U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE

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PUBLIC ROUNDTABLE ON THE RIGHT OF MAKING AVAILABLE

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MONDAY
MAY 5, 2014

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The Roundtable met in the Rayburn House Office Building, Room 2226, Washington, D.C., at 9:00 a.m.

PRESENT

ALLAN ADLER, Association of American Publishers

SANDRA AISTARS, Copyright Alliance JONATHAN BAND, Library Copyright Alliance GREGORY A. BARNES, Digital Media Association JOHN C. BEITER, SESAC, Inc.

GEORGE M. BORKOWSKI, Recording Industry
Association of America

ANDREW P. BRIDGES, Attorney
SOFIA CASTILLO, Copyright Alliance
EUGENE DeANNA, Library of Congress
JOSEPH J. DiMONA, Broadcast Music, Inc.
CHRISTIAN GENETSKI, Entertainment Software
Association

JANE GINSBURG, Columbia University School of Law

Association of AmericaJIM HALPERT,
Internet Commerce Coalition
TERRY HART, Copyright Alliance
LAWRENCE A. HUSICK, Delaware County IP
Roundtable
LEE KNIFE, Digital Media Association

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- KEITH KUPFERSCHMID, Software & Information Industry Association
- GLYNN LUNNEY, Tulane University School of Law
- PATRICE A. LYONS, Corporation for National Research Initiatives
- PETER MENELL, University of California Berkeley School of Law
- SAM MOSENKIS, American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers
- LAURA MOY, Public Knowledge
- JAY ROSENTHAL, National Music Publishers'
 Association
- MATTHEW SCHRUERS, Computer & Communications
 Industry Association
- BEN SHEFFNER, Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.
- STEVEN TEPP, Global Intellectual Property Center, U.S. Chamber of Commerce
- NANCY WOLFF, PACA: Digital Media Licensing Association
- STAFF PRESENT
- MARIA A. PALLANTE, Register of Copyrights and Director of the U.S. Copyright Office
- KEVIN AMER, Counsel for Policy and International Affairs, U.S. Copyright Office
- JACQUELINE CHARLESWORTH, General Counsel and Associate Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office
- MARIA STRONG, Senior Counsel for Policy and International Affairs, U.S. Copyright Office
- KARYN A. TEMPLE CLAGGETT, Associate Register of Copyrights and Director of Policy and International Affairs, U.S.
- Copyright Office
- AARON WATSON, Attorney Advisor for Policy and International Affairs, U.S. Copyright Office

C-O-N-T-E-N-T-S
Call to Order and Opening Remarks
Opening Remarks by the U.S. Copyright Office
Introductions
Introduction of Panelists
Session 1
Panelists:
John C. Beiter SESAC, Inc.
Andrew P. Bridges Attorney
George M. Borkowski Senior Vice President Litigation and Legal Affairs Recording Industry Association of America
Senior Vice President Litigation and Legal Affairs Recording Industry Association
Senior Vice President Litigation and Legal Affairs Recording Industry Association of America Eugene DeAnna

C-O-N-T-E-N-T-S	(CONTINUED)
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Session 1 (Continued)

Panelists (Continued)

Terry Hart Director of Legal Policy Copyright Alliance

Professor Glynn Lunney Tulane University School of Law

Professor Peter Menell University of California - Berkeley School of Law

Sam Mosenkis Vice President, Legal Affairs American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers

Matthew Schruers Vice President of Law & Policy Computer & Communication Industry Association

Nancy Wolff PACA: Digital Media Licensing Association

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C-O-N-T-E-N-T-S (CONTINUED)

Introductions

Participants:

Jonathan Band Counsel Library Copyright Alliance

Joseph J. DiMona Vice President, Legal Affairs Broadcast Music, Inc.

Jim Halpert
Internet Commerce Coalition

Lawrence Husick
Delaware County
IP Roundtable
(On behalf of himself)

Lee Knife Executive Director Digital Media Association

Keith Kupferschmid
General Counsel and
Senior Vice President
Intellectual Property, Software
& Information Industry
Association

Patrice A. Lyons General Counsel Corporation for National Research Initiatives

C-O-N-T-E-N-T-S	(CONTINUED)
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Session 2 (Continued)

Panelists (Continued)

Laura Moy Staff Attorney Public Knowledge

Jay Rosenthal General Counsel National Music Publishers' Association

Ben Sheffner Vice President, Legal Affairs Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.

Steven Tepp

Global Intellectual Property

Center

U.S. Chamber of Commerce

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C-O-N-T-E-N-T-S (CONTINUED)

Introductions Panelists:

Allan Adler
General Counsel and
Vice President for
Government Affairs
Association of American
Publishers

Sandra Aistars Chief Executive Officer Copyright Alliance

Jonathan Band Counsel Library Copyright Alliance

Gregory A. Barnes General Counsel Digital Media Association

John C. Beiter SESAC, Inc.

Andrew P. Bridges Attorney

Mitch Glazier Senior Executive Vice President Recording Industry Association of America

Keith Kupferschmid
General Counsel and
Senior Vice President
Intellectual Property, Software
& Information Industry
Association

Session 3 (Continued)

Panelists (Continued)

Patrice A. Lyons General Counsel Corporation for National Research Initiatives

Professor Peter Menell

University of California - Berkeley

School of Law

Laura Moy

Staff Attorney

Public Knowledge

Nancy Wolff

PACA: Digital Media Licensing

Association

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C-O-N-T-E-N-T-S (CONTINUED)

Introductions

Panelists:

Sofia Castillo Legal Fellow Copyright Alliance

Joseph J. DiMona Vice President, Legal Affairs Broadcast Music, Inc.

Christian Genetski Senior Vice President and General Counsel Entertainment Software Association

Professor Jane Ginsburg Columbia University School of Law

Professor Glynn Lunney Tulane University School of Law

Jay Rosenthal General Counsel National Music Publishers' Association

Matthew Schruers
Vice President of Law
& Policy
Computer & Communications
Industry Association

C-O-N-T-E-N-T-S (CONTINUED)
Session 4 (Continued)
Panelists (Continued)
Steven Tepp
Global Intellectual Property
Center
U.S. Chamber of Commerce
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1	P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
2	9:02 a.m.
3	MS. CLAGGETT: Good morning.
4	Welcome to the Copyright Office Roundtables on
5	the Making Available Right.
6	We are going to start off with
7	some brief remarks audifrom Register Maria
8	Pallante, and then, we will get into the
9	logistics of the actual roundtable discussions
10	today.
11	So, I will turn to Maria for her
12	opening remarks.
13	Thanks.
14	MS. PALLANTE: Good morning,
15	everyone.
16	And for those who don't know, that
17	was the indefatigable Karyn Temple Claggett,
18	who is the Associate Register of Copyrights
19	and Director of Policy and International
20	Affairs.
21	So, a warm welcome to everybody.
22	I know my staff and I are very much looking

forward to this discussion. It is an important one. It is not one that we have had for a long time in the United States.

I especially want to welcome all of our panelists, but especially those who have come from other cities to join us today. And a very warm welcome to our professors who are here as independent scholars, and a very important part of our debate.

So, as all of you know, but I will say it for the transcript, the Copyright

Office is undertaking this study at the request of Congress to assess the state of

U.S. law recognizing and protecting making available and communication to the public rights for copyright owners.

When the United States implemented the WCT [WIPO Copyright Treaty] and WPPT [WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty], we did so under the permissible umbrella approach, confirming that our exclusive rights under Section 106, taken in combination, adequately

protect copyright owners in accordance with the treaty obligations.

In the ensuing 15 years, I think we can all agree that the online environment has evolved rapidly. There is no question that some courts have struggled in applying the statute to current technologies and activities. There has been some confusion about the evidence necessary to establish an infringement claim, based on the activity of making a copyrighted work available online without authorization.

Today we will explore a number of questions -- the degree to which Section 106 continues to adequately cover the rights of making available and communication to the public. For example, does our law sufficiently, today, provide for the actual distribution of the work and the offering of the work for download? And does our law provide for the actual transmission of a work to members of the public and the offering of

1 | that work for access?

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We will look at whether and how we should clarify U.S. law to confirm our treaty obligations and the protections that they require. We will look at how foreign laws have addressed these rights in the past 15 years. And as always when discussing exclusive rights, we are interested in the application of appropriately tailored limitations and exceptions.

My legal staff and I have read all of the public comments and, obviously, the legislative history and all of the relevant court opinions. We are very thankful for both your focus on the past as well as your concerns about the future, and we welcome the discussion today. To the extent possible, we would like to encourage everybody to speak with as much legal detail as possible, as this is, after all, a complex legal discussion.

Thank you very much, and enjoy the day.

1	(Applause.)
2	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you, Maria.
3	Good morning.
4	As Maria mentioned, I am Karyn
5	Temple Claggett, Associate Register of
6	Copyrights and Director of the Office of
7	Policy and International Affairs.
8	Before we actually begin with our
9	formal sessions, I would like to go over just
10	a few logistical points for our roundtable
11	discussion today.
12	First, the roundtable sessions
13	will be moderated by us here at the table up
14	front. As you are aware, we are in a House
15	Committee briefing room, and all of the
16	participants are sitting on the raised
L 7	platform behind us.
18	Participant remarks will be the
19	focus of our discussion today with guidance
20	and questions from the Copyright Office
21	moderators, seated at the front table. We do
22	apologize that our backs will be to the

audience because we will be focused on the participants, and that, as I said, will be the focus of the discussion.

Given the number of panelists that we have for each of our four sessions and our desire to hear from all participants, we are going to ask that participants please be mindful of other people speaking. And tip your card -- if you guys are familiar with international negotiations, you know this process very well -- but tip your card when you would like to make a comment or ask a question, rather than simply jumping in, so that we can easily moderate the discussion. We will, then, formally call on you to signal it is your turn to speak. Otherwise, obviously, things would be very unwieldy very quickly.

We also ask that all participants focus your comments and responses to our specific questions that we raised in our NOI [Notice of Inquiry] or additional follow-up

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questions that we are going to pose to you today. And given time constraints and the number of panelists that we do have, we do ask that you limit your responses to our questions for each panelist to no more than about two to three minutes.

