TPMs are causing, or are likely to cause in the next three years, a substantial adverse impact on users. Because the proponents of the exemption have failed to meet their prima facie burden, the Copyright Office

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2 Id. at 73856.
does not need to examine the relevant statutory factors; however, consideration of those factors also supports a decision to deny the proposed exemption.

*Proposed Class 13.* Two petitioners—the Competitive Carriers Association (“CCA”) and the Rural Wireless Association (“RWA”) (collectively, the “Proponents”)—filed petitions seeking an exemption of the DMCA to allow the unlocking of “mobile connectivity devices,” which the *NPRM* defines as devices that allow users to connect to a mobile data network through either a direct connection or the creation of a local Wi-Fi network created by the device.3 CCA seeks an exemption to allow the owner of a mobile connectivity device, or another person at the direction of the owner of the mobile connectivity device, to circumvent computer programs that enable mobile hotspots to connect to a wireless network that offers telecommunications and/or information services, to connect to another wireless network.4 RWA seeks a similar exemption.5

CCA argues that absent an exemption, mobile connectivity device owners might be forced to purchase a new wireless device when they want to change service providers, resulting in substantial costs.6 RWA argues that the technological measures that control access to mobile hotspots adversely affect the ability of consumers to make lawful use of their mobile

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3 *Id.* at 73865.
4 CCA specifically seeks an exemption for: “[c]omputer programs, in the form of firmware or software, or data used by firmware or software, that enable mobile hotspots or MiFi devices to connect to a wireless network that offers telecommunications and/or information services, when circumvention is initiated by the owner of the device, or by another person at the direction of the owner of the device, in order to connect to a wireless network that offers telecommunications and/or information services, and access to the network is authorized by the operator of the network.” Petition of Competitive Carriers Association at 1-2 (“CCA Petition”).
5 RWA seeks an exemption “to allow for the circumvention of the technological measures that control access to the software and firmware of mobile broadband wireless modems, which are also known as Mobile Wireless Personal Hotspots (“Mobile Hotspots”), to allow the owner of a lawfully acquired Mobile Hotspot, or a person designated by the owner of the lawfully acquired Mobile Hotspot, to modify the Mobile Hotspot’s software and firmware so that the device may be used on a technologically compatible wireless network of the customer’s choosing, and when the connection to the network is authorized by the operator of the network.” Petition of the Rural Wireless Association, Inc. at 1-2 (“RWA Petition”).
6 Long Comment of Competitive Carriers Association Regarding a Proposed Exemption at 2 (“CCA Comments”).
connectivity devices, and that allowing unlocking would increase consumer access to devices that might otherwise not be available.  

Proposed Class 13 Should Be Denied or Narrowed to Exclude In-Vehicle Telematics and Communication Systems. The Copyright Office should deny or at least narrow the proposed exemption. As an initial matter, the class sought by Proponents is overbroad and unsupported by evidence in the record. Although Proponents of Class 13 may not have envisioned including vehicle-based telematics and communication systems in the class, as drafted the Proponents’ Class 13 could be construed to encompass in-vehicle telematics and communication systems, including those provided by GM through OnStar.

Moreover, Proponents have failed to establish a prima facie case that unlocking in-vehicle telematics systems is or is likely to be non-infringing, and that TPMs are causing, or are likely to cause in the next three years, a substantial adverse impact on users. Because Proponents have failed to meet their prima facie burden, the Copyright Office does not need to examine the relevant statutory factors; however, consideration of those factors also supports a decision to deny any exemption for Class 13 that includes in-vehicle telematics systems.

If the Copyright Office finds that an exemption is generally appropriate, it should narrow Class 13 to exclude in-vehicle telematics systems such as OnStar. Although as drafted the proposed exemption class could be interpreted to include the vehicle-based OnStar system, the Proponents did not mention vehicle-based systems when describing the proposed class and no

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7 RWA Petition at 2-4. In addition to CCA and RWA, the SAE International (formerly Society of Automotive Engineers) filed comments taking no position but offering to assist the Copyright Office in its inquiry; and combined comments received through the Digital Right to Repair website generally expressed the view that consumers should be able to unlock any hotspot they own to switch network providers. See Short Comment of SAE International on behalf of the SAE International Vehicle Electrical System Security Committee Regarding a Proposed Exemption; various Short Comments submitted through the Digital Right to Repair website.
commenter has submitted evidence in the record that would support an exclusion that includes such systems.