And I want to reiterate that

point. I do apologize profusely in advance,

but if you are going over the time, we will,

unfortunately, have to cut you off. So,

please be very flexible and understanding of

our very real time constraints and our need to

hear from a broad range of viewpoints.

Our final session of the day
invites comments from the audience and, time
permitting, additional comments from the
participants. For the audience, there will be
a sign-up sheet available during the lunch
break, and comments made in that session will
also be limited to two minutes.

Second, as you can see, today's discussion is being videotaped by the Library

of Congress. Participants, hopefully, you all received a video release form by email. If you have not signed that, please do so. We need to have those before the end of the session today.

For audience members, there will be a short question-and-answer period, hopefully, at the end of each session, in addition to our audience participation session. So, if you decide to participate in that question-and-answer period, you are giving us permission to include your questions or comments in future webcasts and broadcasts of this event.

At this time, I would like to ask everyone in the audience and the participants to please turn off your cell phones or electronic devices that might interfere with the recording of this event. It is actually not our Copyright Office policy, but our friendly ITS policy, just to make sure that they don't have any interference with the

1 videotaping.

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We also, as you can see, have a court reporter who is transcribing the proceedings. We will not have opening remarks from the participants in the sessions, and the participants already know this, but we will just briefly ask everyone up on the platform to identify themselves by their name and affiliation.

If any of the participants or audience members who are not actually participants today have additional comments after the meeting, we definitely have an opendoor policy in the Copyright Office. So, we would be happy to separately meet with you on any of the issues that were raised today.

We also may potentially seek
additional comments--written comments--to
respond to some of the questions and
discussions that we talk about today. If we
do so, we will provide a formal NOI notice.

Are there any questions in terms

of logistics before we begin the discussions
today, either from the audience or the
participants?

(No response.)

Okay. So, we will get started with the first session. I am just going to read what the first session will discuss, and then, I will sit back at the table to ask some questions.

how the exclusive rights in Title 17 cover the making available and communication to the public rights in the context of digital ondemand transmissions, such as peer-to-peer networks, streaming services, and music downloads, as well as more broadly in the digital environment. This session will also address evidentiary issues in infringement actions, and we will also carry on this discussion for the second session.

I am going, before we start, to introduce or ask my Copyright Office

1	colleagues to introduce themselves briefly,
2	and then, we can go around the platform for
3	all the participants.
4	We will start here.
5	MR. AMER: Kevin Amer, Counsel for
6	Policy and International Affairs.
7	MS. STRONG: Good morning.
8	Maria Strong, Senior Counsel for
9	Policy and International Affairs.
LO	MS. CHARLESWORTH: Jacqueline
L1	Charlesworth, General Counsel.
L2	MR. WATSON: Aaron Watson,
L3	Attorney Advisor for Policy and International
L4	Affairs.
L5	MS. CLAGGETT: Okay. Thank you
L6	very much.
L7	And so now, I am going to ask for
L8	everyone on the panel just to simply state
L9	your name and your affiliation, if you are
20	here representing an organization or someone
21	else. I will start with John Beiter.
22	And just one other logistical

1	thing. You have to push the button and the
2	green light will show up if the microphone is
3	on.
4	MR. BEITER: So, again, my name is
5	John Beiter. I am with the Law Firm of
6	Shackelford, Zumwalt & Hayes in Nashville,
7	Tennessee, here today representing SESAC, one
8	of the three performing arts organizations.
9	MR. BRIDGES: My name is Andrew
LO	Bridges. I am an internet and copyright
L1	litigator in San Francisco and Silicon Valley,
L2	speaking on my own behalf.
L3	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you.
L4	MR. BORKOWSKI: George Borkowski,
L5	Senior Vice President of Litigation and Legal
L6	Affairs at the Recording Industry Association
L7	of America.
L8	MR. DeANNA: Good morning.
L9	I'm Eugene DeAnna. I am head of
20	the Recorded Sound Section at the Library of
21	Congress.
22	PROFESSOR GINSBURG: Jane

1	Ginsburg, Columbia Law School.
2	MR. HART: Terry Hart, Director of
3	Legal Policy at the Copyright Alliance.
4	PROFESSOR LUNNEY: I'm Glynn
5	Lunney. I'm at Tulane University School of
6	Law.
7	PROFESSOR MENELL: Peter Menell,
8	University of California at Berkeley.
9	MR. SCHRUERS: Matt Schruers, Vice
LO	President, Law and Policy, Computer and
L1	Communications Industry Association.
L2	MR. MOSENKIS: Sam Mosenkis. I am
L3	with ASCAP, the American Society of Composers,
L 4	Authors, and Publishers.
L5	MS. WOLFF: Nancy Wolff with
L6	Cowan, DeBaets, Abrahams & Sheppard. And I am
L7	here on behalf of actually, we have
L8	modernized it is PACA, the Digital Media
L9	Licensing Association, since images have gone
20	from transparency to files.
21	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you very
	much, everyone.

1	For our first question, before we
2	actually explore our current state of the law,
3	we wanted to focus a little bit on the past,
4	and specifically the legislative history of
5	Title 17. So, we wanted to explore whether
6	the legislative history regarding the
7	evolution of the right of distribution in
8	Section 106(3) of the Copyright Act sheds any
9	light in terms of how we should currently
10	construe U.S. implementation of its
11	international obligations to have a making
12	available right.
13	So, generally, what is the role or
14	should be the role of legislative history of
15	the 1976 Act in determining the U.S.
16	implementation of the right of making
17	available? Does our legislative history
18	provide any direct information in terms of the
19	scope of the distribution right under our
20	current law?
21	And I am actually going to direct
22	sometimes we will direct questions;

1 sometimes we will not -- this time I am going 2 to direct a question specifically to Peter Menell, who already has his flag raised. 3 4 Because I was just reading your law review 5 article last night, so I wanted to direct a 6 question to you in terms of any insight about 7 the legislative history of our evolution of 8 the digital distribution right under our law. 9 Thank you. 10 PROFESSOR MENELL: Thank you. 11 Well, as you know from the article 12 and from the Copyright Office's work 50 years 13 ago, the terminology in the statute derives 14 from 1960s discussions, probably in rooms like 15 this, involving people like us trying to 16 update a statute, the 1909 statute. 17 And there were many discussions 18 about word choice. What really struck me as 19 I was reading and teaching about the issue 20 surrounding internet file sharing was why

Congress changed the words "publish" and

"vend" to "distribute."

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It seems like an

1 interesting question. In fact, the 1961 2 Register Report used the word "publish." As I discovered in documents that 3 4 have not gotten a lot of attention, there was 5 a very specific reason. The article spells 6 that out. 7 But what I want to highlight here is just that judges routinely consider the 8 Copyright Act's legislative history, even when 9 10 the words appear at first blush to be clear. 11 Even common words can have multiple dictionary 12 meanings. As we see whenever we open 13 Webster's, there are several different 14 choices. 15 Many provisions of the 1976 Act 16 were crafted during a largely analog era. 17 so, therefore, judges, including, for example, 18 Judge Gertner in the London-Sire decision, 19 refers to legislative history in trying to 20 sort these issues out. 21 And so, in trying to understand 2.2 this issue, I peeked behind the curtain. Ι

wanted to see what was going on, and, in fact, there are express reasons why they chose the word "distribute," and it had nothing to do with narrowing. In fact, the General Counsel of the Copyright Office, Abe Goldman, says the purpose was to broaden. And as Ed Sargoy, the ABA [American Bar Association] representative, explains, it was largely to avoid confusion that had arisen around publication as a trigger for whether copyright could be forfeited for improper notice.

And so, that is really what I think the article was trying to do, was to explain that story, which is quite interesting.

I will note that one of the comments by Mr. Sanders questions my exploration of legislative history, suggesting that it is improper to consult legislative history predating the enacting Congress. And I will note merely that the Supreme Court didn't get that message. If you read

1	Kirtsaeng, Tasini, CCNV, Abend, Dowling, and
2	Sony, they all refer to pre-legislative
3	session legislative history.
4	In fact, courts will even refer to
5	the CONTU [Commission on New Technological
6	Uses of Copyrighted Works] Report in
7	interpreting the statute, which is really
8	outside of the legislative bounds. It is
9	about trying to understand these issues.
10	And so, that was my purpose, was
11	in exploring that history.
12	Now I want to note one side piece
13	of research that I did.
14	MS. CLAGGETT: Briefly, please,
15	then.
16	PROFESSOR MENELL: Okay. I came
17	across a brief filed 15 years ago in an
18	important copyright case in which the attorney
19	contended that the plain language of the
20	Copyright Act was clear and governed and, yet,
21	proceeded to invoke the statute's legislative
22	history more than 20 times in that brief.

1	I commend that attorney's use of
2	what is suggested is a violation of the
3	cardinal principle of statutory
4	interpretation. And we are fortunate to have
5	that intrepid attorney right here among us,
6	and his name is Andrew Bridges. The case was
7	RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia.
8	And the only thing I want to add
9	is that the Ninth Circuit referred to that
LO	legislative history in correctly construing
L1	the statute, in favor of Mr. Bridges's client.
L2	So, the contention that it is
L3	improper to look at legislative history is not
L 4	one that is, I think, respected. I think it
L5	is common, and I would say every opinion that
L6	is trying to grapple with bringing the analog
L7	era Copyright Act into the digital age,
L8	engages in that process.
L9	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you
20	And I will open it up to others.
21	So, is that the answer? Does the legislative
22	history of Title 17 answer the question for us

and establish that we do have this broad making available right? And if anyone wants to comment in terms of the legislative history showing, or not showing, whether publication or to publish is synonymous with distribution, you can answer that question as well.

I will go Mr. Bridges, who might want to respond specifically and, then, to Mr. Lunney.

MR. BRIDGES: By the way, the brief at issue there, for RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia related to the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, which contained a statutory provision involving something called a "serial copy management system," the definition of which had been amended out of the statute during the legislative process. So, when you have a statute referring to language that has been amended out before the bill became law, there is a bit of a requirement to look at legislative history.

The same issue does not apply to

the distribution right. The statute itself is clear about the fact that the distribution right applies to copies and phonorecords of a copyrighted work being distributed to the public "by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending."

Now the concern is Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines "copies" and "phonorecords" as material objects. The definition is in the statute. So, it requires not only a distribution; it requires a distribution of material objects. And it requires not only a distribution of material objects, but it requires a distribution of material objects, but it requires a distribution of material objects by sale or other transfer of ownership or rental, lease, or lending.

So, when that is clear -- it may be counterintuitive to people, but that is because these are defined terms; they are defined terms -- when it is clear on its face, why go to legislative history to try to vary the clear terms of the statute?

And I think that here I am just
going to wrap up briefly. I think this
touches on a fundamental question of respect
for copyright law in our society, because when
the law says what the law says pretty clearly,
but there is a sense that there is a private
industry consensus, and we are going to go
look at arcane materials and do decades of
research to contradict the obvious, it is no
wonder that the public believes that copyright
law is rigged in favor of certain participants
in the process.

MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you, Mr. Bridges.

responses to your position with respect to whether you think a download can constitute a distribution under our Copyright Act, but I want to see, first, whether there are any responses broadly in terms of the legislative history, and specifically with respect to whether a publication is synonymous with

1	distribution, given the legislative history.
2	So, I am going to turn to Mr.
3	Lunney, and then, I will let any others who
4	want to respond to Mr. Bridges' point about
5	material objects respond as well.
6	PROFESSOR LUNNEY: So, just a
7	brief clarification to start, it is Lunney.
8	MS. CLAGGETT: Lunney. Thank you.
9	Sorry.
LO	PROFESSOR LUNNEY: That's okay.
L1	I would reiterate Mr. Bridges'
L2	point in terms of resorting to legislative
L3	history when statutory language is clear.
L 4	I would also point out that, in
L5	terms of the legislative history, even if you
L6	can equate the distribution with the
L7	publication right, it is not all that clear
L8	under the 1909 Act that a mere offering of a
L9	copy for distribution or lending in a library,
20	for example, would have constituted
21	publication. Certainly, there are no cases
22	where a library was held guilty of copyright

1	infringement or liable for copyright
2	infringement simply by making it available
3	under the 1909 Act.
4	So, we don't have a clear
5	definition of publication in the infringement
6	context where we can use that definition from
7	infringement cases in the 1909 Act to define
8	the scope of the distribution right under the
9	1976 Act, even if we thought they were meant
10	to be equivalent.
11	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you very
12	much.
13	I am going to go with Matt and,
14	then, Mr. Menell.
15	MR. SCHRUERS: I think Professor
16	Lunney said a fair amount of what I was going
17	to say. If the interpretation of publications
18	offered is actually sound, we would expect to
19	see like a pre-1976 Hotaling. And I'm not
20	aware of any. So, until we see a case that
21	offers that interpretation, I am not sure I
22	would put a whole lot of stock in that.

Secondly, a further point -- and maybe I'm just repeating what Andrew said regarding statutory construction -- but it is one thing very much to refer to legislative history to either reinforce the apparent interpretation, and I think I am as guilty as anyone of sort of looking to another sort of source to sort of back up the interpretation that already appears manifest.

It is a very different thing to say this is the language that is clear on its face, the requirement of sale or transfer, and then, to resort to the legislative history to reach an outcome that contradicts the language that seems pretty self-evident.

So, I think it is sort of a common understanding in law schools that sort of legislative history is sort of our resource of last resort. And that applies with particular force when you are trying to offer an interpretation that is at odds with what we have in the statute.

1	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you.
2	And maybe, Mr. Menell, you will
3	have some response to that and whether the
4	legislative history actually contradicts the
5	plain meaning.
6	PROFESSOR MENELL: Yes. No, I do.
7	I mean, if it was so clear, we would have a
8	hard time explaining Judge Gertner's decision
9	exactly to the contrary. She comes to exactly
LO	the contrary conclusion. And this is an
L1	opinion that Mr. Bridges praises.
L2	So, I find it rather remarkable
L3	that we could call it clear when a district
L4	judge who has heard these arguments comes to
L5	the conclusion that the legislative history is
L6	useful and reaches the exact opposite
L7	conclusion.
L8	
	But I want to look back just a
L9	But I want to look back just a week. The Supreme Court rendered a decision
L9 20	_
	week. The Supreme Court rendered a decision

1	case called Octane Fitness.
2	Justice Sotomayor wrote for a
3	unanimous Court, with the caveat that Justice
4	Scalia, and only Justice Scalia, did not join
5	footnotes 1 through 3. The Court ultimately
6	ruled that, quote, "Its analysis begins and
7	ends with the text of Section 285."
8	So, what did those footnotes
9	discuss? The statute's legislative history.
LO	Thus, even when the Supreme Court is assessing
L1	statutory text that appears clear on its face,
L2	eight of the nine Justices considered it
L3	appropriate and useful to review legislative
L 4	history.
L5	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you very
L6	much.
L7	Professor Ginsburg?
L8	PROFESSOR GINSBURG: I wanted to
L9	address the second point about whether a copy
20	has to be a physical object.
21	MS. CLAGGETT: Do we have any
22	other comments in terms of the legislative

1	history before we move on to that second point
2	about material objects?
3	(No response.)
4	Okay, Professor Ginsburg?
5	PROFESSOR GINSBURG: I think if
6	you look at 106(3) alone, one might draw that
7	conclusion. But, given the number of times
8	that the phrase "digital phonorecord delivery"
9	appears in the Copyright Act, a subsequent
10	amendment and a "digital phonorecord
11	delivery" is defined as a digital
12	transmission, and the phrase appears many
13	times in conjunction with the words "reproduce
14	and distribute" I think it is pretty clear
15	at this point that the thing that is
16	"distributed" can be a digital object that is
17	not in a freestanding physical medium.
18	MS. CLAGGETT: Great.
19	Mr. Borkowski?
20	MR. BORKOWSKI: Thank you.
21	Yes, I was actually going to make
22	that point and a couple of others.

If we are talking about not even
looking at legislative history, but just
talking about the explicit language of the
statute, there are a couple of parts of the
statute that are interesting. You know, you
look at the definition of "publication," which
says it is "the offering to distribute copies
or phonorecords." And then, it says
publication is "distribution of copies of
phonorecords."

And then, when you look at Section 115, which Professor Ginsburg just mentioned, it is explicit that a digital phonorecord delivery is each individual delivery of a phonorecord by digital transmission of a sound recording.

And then, later on, it talks about that, without authorization of the copyright owner, the owner -- let me just read the part of the language here -- "the owner of the copyright in the sound recording or the entity making the digital phonorecord delivery has

obtained a compulsory license under this section or has otherwise been authorized by the copyright owner of the musical work to distribute or authorize the distribution, by means of a digital phonorecord delivery, of each musical work embodied in the sound recording." That is explicitly plain language.

Clearly, this notion that a digital file, when it is sent from point A to point B, is not a distribution is just not supportable. And no court has ever recognized that. No court has ever said that.

To say that, when I buy something on iTunes and I buy the file, and it is sent to me over the internet into my hard drive on my computer, that that process is totally -- the Copyright Act does not apply to that process, it just makes no sense. It absolutely makes no sense.

And if you were talking about the plain language of the statute, I think Section

1	115 talking about digital phonorecord
2	delivery, you can't read that language out of
3	the statute.
4	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you very
5	much.
6	And I am sure Mr. Bridges will
7	have a response. But I think I know where he
8	is going to go with that and maybe reference
9	other aspects of exclusive right perhaps.
10	But I was going to follow up and
11	ask a question to the panelists in terms of
12	the case law on this issue, whether there was
13	any case law, in fact, suggesting that a
14	download was not a distribution. And maybe,
15	Mr. Bridges, you had said, "No, there isn't."
16	Mr. Bridges, do you have any
17	response to that?
18	MR. BRIDGES: A download is a
19	reproduction. Why we have to double-count,
20	triple-count acts under different distinct
21	rights in order to essentially I'm a trial
22	lawyer. The reason people want to allege

[violation of the] distribution right and not violation of the reproduction right is that they think that they can justify, to a jury, massive damages for distribution that sound egregious in the context of mere downloads, as in the case of Jammie Thomas-Rasset, where they wanted to go after her for distribution to justify a \$1.5 million jury verdict for 24 downloads.

That is part of the rationale
here. It is double-counting, to slip it into
a more inflammatory sounding violation.

Actually, 115 I believe does not refer to distribution, that digital phonorecord delivery is not delivery of copies; it is distribution of works. Now what distribution of works means, I'm not sure.

But I know that Section 106(3) is distribution of copies or phonorecords, which are material objects. And if somebody thinks that they are not material objects in Section 101, I would like to know what the legislative history is

1	for that to vary from that text.
2	Moreover, it is not just
3	distribution of copies or phonorecords. It is
4	"by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by
5	rental, lease, or lending." Now "transfer of
6	ownership" means, when Person B gets it from
7	Person A, Person A no longer has it. What do
8	you call it when Person A has it and shares it
9	with Person B? You call that a
LO	"reproduction."
L1	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you.
L2	I'm going to go with Professor
L3	Menell and, then, Professor Ginsburg and,
L 4	then, Mr. Borkowski.
L5	Although, I will say we don't want
L6	to spend too much time on this particular
L7	topic because I will say, quite frankly, we
L8	thought it was fairly well-settled, but it
L9	apparently is not quite as well-settled as we
20	thought.
21	But I will go over it first with
22	Mr. Menell.

PROFESSOR MENELL: Well, I think it is completely settled, at least as far as judicial opinions. There are no decisions that come to the conclusion that Mr. Bridges refers to.

And Judge Gertner's 2008 opinion, which he praises, is I think the clearest. In that case, the defendant's counsel, EFF [Electronic Frontier Foundation], made the very same argument that Mr. Bridges presents here. Rather than endorse that argument, Judge Gertner concludes unequivocally at page 173, quote, "An electronic file transfer is plainly within the sort of transaction that Section 106(3) was intended to reach," precisely because it does implicate, quote, "a material object" and because it focuses on the result of that transaction, which is that there is a transfer.