II. INTRODUCTION

A. GM’s Interest in this Rulemaking.

GM, its affiliates and their joint ventures manufacture vehicles in 30 countries, and the company is a leader in the world’s largest and fastest-growing automotive markets. GM, its affiliates and their joint ventures sell vehicles under the Chevrolet, Cadillac, Baojun, Buick, GMC, Holden, Jiefang, Opel, Vauxhall and Wuling brands. OnStar, LLC (“OnStar”) is an affiliate of GM that provides in-vehicle connected safety, security and mobility telematics solutions and advanced information technology, and is available on almost all of GM’s U.S. vehicles. OnStar’s suite of services include automatic crash response, stolen vehicle assistance, remote door unlock, turn-by-turn navigation, vehicle diagnostics, hands-free calling and 4G LTE wireless connectivity.\(^8\)

Granting the proposed exemption for Class 13 without modification and including within it in-vehicle telematics or communication systems could have a chilling effect on future automotive telematics development and deployment and make it more difficult for vehicle manufacturers to satisfy the demands of consumers and regulators on a wide range of issues. The TPMs that Proponents seek to circumvent are the same TPMs that protect general vehicle functionality, ensure vehicle safety and cybersecurity, protect key consumer privacy interests, and enable compliance with federal safety and emissions requirements. Given their critical role in the many layers of protection and security that GM has incorporated in its in-vehicle telematics systems, the Copyright Office should not allow circumvention of such TPMs.

\(^8\) More information on GM and its affiliates, including OnStar, can be found at http://www.gm.com.
Unlike smartphones or other mobile connectivity devices, in-vehicle telematics or communication systems are integrated into the vehicle’s electronic architecture, and act as a major layer of the vehicle’s safety, security, privacy and environmental compliance regime. Using wireless connectivity, the OnStar module can remotely reduce the speed of a stolen vehicle, engage in remote vehicle diagnostics, and provide over-the-air security updates implicating critical aspects of vehicle control. While GM takes great care to maintain the integrity of the OnStar system, allowing unlocking could make these network connections more vulnerable to safety, privacy and security concerns. The OnStar software also uses TPMs to protect important aspects of vehicle emissions controls, which are required by federal and state law and provide important air quality protections. These TPMs, like those governing safety, privacy and security features, should also not be made vulnerable to circumvention.

The TPMs in place in GM vehicles are intended to prevent hackers from accessing important vehicle controls, and the Copyright Office should not approve a class exemption that would circumvent these controls. Because in-vehicle telematics and communication systems serve fundamentally different functions than smartphones or other mobile connectivity devices, the justification for unlocking smartphones or other mobile connectivity devices does not apply to vehicles.

B. Technological Protection Measures in GM Vehicles.

Operations and Importance of TPMs in GM Vehicles. Today’s automobiles include, on average, 30 purpose-built Electronic Control Units (“ECUs”) with functions that range from controlling the radio to regulating vital engine and safety functions. Many of these systems are critical to the safety, privacy and security of the vehicle and compliance with mandatory federal vehicle regulations. The ECUs are designed to be operated as built by the automobile manufacturers, and not to be modified by circumventing TPMs. Operating the ECUs as built is
important to protect vehicle safety, privacy and security, and vehicle regulatory compliance systems. Automobile manufacturers must ensure that these ECUs are protected from tampering and hacking.

Automobile manufacturers employ many different types of TPMs, depending on the availability of the evolving technology and the type of the control system involved. Vehicle ECUs are interconnected via networks that enable interaction between various systems, and, for telematics-equipped vehicles, various remote features. The software operating each ECU is carefully calibrated to ensure the safe and secure operation of the vehicle. Interconnected OnStar services include system diagnostics and security features such as Remote Door Unlock, Remote Ignition Block, and Remote Vehicle Slowdown. GM engineers use TPMs to ensure that these features are safe and secure.