Now I would say that Mr. Bridges's point is certainly a plausible point. You can make that argument. My article goes through

1	how you sort of fit it in and I say there is
2	ambiguity here, and that is why I think the
3	legislative history is useful.
4	When you read Judge Gertner's
5	opinion, she completely agrees with that. I
6	mean, she goes through the legislative
7	history.
8	And I'll note, because Mr. Bridges
9	in his filing says that I don't address this,
LO	I want to point him and the Committee or
L1	the Copyright Office to
L2	(Laughter.)
L3	MS. CLAGGETT: It feels very
L4	formal in here today.
L5	PROFESSOR MENELL: Section
L6	8.11(d)(4)(a)(I) of Nimmer on Copyright, which
L7	I coauthored, and it so indicates, in which
L8	we, David Nimmer and I, discuss Judge
L9	Gertner's opinion at length and we make
20	exactly the point that is alleged that I don't
21	deal with. So, it is set forth there.
22	And I would just say that that

1	decision directly contradicts this point that
2	Mr. Bridges is making. And I am not going to
3	say that his point isn't a plausible point.
4	I am going to say that it has been raised, it
5	has been addressed, and in terms of where the
6	state of the law is, that Judge Gertner's
7	opinion is, I would say, the most thorough
8	analysis that we have in a reported decision.
9	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you very
10	much.
11	I think Professor Ginsburg was
12	next, then, Mr. Borkowski, and Mr. Bridges.
13	Did you want to go ahead? Yes.
14	Oh, okay, you agree with what
15	Professor Menell said.
16	Mr. Borkowski?
17	MR. BORKOWSKI: Yes, I just wanted
18	to address a point about the distribution
19	argument with Section 115 that Mr. Bridges
20	made a moment ago.
21	Section 115 is entitled
22	"Compulsory License for Making and

1	Distributing Phonorecords." It is a
2	limitation on the Section 106(3) distribution
3	right.
4	If a digital phonorecord delivery
5	were not a distribution, there would be no
6	need to limit that right through a compulsory
7	license. There would be no need for a
8	compulsory license because the right wouldn't
9	exist. The text of the statute I think is
10	plain.
11	And on this "or other transfer of
12	ownership" point that Mr. Bridges makes in his
13	filing also just now, the transfer of
14	ownership is the transfer of ownership of the
15	copy. It is quite simple, and that is what it
16	is.
17	MS. CLAGGETT: Mr. Bridges, do you
18	have any brief response to that?
19	MR. BRIDGES: Well, the point is,
20	it is for the making and distributing of
21	phonorecords, and the "making" seems evident.
22	Two questions: do we need multiple rights?

Should a download also be a performance?

Should a download also be a derivative work?

Should we multiply violations for single acts?

That is what is happening here.

Is a copy the "making" of a phonorecord? Is the transfer of a file that lands on a target storage medium, is that not a reproduction, so that we need to expand distribution to cover it? And then, to shoehorn it into this sale or transfer of ownership, it is not needed, other than to come up with inflammatory reasons for large jury verdicts.

And the last thing I will say is
Mr. Menell sort of keeps mentioning the
Gertner opinion. I think the Gertner opinion
is the best opinion out there. I don't think
that any case has gotten it right. I hope
that the right client will hire me to make the
point in the right case, and that a judge will
feel comfortable actually reaching what feels
like to a judge a more radical outcome. But

1	the more radical outcome absolutely comports
2	with the statute. And if somebody has
3	contrary evidence as to why 106(3) doesn't
4	mean what it says, then I would like to hear
5	that.
6	MS. CLAGGETT: And I think you
7	have gotten some responses here today.
8	Because I do have a couple of
9	other questions that further discuss the
10	issues with respect to making available more
11	broadly, I do want to get the last couple of
12	responses that we have, and then, move on with
13	another question.
14	But I think that we had Mr.
15	Borkowski, Mr. Schruers, and then, Professor
16	Ginsburg. And then, I will go on with the
17	next question.
18	MR. BORKOWSKI: Thank you.
19	Because he has said it twice now,
20	I can't leave this point un-responded to. But
21	this notion that having a digital distribution
22	right, which I think plainly exists, to argue

that that is just some kind of way to gin up statutory damages or large jury verdicts against infringers, it just shows -- everybody knows the industry and the defendants usually that Mr. Bridges represents, and he does a fabulous job doing that.

But it is those defendants who want to go out of their way to make it virtually impossible for copyright owners to protect their works. And if you do not have a digital distribution right, and if you don't have a making available right, then you have to track down every single download. Or if you have an investigator who is an anti-piracy investigator who shows that a download has happened from an infringing site, and maybe he or she downloads 15 works, while let's say 2,000 are being offered up, you know, please come here and take them for free, that is going to significantly negatively impact copyright owners in protecting their rights.

There is massive, massive

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infringement on the internet. And we need
more tools to combat it, not fewer tools.
MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you, and we
will get into some of the evidentiary
questions, I think, a little bit later.
I am going to go with Matt
Schruers, and then, Professor Ginsburg, and
then, John Beiter. Did I get that right?
Yes, okay.
MR. SCHRUERS: I don't want to
weigh-in on the debate about material copies
other than to say, to some extent, the very
informed exchanges here do somewhat conflate
two separate questions, right?
So, material copies is one aspect
of 106(3), and sale or other transfer of
ownership is another question. So, the sort
of analytical framework requires satisfying
these two elements.
A lot of interesting sort of
brain-twisting conversations about material
copies, and I think that is very interesting.

You need to satisfy that to get to a digital distribution right. You need to satisfy that and sale or other transfer of ownership -- and by satisfy, I mean sort of wish it away -- to get to making available.

So, even if we establish -- and there is probably good policy reasons for that -- that digital distribution is distribution under 106(3) because of material copies, and it involves digital copies, that doesn't get us to a making available right. That only gets us halfway, to digital distribution. Then, you also need to sort of jump that second chasm to get to digital attempted distribution.

MS. CLAGGETT: Right, and that is actually why I did want to not spend too much time on this early conversation, because there are two aspects of the discussion. Once you accept or not, or assume for purposes of our discussion, that digital distribution is covered under Section 106, then you do have to

1	get to the making available concept as well.
2	But I think Professor Ginsburg was
3	next.
4	PROFESSOR GINSBURG: Yes, I think
5	that that is absolutely right. I think that
6	one cannot say that Section 115 is only about
7	making copies because it says to make and
8	distribute to the public. And if you are not
9	going to distribute those copies, those
10	phonorecords, to the public, you don't get the
11	compulsory license.
12	But the point I wanted to make
13	addresses a different proposition which we may
14	develop further. Andrew Bridges says that a
15	digital distribution right is simply an
16	abusive add-on, and what is going on here is
17	reproduction.
18	Well, I think there are two
19	answers. One is we could have a real making
20	available right that stops slicing and dicing
21	everything, our current patchwork. I suspect
22	that there is not that much enthusiasm for a

real making available right, and that is another panel.

But I think that it would be very problematic to limit the digital communication of files to a reproduction right in light of Cablevision. Because under Cablevision, who knows what's going to happen by the end of June? But, in light of Cablevision, it is the user who is, quote, "making" the copy. So, the reproduction is not occurring at the level of the entity that is offering the possibility to make those copies.

A distribution right could actually fill the gap created by Cablevision, at least under the interpretation of Judge Gertner in the London-Sire case. She says that there is a transfer of ownership when the copy gets made in the recipient's file, but that happens because there is a distribution. So, the act of distribution, at least as viewed by Judge Gertner, would identify an infringement at the level of the economic

1	actor that is causing those copies to be made,
2	even if one were to follow Cablevision and say
3	that the reproduction is engaged in by the
4	end-user.
5	So, I think that the distribution
6	right, far from being an abusive add-on, might
7	be the only thing that saves us from non-
8	compliance with our international obligations.
9	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you very
10	much.
11	I am going to go to Mr. Beiter,
12	and then, Mr. Schruers.
13	But it looks like we do have now
14	two final, hopefully, flags on this particular
15	issue, because I do have a specific question
16	that I do want to get to in terms of the
17	aspect of making available.
18	But if you want to go on to have
19	some discussion in terms of the material
20	object point and digital distribution, we will
21	have final comments right now.
22	MR. BEITER: Well, I just want to

1	say I am not really here to focus on the
2	distribution right because I am here
3	representing a performing rights organization.
4	But, just observing the conversation, it does
5	seem to me that there is a certain amount of
6	agreement that the language concerning the
7	distribution right is unambiguous. It just
8	appears that there is not a lot of agreement
9	on what it means.
10	(Laughter.)
11	MS. CLAGGETT: People don't agree
12	about what it means. Thank you.
13	(Laughter.)
14	I think it was Professor Menell
15	next, and then, Mr. Schruers.
16	PROFESSOR MENELL: It is my
17	understanding that we are going to talk this
18	afternoon about policy issues. And a lot of
19	what Mr. Bridges has said on this issue, at
20	least in his most recent comments, I think go
21	directly to those questions.
22	This session I understand to be

1	about what the law is
2	MS. CLAGGETT: Right.
3	PROFESSOR MENELL: how it is
4	interpreted.
5	So, I want to quote a brief
6	passage from London-Sire. Judge Gertner says,
7	"Congress wrote Section 106(3) to reach the,"
8	quote, "'unauthorized public distribution of
9	copies or phonorecords that were lawfully
10	made, " citing the House report "unlawfully
11	made."
12	"That certainly includes
13	situations where, as here, an original copy is
14	read at point A and duplicated elsewhere at
15	point B." Footnote 28, "It is irrelevant that
16	such an action may also infringe the
17	reproduction right secured to the copyright
18	holder under Section 106(1). A single action
19	can infringe more than one right held under
20	Section 106."
21	So, the final sentence in this
22	paragraph is, "Since the focus of 106(3) is

1	the ability of the author to control the
2	market, it is concerned with the ability of a
3	transferor to create ownership in someone else
4	not the transferor's ability simultaneously
5	to retain his own ownership."
6	Now that was an interpretation. I
7	would acknowledge that we could have
8	interpreted it differently. But, if we are
9	trying to address, as this session is, what
10	courts have interpreted and how they have done
11	it, they have used legislative history and
12	they have come to this interpretation.
13	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you.
14	And I think we have Mr. Schruers.
15	Mr. Schruers?
16	MR. SCHRUERS: So, following on
17	Professor Ginsburg's comment earlier with
18	respect to Cablevision, I think that is only
19	correct if we assume that at no point do
20	secondary liability doctrines enter into the
21	conversation.
22	And I mention that, one, because I

fully expect that a lot of parties in future
Cablevision-like scenarios will freely resort
to secondary liability, and, also, because I
think that points out a very important aspect
of this conversation, which is that our broad
and often expanding secondary liability
doctrines here in the United States are part
of our international compliance -- I'm sorry
-- international treaty compliance.