The TPMs currently in place in GM vehicles are an integral part of an overall safety, cybersecurity, privacy and emissions regulatory strategy and solution. GM’s TPMs are strategically designed and implemented to protect vehicle occupant safety (GM’s highest priority) and to maintain mandatory emission protections, as well as to thwart illegal activities such as cybersecurity attacks, theft, odometer fraud, modifications to air bag systems, and warranty fraud. In addition, TPMs protect information gathered by and stored in vehicle systems that if released, could compromise consumer privacy, including geolocation information, trip history, call history, and contacts.

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9 Examples of TPMs used by GM include seed/key access control mechanisms, firmware signing, and sensitive data encryption.
10 Remote Door Unlock enables OnStar to open a vehicle’s doors without a key. Remote Ignition Block allows OnStar to send a remote signal to block the engine of a vehicle that has been reported stolen from starting. Stolen Vehicle Slowdown sends a signal that gradually slows down a stolen vehicle, enabling police to apprehend the individual who stole it. See OnStar Services, available at https://www.onstar.com/us/en/services/services.html.
Allowing a vehicle owner—or a third party, at the direction of a vehicle owner—to modify the OnStar telematics system to unlock its wireless broadband connection reduces the protections on networks and systems with which the telematics system is designed to interface. Allowing unlocking could also threaten the successful implementation of certain applicable legislative and regulatory goals and introduce risks to vehicle safety, privacy and security.

**Alternatives to Circumvention of TPMs in GM Vehicles.** An exemption for Class 13 is not necessary, because consumers already have the ability to connect with any carriers’ data network while in their GM vehicle. Notably, consumers can use their smartphones or, if available, other mobile connectivity devices to connect to any carriers’ data network. Other functions of the OnStar service, such as turn-by-turn directions, can similarly be obtained from numerous providers on a wide variety of GPS-enabled hand-held devices.

Both the purpose and function of in-vehicle telematics and communication systems differ significantly from that of hand-held wireless telecommunication devices, and consumers use hand-held mobile devices in very different ways than they use the OnStar system. Allowing circumvention of in-vehicle TPMs to unlock telematics systems such as OnStar would deliberately weaken the protections GM has put in place to ensure the operation of important regulatory requirements, vehicle safety, consumer privacy and vehicle security. It could also limit the availability of in-vehicle telematics and communication systems in the future and suppress innovation in the sector. Automobile manufacturers may be forced to rethink whether to offer the affected features absent the ability to protect them with robust TPMs.

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C. **Effects of Circumvention of TPMs in GM Vehicles.**

In-vehicle telematics and communication systems do not function like smartphones or other mobile connectivity devices, and vehicle TPMs protect important safety, cybersecurity, and emissions systems in GM vehicles; protect personal privacy; prevent fraud and other illegal activities; and enable innovation and consumer choice.

Because GM’s in-vehicle mobile computing elements interact with other vehicle ECUs in safety and emissions systems, allowing circumvention would pose needless risks to those systems.\(^\text{12}\) Allowing consumers and third parties to bypass built-in restrictions on access to the underlying software to connect to an unsupported network could increase in-vehicle telematics and communication systems’ vulnerabilities.

Placing safety, privacy and security foremost is not just a GM best practice; GM’s TPMs also ensure that vehicles meet federally mandated safety and emissions standards. Circumvention of some emissions-oriented TPMs, such as the seed/key access control mechanisms, could violate federal law. Notably, the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) prohibits “tampering” with vehicles or vehicle engines once they have been certified in a certain configuration by the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) for introduction into U.S. commerce.\(^\text{13}\) “Tampering” includes “rendering inoperative” integrated design elements to modify vehicle and/or engine performance without complying with emissions regulations.\(^\text{14}\) In addition, the Motor Vehicle Safety Act prohibits the introduction into U.S. commerce of vehicles

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\(^{12}\) As Jeff Williams, CTO of Contrast Security, observed: “I don’t want to be hyperbolic about it, but we are connecting computers to things that can now kill you. Cars are potentially a really deadly thing if you lose control. So we are crossing a threshold into a world where you aren’t just losing a spreadsheet or a credit card number, you are talking about directly harming people.” Cadie Thompson, “More connected cars may mean more hacked cars,” CNBC.com (Feb. 9, 2015), available at http://www.cnbc.com/id/102409721# (“Connected Cars”).