And so, to the extent there are any gaps, I think one needs to acknowledge not only is there a gap with some agreed-upon international interpretation, but also that secondary liability does not apply in that gap.

And seeing the frequency with which secondary liability theories are alleged, I am not inclined to think there are many cases where plaintiffs wouldn't allege secondary liability.

MS. CLAGGETT: Yes, and I think we are going to have a few questions about the

secondary liability point and whether you should consider that as part of the kind of overall ability to satisfy the U.S. obligations under a making available right, the concept of a secondary liability.

I wanted to turn back to the text of the statute in terms of focusing on the actual issue of whether, putting aside again, assuming for the moment that a digital download is a distribution, whether the act of making that download available to the public is a violation of our current law, which, as we have pointed out before, we have an obligation to. And the Congress, as well as the Executive Branch, has concluded that, in fact, our law does cover making available.

But some of the comments mentioned the phrase that is in Title 17 "to authorize" the distribution as an important aspect of the discussion as to whether there is a making available right in the United States. And so, I wanted to just get some general thoughts as

1	to what is the role of the phrase "to
2	authorize" in the opening clause of Section
3	106. And is that important for the
4	interpretation of the scope of the
5	distribution right in the United States and
6	how it relates to making available?
7	Any takers on that?
8	Mr. Schruers?
9	MR. SCHRUERS: Since this is
10	relevant to my previous point, "authorized" is
11	frequently pointed to. Without taking this
12	position, litigants often point to
13	"authorized" as the statutory basis for
14	theories of secondary liability. And indeed,
15	commonwealth countries frequently use
16	"authorized" in their articulation of
17	secondary liability doctrines.
18	So, I think that is a perfectly
19	good segue to demonstrate that secondary
20	liability theories are going to be relevant
21	here in the context of our compliance.
22	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you.

1	Professor Ginsburg?
2	PROFESSOR GINSBURG: Whatever "to
3	authorize" may have thought to have been meant
4	when the 1976 Act was drafted, I am not sure
5	that it has been interpreted in a way that is
6	consistent with its interpretation in
7	commonwealth countries. It has been
8	interpreted as secondary liability.
9	And I think that it is quite
10	problematic to base our compliance with a
11	making available right on secondary liability
12	because it means that the end-user is the
13	first-line infringer. And I don't think that
14	we should base a copyright system on making
15	end-users the first-line infringer.
16	MS. CLAGGETT: Mr. Bridges? And
17	then, Professor Menell.
18	MR. BRIDGES: Right. I question
19	that question that she just made, making end-
20	users the primary target, the primary
21	infringer. That was the very issue in
22	Cablevision.

1 In Cablevision it was not a 2 question as to whether a reproduction had been made or not. 3 The question was, who made the reproduction? And the view was that 4 5 Cablevision did not make the reproduction. 6 It is what I call "thumb-based" 7 liability. You are liable for direct 8 infringement if your thumb on the remote control causes the copy to be made. 9 That is 10 the way the Second Circuit came out, and by 11 stipulation, the parties had taken fair use 12 and secondary liability off the table. So it should not be seen as a 13 14 question as to whether there is a reproduction 15 or not. Cablevision is about who made the 16 reproduction. 17 Now it may be unpalatable to sue 18 the individuals, and that takes us right back 19 to the question of respect for copyright law 20 because if individuals are going to be held 21 liable, they may not like the state of the

But the fact is the individuals ought to

law.

1 be the first line of attack in terms of 2 analyzing where the infringement occurs. Whether it is wise to sue 3 individuals or whether individuals have all 4 5 sorts of fair use reasons for what they are 6 doing is a separate matter. But saying "Oh, 7 we don't want to involve the public in this debate," I think, avoids the real issues going 8 on because ultimately it is a public interest 9 10 at stake. And the question is, are we just 11 making intermediaries and technology companies 12 the scapegoats for conduct that we really 13 don't want the public to do? 14 MS. CLAGGETT: And I think that we 15 can explore some of those broader policy 16 questions later in the afternoon in some of 17 our conversations about clarity and, then, the 18 possible benefits of clarity in our law. 19 I think we had Professor Menell 20 and, then, Professor Lunney. Lunney? Got it. 21 And then, Mr. Schruers. 2.2 PROFESSOR MENELL: So, the

detailed answer to your question is that, like
the term "distribute," there is legislative
history that tells us where the word
"authorize" came from.

But I would concur with Professor Ginsburg that this is not something that played much of a role in the development of the jurisprudence. And I think it is largely because, until around 1998-1999, until the internet really became the central focus, we were operating in a system in which the reproduction right did carry most of the power, that one could assert the reproduction right and win.

And so, once we got into a world where we had multiple layers of players, that is when this question of where is, as perhaps Judge Calabresi might say, you know, who is the least cost-avoider? How can plaintiffs who are trying to protect their rights use the full panoply of rights?

And I would agree that that is a

hard question. It has not been modernized.
And I hope we will get to those issues later
today.
But in terms of how "authorized"
developed, it kind of stagnated. We just
didn't see that term being invoked. If you go
outside of the United States, I think to
Australia and some other countries, you will
see that that term did take on a broader
meaning and might well provide something like
a making available right. But it is, at least
at this stage, a dormant issue.
MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you.
Mr. Lunney? And then, Mr.
Schruers.
PROFESSOR LUNNEY: I just wanted
to say that I agree with Professors Menell and
Ginsburg on this, since I so rarely get the
chance to say that.
(Laughter.)
MS. CLAGGETT: Wonderful. We have
one aspect of agreement on the panel today.

1	That's great.
2	Mr. Schruers?
3	MR. SCHRUERS: So, I want to
4	return to the question about end-users being
5	the first line of attack. It is certainly not
6	desirable for end-users to be the subject of
7	litigation if the file sharing carpet-bombing
8	that the recording industry did, you know,
9	back right after the
10	MS. CLAGGETT: But I think that
11	there is a suggestion that the law should
12	require that.
13	MR. SCHRUERS: So, that is where I
14	am going, right? I think making those parties
15	the litigants is not the same as making those
16	parties the infringers, right? And in the
17	same way that Sony v. Universal didn't drag
18	individual home-recorders into the court, I
19	think it is a foregone conclusion that the
20	industrial actors are going to be the
21	defendants most of the time because that is
22	where the money is.

And so, we don't need to sort of pretend those actors are the direct infringers, simply because those are the ones who it is most palatable to sue. I think we simply acknowledge that you are suing the party who is secondarily liable for infringement that an end-user is doing.

It is one thing to say that the end-user is the infringer and another thing to say that the end-user is the most desirable litigant. I don't think end-users are desirable litigants, for all the reasons that the Thomas-Rasset case tells us.

But that doesn't mean that we have to sort of disappear them from the whole process and, then, simply assume that the intermediary or the service provider or the device provider is not directly liable. They would be secondarily liable to the extent that the end-user is liable. And simply, we dispute the issue, acknowledging that that party is relevant to the conversation, but,

1	also, perhaps not the most desirable litigant.
2	So, it is very important to keep
3	clear in saying who is the direct infringer.
4	It is not the same question as who do we want
5	to drag into the courtroom.
6	MS. CLAGGETT: But, even for
7	purposes of secondary liability, you would
8	have to prove direct infringement. And so, I
9	think we are going to get into some questions
LO	with respect to how do you prove that in the
L1	context of someone who is, for example,
L2	uploading something on the internet. How can
L3	you actually do that under our current law and
L4	whether it is appropriately addressing that
L5	issue?
L6	I think we had Library of Congress
L7	next.
L8	MR. DeANNA: I have never been
L9	called the Library of Congress.
20	(Laughter.)
21	I just want to take this
22	opportunity to mention one of several of my

many unintended consequences remarks. We talked about unauthorized copies. I just want to go on record as reminding people that libraries and archives have really no resources to track the historical acquisition histories of materials, and that there are many, probably many, many unauthorized copies in the collections of libraries and archives, including the Library of Congress.

In my area, the Motion Picture
Broadcasting and Recorded Sound Division, some
of the most historically-significant,
important films, television broadcasts, sound
recordings, radio broadcasts have come from
private collectors and citizen donors to the
collection. And these are materials that I
can tell you most frequently the rightsholders, whether they are the creators, the
heirs, or the members of the industry, don't
hold physical copies of. So, our role to
acquire and preserve and sustain those stands
to benefit all of those people significantly,

1	and we are concerned about that.
2	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you.
3	I think we will have Mr. Bridges
4	and, then, Professor Lunney and, then,
5	Professor Ginsburg.
6	MR. BRIDGES: One detail on the
7	question of "to authorize," and I didn't
8	research this, thinking about it for today.
9	But I think there is at least one case where
LO	a plaintiff sued a defendant for licensing a
L1	work that the defendant did not have the
L2	rights to license. And I think it was a
L3	lawsuit under the "authorize" prong, and I
L 4	think that the court decided that the mere
L5	granting of a license did not violate the
L6	"authorize" prong, that the actual
L7	exploitation of a Section 106 right had to
L8	have occurred in order for the plaintiff to
L9	have a violation here.
20	So, I think using "to authorize"
21	as a wedge to try to get at offers or inchoate
22	action that doesn't actually result in an

1	actual exploitation of a Section 106 right
2	probably would not fly under current law.
3	Others may know contrary
4	decisions, but I do recall one decision to
5	this effect.
6	MS. CLAGGETT: And I think that is
7	mentioned in, I think, Tom Sydnor's comments,
8	I believe.
9	Professor Lunney? And then,
LO	Professor Ginsburg.
L1	PROFESSOR LUNNEY: I just want to
L2	respond briefly to Matthew's point about
L3	having the direct infringers, the consumers be
L 4	the direct infringers, just as a convenient
L5	backdrop. I think we got into a lot of
L6	trouble by using them that way. In Napster,
L7	the Ninth Circuit sort of causally brushes
L8	aside the direct infringement questions,
L9	causally brands everyone an infringer because
20	they are not before the court.
21	And then, when it gets turned
22	around in 2003 and they start suing individual

file sharers, I think it is a problem. I
would much rather have a system that is
rational with respect to the people who can
control the infringement than going after the
consumers just as a hook to get those parties
involved.