\(^{13}\) 42 U.S.C. § 7522(a).

\(^{14}\) *Id.*
that do not comply with the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, and knowingly making inoperative any part of a device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle in compliance with an applicable motor vehicle standard.\textsuperscript{15}

Many known tampering methods are used to hide the failed or deactivated operation of an emissions or safety system, rendering these conditions unknown to a subsequent purchaser of the vehicle. If a vehicle’s airbag systems, including any malfunction indicator lights, have been disabled (whether deliberately or inadvertently), a subsequent vehicle owner will have no advance notice that her safety could be in jeopardy. Similarly, a subsequent owner would have no way of knowing if a vehicle’s emissions systems have been subject to tampering.\textsuperscript{16} For good cause, federal environmental and safety regulations regarding motor vehicles establish a well-recognized policy against tampering with in-vehicle electronic systems designed for safety and emissions control.

GM incorporates TPMs into its vehicle system designs to avoid leaving connected vehicles vulnerable to cyberattack. Allowing consumers of vehicle-based telematics services to switch wireless network providers, or access the underlying software that currently connects in-vehicle telematics systems to a specific wireless provider, would remove this protection without offering GM a comparable alternative for ensuring compliance with important regulatory requirements and protecting vehicle safety, privacy and security.

Vehicles equipped with in-vehicle telematics systems may collect information on drivers and their movements, including geolocation information, trip history, call history, and contacts. GM uses TPMs to protect information gathered by and stored in vehicle systems the release of which could compromise consumer privacy, including personally identifiable information.

\textsuperscript{15} 49 U.S.C. §§ 30112(a)(1), 30122(b).

\textsuperscript{16} For tampering that the subsequent owner eventually discovers, manufacturer warranties do not cover the repair of damage caused by the tampering, placing the repair cost on the subsequent owner.
GM also relies on TPMs in vehicles to guard against fraud, theft and other illegal activities by vehicle owners and third parties. For example, a frequently-cited GM TPM, the seed/key access control mechanism, is also one of the TPMs used in vehicle security functions such as key learning and anti-theft protection. Maintaining the integrity of in-vehicle TPMs is vitally important to ensure the safety, privacy and security not only of the original vehicle owner, but also of a subsequent purchaser, who might have no way of knowing that a previous owner compromised an important in-vehicle safety, security or privacy protection.

Finally, design, development and production cycles run much more slowly in the automotive sector than they do in the wireless handset sector, with current development cycles taking up to five years. Permitting unlocking of in-vehicle telematics and communication systems could further complicate and prolong this production cycle because this cycle would need to take into account the adverse effects of unlocking. This disrupts innovation and consumer choice, and suppresses the otherwise promising growth in this sector.17

In view of the foregoing, GM urges the Copyright Office to deny the proposed exemption as applied to in-vehicle telematics and communication systems. If granted as proposed, the exemption could pointlessly reduce the effectiveness of the TPMs vehicle manufacturers such as GM have developed to promote vehicle safety and security, protect consumer privacy, prevent fraud and theft, and promote innovation. The Proponents have not put forth any rationale to justify such a result.

III. PROPONENTS HAVE FAILED TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE IN SUPPORT OF THE EXEMPTION

The Proponents have failed to establish a prima facie case in support of an exemption for Class 13. In addition, the proposed class is overbroad, and no commenter has provided evidence

that would support an exemption for unlocking in-vehicle telematics and communication systems. The Proponents have also failed to establish that the uses for which they seek an exemption are noninfringing under the relevant law, and GM’s TPMs do not adversely affect significant numbers of noninfringing users and uses.

A. Exemption Proponents Have Not Met Their Required Statutory Burden.

Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 1201, proponents of an exemption from the DMCA prohibition on circumvention bear the burden of establishing that “persons who are users of a copyrighted work are, or are likely to be in the succeeding 3-year period, adversely affected by the prohibition . . . in their ability to make non-infringing uses . . . of a particular class of copyrighted works.”18 Thus, to establish a prima facie case for the proposed class, Proponents must affirmatively demonstrate that (1) the uses affected by the prohibition on circumvention are or are likely to be noninfringing and (2) as a result of a TPM controlling access to the copyrighted work, the prohibition is causing, or in the next three years is likely to cause, a substantial adverse impact on those uses.19 The proponents must also establish that the harm alleged “is more likely than not” based on a preponderance of the evidence,20 and the harm must be “distinct and measurable, and more than de minimis.”21

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B. The Proposed Class Is Overly Broad and No Evidence Supports an Exemption for In-Vehicle Telematics and Communication Systems.