Now it may be some of the secondary liability standards with the sort of knowledge and other aspects of it that make it not so much a strict liability tort are better tailored to address the copyright infringement issues in this context. But I think it is extremely problematic to have those consumers on the hook as direct infringers as a necessary sort of predicate for the secondary liability standard.

MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you.

Professor Ginsburg?

PROFESSOR GINSBURG: I will return the favor and say that I also agree with the desirability of going after the economic actor and not the end-user, not only as a matter of

1 litigation, but even in terms of how we want
2 to conceptualize the system.

But this comment goes to, will basing enforcement on secondary liability actually work? And I think there is a significant problem with that because--again, assuming that the Cablevision model remains viable, so that the end-user makes the copy--let's suppose the storage locker is sitting on a server outside the United States, right? So, where is the copy made? Is it made in Vanuatu?

And at that point, there could be a violation of Vanuatuan copyright law, but under U.S. precedent, notably the Subafilms case, there is no secondary liability under the U.S. copyright law for enabling an infringement outside of the United States.

So, that would, then, get one into the question, first of all, is there a violation of the copyright law where the server is (perhaps opportunistically) located?

1 And that may certainly raise litigation costs 2 in trying to figure out what pleading and proving foreign law. 3 4 And then, there is the problem that in lots and lots of countries they don't 5 6 have secondary liability the way we do. 7 this could actually be a rather clever scheme 8 to insulate a digital-delivery business model. 9 MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you. 10 Mr. Bridges? 11 MR. BRIDGES: Thank you. 12 I wanted to go back to the issue of individuals versus the "economic actors." 13 14 I think that the recording industry made a 15 very, very fundamental mistake when it went 16 after Napster because there were people who 17 believed that it was okay to download things; 18 it was just not okay to be Napster. 19 By not bringing enforcement against individuals, the enforcement did not 20 21 bring home to the public that they have a 2.2 responsibility and they have obligations under 1 the law.

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And I remember, I think it was at a hearing in the Senate, I think Senator
Schumer, if I am correct, was saying that his daughter was downloading music from Napster
"while it was still legal," was his phrase.
He didn't stop to think that his daughter was doing anything wrong. He just thought that
Napster was okay until the court said it
wasn't okay, but that the only question was about Napster's conduct.

So, I do think that putting the public front and center in enforcement, I completely agree. I don't think that it is wise to go out and sue lots of members of the public.

But that brings me to my second point. A good reason to put the public front and center is it is sort of like how the society feels about wars maybe when there is a draft instead of a volunteer army. And when people think that their sons and daughters may

get sent off to war, they might feel a little
bit differently about going into war.

If the public thinks "we are going to get sued and we are going to be held liable for a \$1.5 million jury verdict for 24 downloads, what do we think about this system?" And I think actually keeping the focus on the public will help provoke the public debate that is so necessary in this arena.

MS. CLAGGETT: I see a lot of raised flags in response to that. So, I think we have a lot of discussion.

respond to this first, because I think some of this is putting perhaps some of the content owners in somewhat of a Catch-22, because, on the one hand, you say, well, we shouldn't have these \$1.5 million statutory damage awards against users, but, on the other hand, they should go after the users, but, on the other hand, it is not a wise thing for them to do.

1 So, Mr. Borkowski, do you have a 2 response to that? 3 MR. BORKOWSKI: I do. This is an 4 argument for essentially eliminating copyright 5 protection completely. Because what Mr. 6 Bridges is arguing is, you know, you don't 7 focus on the facilitators of the infringement. 8 What you do is you have to focus and make people take responsibility for their actions. 9 10 Nobody really believes that. 11 The whole notion is that, you 12 know, if you go after individuals, then, all 13 of a sudden, there is going to be this huge 14 groundswell of protest. And where this 15 argument goes is that, therefore, we are going 16 to water-down the Copyright Act even more to 17 prevent true enforcement of infringement. 18 You have to go after the 19 facilitators. The facilitators are the ones 20 that cause the problems, and the Napsters of 21 the world -- I litigated that case proudly on 2.2 behalf of the record industry.

1	The Napsters of the world are the
2	problem. They are the facilitators. And you
3	have to go after the facilitators. This is
4	why the Supreme Court unanimously in the
5	Grokster case pulled out this notion of
6	inducement, which may or may not be part of
7	contributory infringement. Who knows? I
8	always plead it as a third cause of action
9	separate from contributory infringement.
10	It is these actors who are
11	inducing others to infringe, and they are
12	responsible, they are clearly responsible.
13	You could say that the individual is
14	responsible, sure, okay, morally, let's say.
15	But that doesn't mean that the intermediary is
16	not also responsible.
17	And it is these doctrines of
18	secondary liability which are extremely
19	important and do allow us to go after those
20	who are really creating the problem of
21	copyright infringement on the internet.

MS. CLAGGETT:

Okay.

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Thank you

1 very much. 2 And I think we are going to Professor Menell, then Mr. Schruers, then back 3 to Mr. Bridges, although I will want to turn 4 5 it back again to the making available concept 6 because I think we are talking a lot about a 7 lot of very broad, general concepts in terms 8 of secondary liability, who should we sue, 9 users, or are statutory damages too high, and 10 I do want to make sure that we focus on the 11 issue of making available. And so, we are 12 going to have some specific questions in terms 13 of, under our law, what particular activity 14 does violate Title 17. 15 But, first, we will go to Professor Menell. 16 17 PROFESSOR MENELL: I do think that 18 we are again bleeding into what is the 19 alternate policy choices. You know, I am very anxious to talk about that, but I feel that 20 21 would be jumping the gun.

The one point that I will make

right now is that I am feeling deja vu. In

April 2002, I moderated a panel at the

Computers, Freedom, and Privacy -- underline

"privacy" -- Conference that took place in San

Francisco. And a senior attorney at EFF made

exactly the point that Andrew is making,

although he was perhaps even more aggressive

in saying that you are targeting the wrong

people.

And we have recently relived that because I relate that story in an article, and it was disputed whether or not it was said.

We got the transcript; it was said.

But I do think that we are in this sort of very delicate space where we can easily make arguments on either side of how we should go forward. And as my comments do discuss, we are, I think, largely talking about issues of remedy. I mean, remedy is what is driving so much of this, that if we had sensible remedies, I think the making available issue is -- I'll use a term of art

1 -- a no-brainer.

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I don't think we really want to get into debates over whether someone should be able to put a recently-released film into a folder that is available to the public at large.

And that relates to something that Professor Lunney also raises in his comments, and on which I would agree with him, that the porn troll litigation that is going on is, I think, very counterproductive to the entire copyright system.

One of the advantages of having a clear making available right is that we don't even get into the joinder question because it means that every member of the Bit Torrent swarm is him or herself liable under 106(3). And that would modestly improve what is, I think, a very pathological part of our copyright system right now.

I would hope that everyone on a panel like this would say that was not what

1 the founders or the drafters of the 1976 Act 2 or anyone thought the copyright system should be about, trying to use the threat of exposing 3 someone's private viewing habits as a basis 4 5 for extorting a large settlement. 6 And so, the making available right 7 actually does clarify and clean up that kind 8 of litigation. But I think we ought to step back and try to rationalize more than just 9 10 making available in order to get past this 11 roadblock. 12 MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you very 13 much. 14 I am going to go to Mr. Schruers, 15 and then Mr. Bridges. 16 But I am going to preview my next 17 question about the making available right, 18 which is to have some focus on the discussion 19 in terms of, okay, we are assuming for

purposes of our discussion that digital

right, but we want to now take it a step

download is a violation of the distribution

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further in terms of making available.

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And the question will be to the panel, first of all, just a very broad, how do we implement the making available right in the United States generally, to focus on? And then, I am going to have some specific questions in terms of particular activity.

But I will start now with Mr.

Schruers and Mr. Bridges to close off this aspect of the discussion that we have right now.

MR. SCHRUERS: So, going back to what Andrew said before and his sort of draft analogy, I do think there is something important to take away from the observation that it is easier to have an utterly-ridiculous copyright system so long as it stays before the radar, right? As long as nobody notices how ridiculous it is, we don't really have to worry about that, right? As lawyers, we can rationalize it; it is hard to rationalize things to the public. And so, if

1	you are sort of afraid to have airing the
2	litigation laundry, then maybe we need to
3	think about how well the system is
4	functioning.
5	But I also want to focus on the
6	targeting the right people. I think the word
7	"target" or "attack" or "go after," these are
8	all very ambiguous. The point is
9	MS. CLAGGETT: Sue maybe for
10	infringement?
11	MR. SCHRUERS: Right. So, I think
12	"sue" is really the best way, is the best verb
13	to use.
14	There are a lot of reasons we have
15	seen why plaintiffs want to sue the
16	intermediaries, the service providers, the
17	device manufacturers, whatever. That's fine.
18	You are the author of your complaint; you can
19	sue whom you see fit.
20	But my point is that, just because
21	it makes sense from a pecuniary standpoint and
22	from a litigation convenience standpoint to go

after the device manufacturer or the service provider, or so on, that doesn't mean that you can now pretend that that actor is the direct infringer. They may well, once a burden of proof has been met, be established to be a secondarily-liable actor, and many remedies still apply against that actor.

But, to the extent that is any
merit in the argument that we don't want to be
dragging end-users into the courtroom, it
doesn't mean you can wish the end-user away.

The end-user is a party to the transaction and
proof of direct infringement by the end-user
will be an element of the burden of proof
against the intermediary.