A major focus of this rulemaking proceeding is on how to define the excluded class. Congress intended for an excluded class to be “a narrow and focused subset” of the statutory categories, and the Copyright Office must “look to the specific record” to assess the proper scope of the class for a recommended exclusion.

As proposed, Class 13 is overly broad and should be rejected or refined to exclude in-vehicle telematics and communication systems. The Proponents do not argue in favor of including such systems in their proposed class, and no filer has submitted any evidence in the record that would support an exclusion for unlocking in-vehicle telematics and communication systems.

Relying on previous exemptions granted for unlocking wireless telephone handsets, CCA argues that the proposed class is appropriate because of steadily increased consumer demand to be able to connect mobile connectivity devices to any carrier’s information network, as well as its telecommunication network. CCA suggests that consumers do not distinguish between various connected devices and asks the Copyright Office to consolidate exemptions for wireless handsets, all-purpose tablet computers, mobile hotspots/MiFi devices and connected wearables and consumer machines into one broad class.

Review of DMCA exemptions is conducted de novo, and previously granted exemptions do not factor into the current proceeding. In every DMCA review, “the contours of a class will

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23 Id. at 55690-91.
24 CCA Comments at 2.
25 CCA Petition at 1 n.1.
depend on the factual record established in the rulemaking proceeding.” The Copyright Office can refine a proposed class definition to ensure that it is appropriately tailored to its findings, but only where the proponent “has otherwise succeeded in demonstrating that some version of its exemption is warranted.” The Copyright Office “cannot delineate the appropriate contours of a class ‘in a factual vacuum.’”

The Copyright Office is faced with just such a “factual vacuum” here. The proposed Class 13 proffered by Proponents is overbroad, and no commenter has submitted any evidence that the class should include in-vehicle telematics and communication systems. In the absence of any discussion in the record to support the assertion that unlocking such systems would be non-infringing and that, absent an exemption, Proponents would be subject to actual or likely harm in the next three years, the Copyright Office must decline to adopt proposed Class 13, or must narrow it to exclude unsupported elements such as in-vehicle telematics and communication systems.

C. Exemption Proponents Have Failed to Establish that the Uses Affected by the Prohibition Are Noninfringing.

Proponents have also failed to demonstrate that the use for which they seek an exemption is noninfringing under relevant law. As a threshold matter, Proponents must demonstrate that their proffered use is or is likely non-infringing; it is not enough to show that a use could be merely plausibly or conceivably non-infringing. The burden of proof remains on the

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28 Id. at 65276.
29 Id.
Proponents to establish the noninfringing use; there is no ‘rule of doubt' favoring an exemption when it is unclear whether a particular use is a fair use.\textsuperscript{31}

1. Proponents’ Proposed Uses Do Not Qualify As Fair Uses.

The four factors that make up the Section 107 “fair use” analysis weigh against a finding that Proponents’ proposed use is fair use: (1) the purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion of the protected material used; and (4) the market for the copyrighted work.\textsuperscript{32}