Because once we start using theories such as making available to transform those who were previously secondarily liable into direct infringers, you have very much upset existing balances in the statute. And now, you may well have transferred an entire third tier of tertiary-liable parties into

1	secondarily-liable parties. And I don't think
2	we have fully explored the consequences of
3	that.
4	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you.
5	Mr. Bridges, do you have a brief
6	comment?
7	MR. BRIDGES: Very brief. I am
8	pleased to be able to agree with Professor
9	Menell.
10	And this is a little bit on a
11	tangent, but I think it is important to say it
12	here. He said that the remedy issues are
13	really driving a lot of the discussion. Let
14	me be clear: I think statutory damages are
15	the single most distorting and corrupting
16	aspect of copyright law. That should be
17	amended today. And then, when that gets
18	fixed, I actually think then is the time to
19	see what other changes to make in copyright
20	law.
21	But the discussion is so
22	distorted. In the last decade, I have not

1	defended a single case where the damages
2	claimed were less than \$1 billion. And my
3	current case right now, over 30,000
4	photographs of a soft-core porn company, the
5	claim is \$4.5 billion.
6	The LimeWire case, Judge Wood
7	pointed out that the plaintiffs were seeking
8	trillions of dollars, "more money," my quoting
9	approvingly the defense brief, "than the
10	entire revenues of the recording industry
11	since Thomas Edison invented the phonograph."
12	When that gets fixed, a lot of the
13	other discussions here can be put into a
14	different light.
15	MS. CLAGGETT: And that is, I
16	think, some of the discussion we will discuss
17	a little bit later in terms of benefits of
18	clarity and how that might look. But we don't
19	want to have a specific discussion exclusively
20	about statutory damages.
21	So, I want to go back to the
22	question that I previewed in terms of going

1 back to making available -- how does the 2 United States implement the making available 3 right in its law? We talked a little bit 4 earlier about legislative history and the fact 5 that legislative history, or at least some of 6 the recent legislative history that was 7 uncovered suggests that Congress did, in fact, 8 intend to very clearly cover a making available right. 9 10 We talked about the fact that

We talked about the fact that publication was very broad under the 1909 Act, and distribution was simply seen in some people's views as synonymous with publication or to publish.

And then, we discussed briefly whether "to authorize" would be another hook to talk about the act of making available under United States law.

So, I wanted to broadly have the question about U.S. law, how do we implement the making available right? And then, I want to go through just a couple of brief examples

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1 of particular conduct. For example, the act 2 of a person simply putting a digital file in 3 their shared folder on their computer, is that 4 the act of making available, and does that 5 violate, in and of itself, U.S. law? 6 So, I will start with Professor 7 Ginsburg. 8 PROFESSOR GINSBURG: I think we might need to start by seeing if we all 9 understand what "making available" is in the 10 11 same way. Because, as I read the comments, I 12 think that there might not be full agreement. 13 MS. CLAGGETT: That is a very good 14 question, actually, because -- and we might

MS. CLAGGETT: That is a very good question, actually, because -- and we might discuss this more a little bit later on when we talk about how different countries have implemented it. But it seems like there was a large consensus that, yes, we do have a making available right, but, then, different people disagreed as to whether that right, for example, would cover the activity of just offering something for sale --

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1	PROFESSOR GINSBURG: Exactly.
2	MS. CLAGGETT: offering a
3	download.
4	PROFESSOR GINSBURG: So, I believe
5	that the making available right covers not
6	only the actual transmission or delivery, but
7	also the offering, whether it is offering a
8	download or offering a stream. The standard
9	in the WIPO Copyright Treaties is clear in
10	that respect, but I think we will probably
11	defer that issue to the last panel.
12	But if one starts from the
13	position that the making available right
14	includes not merely actual communications,
15	downloads or streams, but offers to download
16	or stream, then the next question is: Was
17	Congress right in saying that, under the so-
18	called umbrella solution, we actually had a
19	sufficient patchwork of rights?
20	And that, in turn, requires an
21	understanding of both the public performance
22	right as covering the offering or the proposal

1 to communicate a performance or a display of 2 the work, and also of the distribution right as covering the offer to distribute. 3 4 So, in that respect, I agree that 5 the steps there, the question is whether, as 6 a matter of positive law, we have filled in 7 I think that the cases on all those steps. 8 the digital distribution right are a little 9 all over the map. So, while the PTO Green 10 Paper says, somewhat hopefully perhaps, that 11 our positive law does recognize a digital 12 distribution right --13 MS. CLAGGETT: And we have said 14 that as well. 15 PROFESSOR GINSBURG: Right. 16 And the Copyright Office has also Excuse me. 17 I suppose there is some room for said that. 18 doubt, although I agree with Professor Menell 19 that the better interpretation would reach both the actual distribution of a file and the 20 21 offer to distribute a file. 22 I had thought that, at least on

1 the public performance right side, we were in 2 compliance. But, as a result of Cablevision 3 and Aereo, I am less confident of that 4 conclusion because of the nifty trick of 5 turning everything into a private performance 6 by virtue of an intermediate consumer-made 7 copy that is the source of the communication. 8 So, I suppose that it is possible 9 to interpret the extant copyright law in a way that would cover what I think is the full 10 11 scope of the making available right, but I 12 think that there are divergent 13 interpretations. And so, it would be 14 necessary to have a consistent interpretation. 15 On your question about putting a file in a shared folder, I think that if the 16 17 sharees are sufficiently numerous, they are a 18 substantial number of persons beyond a family 19 and its circle of social acquaintances, then 20 I think that that would be a making available 21 to the public.

MS. CLAGGETT:

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And just to follow

up really quickly before I turn it over to the others, you mention that, if interpreted correctly, our law, you know, our extant rights would cover making available. And could you just explain in terms of how the law would work in that regard if it is, in fact, interpreted in that way, and whether there are courts that have so found that with respect to the current state of our law.

PROFESSOR GINSBURG: So, I think that Judge Gertner's decision comes closest on the distribution right side, through the evidentiary device of presuming that an actual transmission or an actual distribution has taken place. But I don't think it should be necessary to do that.

The Elektra case, by going with the publication right -- and I defer to Peter on this -- maybe comes closest, although I suppose there is not complete agreement on publication.

And with respect to the public

performance right, I think that the language of the definition of public performance is actually quite close to the formulation of the making available right.

The principal problem I think is not necessarily doctrinal. I mean, I think that the bits and pieces are there, but it is, rather, one that a couple of people have alluded to, which is right now the way the business slices up the rights, it runs the risk of having to get multiple clearances, and that doesn't seem desirable. Now some of this may be slowly being worked out, but an advantage of a making available right is that it would sort of force a simplified clearance But, even if we remain with the process. current patchwork, I think it will be necessary to find ways to not make people pay more than once.

The last thing I would say in that respect concerning the patchwork and, also, who owns which rights, is that we have thought

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1	that we could tell the difference between a
2	download and a stream; we could tell the
3	difference between a reproduction
4	distribution, on the one hand, and a public
5	performance, on the other hand. That is the
6	"ringtones" case. But I think that the court
7	there was looking at two ends of the spectrum
8	when they invoked the metaphor of the record
9	store for a download and the radio for a
10	stream. That ignores that there may be a
11	whole lot of activity in between those
12	extremes whose characterization as a public
13	performance or as a distribution, as a digital
14	distribution of a copy or a phonorecord, may
15	not be so obvious. And that, again, raises
16	the question of, are we going to be making
17	people pay twice for what economically should
18	be a single operation?
19	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you very
20	much.
21	I am going to go with Professor
22	Menell, then Professor Lunney, then Mr.

1 Lunney. Why do I want to keep doing Bridges. 2 that? Professor Lunney, then Mr. Bridges, and 3 then Ms. Wolff. 4 So, Professor Menell? 5 PROFESSOR MENELL: The question 6 you ask is one that I think built into it is 7 how courts have gone about this process of adjudicating these different skirmishes. 8 And if you look across all of those, there are 9 10 these waves and patterns. 11 And I think that is why many of 12 the comments reflected a degree of, everyone 13 was clear, as my fellow panelist said, on the 14 statute being clear; it is just they disagreed 15 on what it meant. 16 (Laughter.) 17 And that is because district 18 judges are not experts in copyright law. They 19 rely almost entirely upon the briefs that lawyers file in the cases, that the clerks are 20 21 typically not trained at the sort of level of 2.2 research that would have to go into the

archeology of 1960s legislation. And so, what you get depends on whether that judge has a particular approach to reading a statute or the amount that is put into the briefs.

What shocked me, when I went back and when I started this research, I pulled the briefs in every single case that adjudicated the distribution right in a file sharing context, and none of them found any of these materials that I found. And it surprised me in part because I would have expected the record companies and some of the motion picture studios, who were paying very top law firms to find the answers to these questions, I would have expected them to do this.

And what I learned -- and this is,
I think, sort of true across a lot of area of
copyright -- is that people often stop at the
House report. And if the House report doesn't
-- and I am talking about the House report
that issued at the final legislative term
where the law issued -- if it doesn't have

1 much on it, you don't see that in the briefs. 2 Well, I believe that when courts start to look at this richer trove of 3 4 material, they will come to a coherent 5 analysis. I think Professor Ginsburg has 6 woven it together. I think Judge Gertner did 7 an amazing job, given that she didn't have all 8 of that information. The one case that did was the 9 10 Tenth Circuit Diversey case. That is the only 11 case that has confronted this issue at an 12 appellate level since at least my research was 13 available. 14 And I don't know that the court 15 fully read and agreed with everything. 16 cites that work. And in my work with David 17 Nimmer, I think we tried to come to a coherent 18 analysis that is faithful to what Congress was 19 trying to do and the passage of time and 20 development of technology. 21 Congress can put a finer point on 2.2 this right now. I mean, this is, I think,

1 worthwhile, given that we have a lot of money 2 being spent litigating cases. And I have no doubt that there will be further skirmishes. 3 4 So, the answer, I just don't put a 5 lot of faith in decisions, even Judge 6 Gertner's decision, just because she didn't 7 So, when you don't have have the evidence. good evidence, you don't often get the correct 8 9 answers. 10 I do believe that courts like this 11 evidence, not everyone. Justice Scalia, 12 probably being the extreme example, wouldn't 13 look at it. But most judges I think do care 14 about trying to be faithful to this 15 institution. 16 When I think about how Congress in the 1960s would look at this issue, I think 17 18 they would find this to be, as I said earlier, 19 a no-brainer, that making a file available to 20 the public at large -- so, let's just take one

term from the 1909 Act, "to vend" -- "to

vend," that was an expressed right.