The first fair use factor considers whether the proposed use is “transformative” in that it “adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.”\textsuperscript{33} For example, in Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., the court found that this element suggested fair use when a software maker reverse engineered a gaming system and provided new opportunities for game play in a new environment.\textsuperscript{34} The Proponents demonstrate no such transformative use here. Rather, CCA simply asserts that an exemption for proposed Class 13 would constitute “fair use” because connecting to a wireless network of a consumer’s choice is “a reasonable and non-infringing use.”\textsuperscript{35} This assertion fails to meet the Section 107 evidentiary standard.\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{31} 2012 Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 65261. A proponent must show more than that a particular use is noninfringing; it must “establish that the proposed use is likely to qualify as noninfringing under relevant law.” 2014 NOI, 79 Fed. Reg. at 55690.
\textsuperscript{32} See 17 U.S.C. § 107; Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 602 (9th Cir. 2000).
\textsuperscript{34} 203 F.3d at 606-607.
\textsuperscript{35} CCA Comments at 4.
\textsuperscript{36} RWA does not provide any explanation of how its proposed exemption would constitute “fair use,” and so fails to establish a prima facie case for the exemption. See RWA Petition at 3 (simply alleging “[t]he noninfringing uses of copyrighted works will be the use of Mobile Hotspots on the wireless network of the customer’s choosing.”).
The second inquiry is the nature of the copyrighted work. Because they mix function with expression, computer programs and software provide unique challenges in analyzing this prong of the fair use test.\textsuperscript{37} Although CCA claims that the TPMs in question are “intended to be changed” by being copied, it provides no support for that assertion.\textsuperscript{38} The in-vehicle software protected by GM’s TPMs is a highly creative work designed by specialized engineers who have developed a delicate and precise controlling system within a vehicle, subject to a complex framework of security needs, regulatory requirements, and quality, performance and reliability standards. This software is the result of many years of research and development and a significant investment of resources by GM. The mere existence of certain functional elements does not obviate the need to protect the expressive aspects also encompassed in the work.

The third fair use factor is the amount of the work used; copying a greater percentage of the work argues against fair use. CCA alleges that the amount of code used in an altered state is small compared to the total operating system software.\textsuperscript{39} However, when the ultimate, as opposed to direct, use of the copyrighted material is limited, courts have given this element very little weight.\textsuperscript{40} Thus, regardless of the amount of code copied by unlocking, the Copyright Office should find this factor is either neutral, or disfavors a finding of fair use.

The final fair use factor considers whether the infringing use threatens the potential market for, or value of, a copyrighted work. Under this factor the Copyright Office addresses whether “unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort” proposed by the Proponents would

\textsuperscript{37} Sega Enterprises LTD v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1524 (9\textsuperscript{th} Cir. 1992).
\textsuperscript{38} CCA Comments at 4. According to CCA, because carriers routinely update the preferred roaming list (“PRL”) on their customers’ devices, the original author of the copyrighted work intended these variables to be changed without constituting a copyright violation. CCA Petition at 3.
\textsuperscript{39} CCA Comments at 4.
\textsuperscript{40} Sega v. Accolade, 977 F.2d at 1526-1527.
negatively impact the value of copyrighted works.\textsuperscript{41} Because fair use is an affirmative defense, a proponent would have difficulty securing a favorable assessment on this fourth prong “without favorable evidence about relevant markets.”\textsuperscript{42} Proponents have offered no such evidence here. To the contrary, an exemption for Class 13 could pose a credible threat to the market for in-vehicle telematics and communication systems if, as a result of unlocking, consumers believed that vehicle safety, security, privacy or emissions systems were compromised or placed at increased jeopardy of being comprised, and rejected the integration of such systems in their vehicles.

2. \textit{OnStar Licensees Are Not Software Owners and Are Not Protected by Section 117.}

Section 117 is an affirmative defense that permits the owner of a copy of a computer program to copy or modify the program for limited purposes without infringing on the copyright.\textsuperscript{43} CCA argues that unlocking a mobile hotspot does not change the original software, and so does not create a “derivative work,” and that because owners of mobile hotspots are also owners of the underlying software, any derivative work that was created would be protected under Section 117.\textsuperscript{44}

CCA specifically alleges that unlocking a mobile communication device only “changes underlying variables accessed by the program,” rather than creating an entirely new derivative work.\textsuperscript{45} However, as discussed above, allowing unlocking of an in-vehicle telematics system could have much more significant and far-reach effects on important cybersecurity, safety, privacy and emissions control mechanisms.


\textsuperscript{42} Id.


\textsuperscript{44} CCA Petition at 3.

\textsuperscript{45} CCA Comments at 4.
In addition, licensees are not owners of OnStar software, and the two cases cited by CCA actually confirm this position. In *Krause v. Titleserv, Inc.*, the court found that the appropriate test for ownership of a copy of software was straightforward: whether the possessor of the copy “enjoys sufficiently broad rights over it to be sensibly considered its owner.” In *Vernor v. Autodesk*, the court developed a more detailed test and asked whether the copyright owner specifies that the user is granted a license; significantly restricts the user’s ability to transfer the software; and imposes notable use restrictions. Under either test, CCA’s argument that the licensee of an in-vehicle telematics and communication system such as OnStar is the owner of such a system fails. The user terms for OnStar plainly provide that the consumer is only granted a license, not ownership of the software, imposes strict limitations on the use of that software, and retains for OnStar the right to access, modify, or update the software at any time. Thus Section 117 does not support CCA’s claim that unlocking a mobile connectivity device is a permissible use of copyrighted in-vehicle telematics and communication system software.

D. GM’s TPMs and the Prohibition on Circumvention Do Not Adversely Affect Significant Numbers of Noninfringing Users and Uses.

In addition to establishing that the proposed uses are noninfringing, Proponents must also demonstrate that the alleged adverse effects caused by the prohibition on circumvention on the use of the copyrighted works are “distinct, verifiable, and measurable impacts” occurring in the marketplace; an exemption “should not be based on *de minimis* impacts.” With respect to this element, the Copyright Office’s main focus must be on whether a “substantial diminution” of the

46 402 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2005).
47 *Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc.*, 621 F.3d 1102, 1110-1111 (9th Cir. 2010).

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availability of works for noninfringing uses is “actually occurring.” Proponents must demonstrate that the prohibition on circumvention has or is likely to have a \textit{substantial} adverse effect on noninfringing uses of a particular class of works. \textsuperscript{51} “[M]ere inconveniences, or individual cases that do not rise to the level of a substantial adverse impact” are outside the scope of the Copyright Office’s review. \textsuperscript{52} CCA has not met this standard.

CCA argues that “[a]bsent an anti-circumvention exception, owners of mobile hotspots and MiFi devices will have no right at all to unlock these devices in order to switch carriers or connect to new networks abroad,” which will render them “captive” to their original carrier. \textsuperscript{53} According to CCA, the consequences of not extending an exemption would be “decreased competition and consumer welfare.” \textsuperscript{54} There is no evidence in the record, however, that a “substantial diminution” of the availability of in-vehicle telematics and communication systems is actually taking place—in fact, there is no evidence regarding the market for such systems at all. In addition, no filer has commented on, let alone attempted to quantify, any adverse effects arising from the current unavailability of an exemption. For these reasons, the Proponents have failed to satisfy their burden of establishing a prima facie case for the proposed exemption, and the exemption for Class 13 as applied to in-vehicle telematics and communication systems should be denied.

\textsuperscript{50} \textit{Id.}, citing Staff of House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105\textsuperscript{th} Cong., \textit{Section-by-Section Analysis of H.R. 2281 as passed by the United States House of Representatives on August 4, 1998} at 6 (Comm. Print. 1998) (“House Manager’s Report”).
\textsuperscript{51} 2010 Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 43826.
\textsuperscript{52} House Manager’s Report at 6.
\textsuperscript{53} CCA Petition at 5.
\textsuperscript{54} CCA Comments at 9.
IV. THE SECTION 1201(A)(1)(C) FACTORS ARE NEUTRAL OR WEIGH AGAINST GRANTING AN EXEMPTION

Although because Proponents have failed to establish a prima facie case in support of the exemption the Copyright Office does not need to address the Section 1201 test, these factors also weigh in favor of denying the proposed exemption.

Section 1201(a)(1)(C) directs that the rulemaking proceeding examine, as appropriate:
(1) the availability for use of copyrighted works; (2) the availability for use of works for nonprofit archival, preservation, and educational purposes; (3) the impact that the prohibition on the circumvention of technological measures applied to copyrighted works has on criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research; (4) the effect of circumvention of technological measures on the market for or value of copyrighted works; and (5) such other factors as the Librarian considers appropriate. The first and fourth factors argue in favor of denying the exemption as it would apply to in-vehicle telematics and communication systems. The second, third and fifth factors are not relevant here. Finally, the Copyright Office should consider the benefits that TPMs provide, which outweigh any inconvenience to consumers.

A. The Protections Enable Public Access to Copyrighted Works that Would Otherwise Be Threatened.

The most important aspect of the “availability” test is whether the availability of the work in a protected format “enhances or inhibits public use of the work.” CCA argues that locks on mobile hotspots reduce the availability for use of the copyrighted software operating system, and

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56 See 2010 Recommendation at 102; 2012 Recommendation at 77.
57 2012 Recommendation at 97 (noting that other important elements include whether the protected work is available in other formats, and, if so, whether such formats are sufficient to accommodate noninfringing uses).
that it is aware of no other available formats of such operating system software that would not require circumvention.\textsuperscript{58}

In-vehicle telematics and communication systems rely on protected access to a specific wireless broadband network or networks to ensure the availability and reliability of a wide range of telematics services. Protecting the underlying software by declining to extend the proposed exemption for Class 13 to in-vehicle telematics and communication systems would ensure that these systems continue to remain available and reliable. Absent this protection, vehicle manufacturers, including GM, may be forced to consider reducing offerings or withdrawing these systems from the market, rather than risk creating serious vehicle safety, security, privacy and emissions risks. This statutory factor argues in favor of denying the proposed exemption.

\textbf{B. The Circumvention of Technological Measures Would Harm the Market for and Value of Copyrighted Works.}

The fourth statutory factor requires the Copyright Office to consider the impact of circumvention on the market for or value of the copyrighted works. CCA argues that the circumvention of mobile hotspot locks will improve the market value of the copyrighted work, because it will increase the ability of a consumer to sell, or transfer, the mobile hotspot on the secondary market.\textsuperscript{59} However, as GM has previously noted, the market for in-vehicle telematics and communication systems is considerably different from that of other mobile communication devices. Consumers do not purchase a GM vehicle so they can go online, and OnStar connectivity is at most a supplement to the primary function of the car, which is transportation. It is highly improbable that requiring unlocking of in-vehicle telematics and communication systems would increase the retail, or resale, value of automobiles. To the contrary, allowing unlocking could give rise to the perception of security, privacy and safety vulnerabilities that

\textsuperscript{58} CCA Comments at 10.
\textsuperscript{59} Id. at 11.
could in turn dampen the market for connected vehicles, making the presence of an in-vehicle
telematics and communication system a liability rather than, as GM hopes will be the case in the
future, an asset.

C. The Benefits of TPMs for Vehicle Safety Outweigh Any Chilling Effect on Consumers.

As a final consideration, Congress directed the Copyright Office in undertaking DMCA
rulemaking proceedings to “consider the positive as well as the adverse effects” of TPMs on the
availability of copyrighted materials. Weighing the statutory factors requires consideration of
“the benefits that [TPMs] bring[] with respect to the overall creation and dissemination of works
in the marketplace.”60 In this case, the benefits of TPMs vastly outweigh any minor
inconvenience to consumers.

The software that GM includes as part of the OnStar service is a critical, integrated part
of the safety, security, privacy and emissions systems that control each OnStar-equipped vehicle.
TPMs allow automobile manufacturers such as GM to protect the in-vehicle safety, security,
privacy and emissions control features of their automobiles, which in turn enhances the safety,
privacy and security of drivers, passengers, and pedestrians. Allowing consumers to breach
these protective measures could lead to the reduction or elimination of these benefits, without
providing any corresponding benefit for which there is any documented consumer demand. In
the absence of any evidence of consumer desire to unlock in-vehicle telematics and
communication systems, or of any harm arising from the current unavailability of this
exemption, this factor weighs against granting the requested exemption.

60 House Manager’s Report at 6.
V. CONCLUSION

Congress anticipated that exemptions from the DMCA’s protections would be made “only in exceptional cases.”\textsuperscript{61} The Copyright Office should deny the proposed Class 13 exemption, or refine the class to exclude the circumvention of automotive TPMs, including unlocking of in-vehicle telematics and communication systems, because of unique and significant safety, environmental, privacy and cybersecurity risks presented in the automobile environment that do not arise in the context of unlocking other consumer devices such as smartphones or tablets. The Proponents have failed to establish a prima facie case for an exemption, and the statutory factors also weigh against circumvention of this important protective mechanism.

Respectfully submitted,

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March 27, 2015