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1	So, do you think that, if a
2	bookseller had unauthorized, illegal copies of
3	a book in the window with a price tag on it,
4	that an investigator would have to photograph
5	someone actually purchasing the book or they
6	would have to go and get evidence of someone
7	who bought a book? No. I think that you
8	would bring a lawsuit. You would say,
9	"They're vending it," just as today I think we
LO	could talk about putting it in a file-share
L1	folder is making it available to the public,
L2	which is the concept of publication.
L3	Publication doesn't require a reception.
L 4	And so, we are just trying to kind
L5	of come to common-sense approaches. What
L6	makes it not common sense is what Andrew and
L7	I do agree on, which is that I think the
L8	remedies are also out of step, but we can talk
L9	about that later.
20	MS. CLAGGETT: Yes. Thank you
21	very much.
22	I am going to go to Professor

1	Lunney.
2	PROFESSOR LUNNEY: Thank you.
3	So, I wanted to start where Jane
4	started, and that is we really don't know what
5	the treaties require, right? So, we have
6	language from the treaties, but we have no
7	authoritative source interpreting it.
8	And so, when she made certain
9	statements in her comments about this is what
LO	the right means, I was curious to know what
L1	she would cite. And, of course, she goes to
L2	the Court of Justice for the European Union
L3	and some other states that have implemented,
L 4	but they are not binding; their
L5	interpretations are not binding on us. And
L6	certainly, in those states where it has been
L7	adopted, it has been inconsistently applied.
L8	There's at least some decisions
L9	that she has acknowledged that come out the
20	same way as Cablevision, other than making
21	available language.
22	So, when I look at our law, and

particularly the P2P file sharing context or file sharing more generally today, the difference in litigation between having to prove a download and not having to prove a download is relatively small. If you see a file listed in a share folder, how do you know it is really that file? Not everything on the internet is what it says it is; that may surprise you. But you actually have to download it, and then, when the investigator has downloaded it, that often, at least in the courts' opinions -- the litigators have argued this, but the courts have come out and said that is enough to show the download.

sort of minor technical difference in the evidentiary requirement seems to me is not going to put us out of step. Whether we require proof of download or don't as part of the prima facie case, it is still going to be an element you are going to have to show to prove that it was, in fact, the work that you

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1 are claiming it was that was made available. 2 So, it seems impossible to me that that would put us out of step with our treaty 3 4 obligations. And so, that is where I want to 5 start. 6 MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you very 7 much. 8 I am going to go to Mr. Bridges 9 now. 10 MR. BRIDGES: Thank you. 11 I want to criticize a casual, 12 shorthand, paraphrased approach to copyright 13 law. Our Copyright Act is like the Internal 14 Revenue Code, and you could say we are going 15 to tax acquisitions at such-and-such a rate, 16 and you could have this general concept of 17 acquisition or you can distinguish between a 18 sale of assets and reverse triangular merger, 19 and all sorts of gymnastics that corporate 20 lawyers do so well to guide themselves through 21 the tax code to minimize taxes. 22 There is no distribution right in

1	American law. There is a distribution right
2	of distributing "copies or phonorecords to the
3	public by sale or other transfer of ownership.
4	" That is the right. It is the right to
5	distribute certain things in certain types of
6	transactions.
7	Now that we have been talking
8	about the making available right the making
9	available right we have heard referred to a
10	number of times I disagree with Professor
11	Lunney and Professor Ginsburg about whether it
12	is clear as to what the making available right
13	is. Let me read to you from the WIPO
14	Copyright Treaty, Article 6.
15	It's "the making available to the
16	public of the original or copies of works
17	through sale or other transfer of ownership."
18	That is not just "making available"
19	disembodied from these particular aspects.
20	And the Agreed Statement to
21	Article 6 of that provision of the,
22	quote/unquote, "making available right"

1 explains that the term "copies" that are 2 subject to that making available right refers "exclusively to fixed copies that can be put 3 into circulation as tangible objects." 4 5 So now, there is another form of 6 making available that comes in under the right 7 of communication, and that is different. 8 corresponds to our performance and display 9 rights. But when we talk about the making 10 available right, let's use the very, very 11 terms that the treaty has, if we mean to be 12 referring to the right that the treaty 13 describes. 14 MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you very 15 And I will just point out that we 16 referenced, for example -- and Professor 17 Ginsburg might have some response on this as 18 well -- WCT Article 8, because we were 19 actually talking about the on-demand, 20 interactive context and the digital context. 21 MR. BRIDGES: Right, and I am 2.2 dividing up the distribution and performance

1 prongs. Distribution corresponds to Article 2 6, and performance corresponds to Article 8. So, we are coming back to the 106(3). 3 4 Article 6. 5 MS. CLAGGETT: Okay. I want to 6 turn to Ms. Wolff next. 7 MS. WOLFF: Sort of a segue, because the aspect I was interested in is the 8 communication right, in particular, the right 9 10 of display. Because I think if you are 11 looking at that right, and if you look at the 12 106 rights, that we do have the right to 13 publicly display works. 14 But I think the courts have 15 misinterpreted, and they have done what Andrew 16 Bridges has said; you know, we should be 17 separating now distribution from display. The 18 courts, unfortunately, have tied reproduction 19 to display, and I think they have 20 misinterpreted the display rights, such that 21 visual artists really don't have a making 22 available right with works once they are

1 online.

And I think it started with the Perfect 10 v. Amazon case, where they limited the process in which you communicate a visual work to one in which it is served on that particular server. So, I think the server test, unfortunately, couples the reproduction right with the display right. And I think that too narrowly interprets the right of display, which deals with the right to transmit or otherwise communicate the display of the work to the public by means of any device or process.

So, what happens is, if you use clever technology devices, you can essentially cut and paste an image and do inline linking or framing. So that the end-user, the one who is viewing the communication just sees now even a large high-res image which doesn't even now relate back to the original site where it came from.

So, by not having it on the

1	server, there is no actual copying. So, you
2	never have any direct infringement. And
3	unfortunately, it creates the actors who are
4	making available images, and in many cases now
5	not even the thumbnails that were in the
6	Perfect 10 case, but high-res, large images to
7	the public. And it is causing very decreased
8	traffic to the site which has legally
9	authorized the display of the image and has a
10	very high increase in piracy, when it is very
11	easy just to right-click a high-res image.
12	So, that is where I think that the
13	courts have really taken some missteps in
14	looking at the display right and requiring
15	that there has to be a copy on a server of the
16	direct infringer.
17	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you very
18	much.
19	And I was just going to say that
20	we have about 10-15 minutes left. We did want
21	to get an opportunity to see if there were any

audience questions or comments, rather.

22

So,

I am going to really just end with the last number of flags that we have up, and then, we will turn it to the audience in case anybody from the audience has some remarks that they would like to make in response to any of the questions we raised in the first panel.

I am going to go to Mr. Borkowski first.

MR. BORKOWSKI: Thanks. I will try to be brief. Just a couple of points I wanted to make.

Since we are talking about the language of whether it is the treaties or whether it is the Copyright Act, putting aside the legislative history, Section 506(a)(1)(c) of the Copyright Act imposes criminal penalties for the distribution of a work being prepared for commercial distribution by making it available on a computer network accessible to members of the public. That could not be clearer. The Copyright Act already recognizes making available explicitly.

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1	And also, if you look at the
2	definition and I said this at the very
3	beginning of this panel the definition of
4	publication, or Section 101 of the Copyright
5	Act, publication is "the offering to
6	distribute copies or phonorecords." And then,
7	publication is further defined as "the
8	distribution of copies or phonorecords." So,
9	the offering to distribute is already
10	recognized by the Copyright Act.
11	I think it is clear that, if an
12	online user puts something in his or her share
13	folder, that volitional act is enough to be
14	making available, whether she deliberately
15	enables it or does not change the default that
16	is usually to share, which is usually what the
17	intermediary, secondary infringers try to get
18	people to do.
19	I am just going to wait. This
20	isn't directly relevant. I will be one
21	minute.
22	I have to say that I do disagree

1	with Mr. Bridges and even Professor Menell.
2	Statutory damages are one of the most
3	important tools that copyright owners have.
4	They have a deterrent effect, and they are
5	critical to enable us to fight large-scale
6	online piracy.
7	The Rasset-Thomas case is always
8	used as this example of, oh my God, look what
9	happened. Well, three separate juries of her
LO	peers found her liable for lots and lots of
L1	money.
L2	Talk about individual
L3	responsibility. A jury of peers, three
L4	separate times. I just want to make that
L5	crystal clear.
L6	And by the way, the amount that
L7	was awarded per infringement was substantially
L8	less than \$150,000. I am not aware of any
L9	large-scale infringement case in which any
20	jury has come close to awarding the maximum.
21	So, whatever is pled in complaints
22	by plaintiffs' lawyers, you know, billions of

1	dollars, Dr. Evil, whatever, it is not
2	realistic. The awards are never nearly close
3	to maximum.
4	MS. CLAGGETT: Thanks.
5	MR. BORKOWSKI: All right.
6	MS. CLAGGETT: I am going to go to
7	Mr. Schruers, Mr. DeAnna, Professor Ginsburg,
8	and then, end with Mr. Beiter.
9	Thank you.
10	MR. SCHRUERS: So, regarding the
11	language in Section 506 that Mr. Borkowski
12	quoted, I think that is actually a limitation
13	on the language, right? It is one particular
14	modality by which it might be distributed.
15	That doesn't mean that that modality satisfies
16	the distribution.
17	So, you know, if it had said
18	distributing it by throwing it out of an
19	airplane, that wouldn't mean that every time
20	somebody threw something out of an airplane
21	that violated the distribution right. I mean,
22	you still have to satisfy all the other

1	elements.
2	In fact, I think that is
3	dispositive in the other direction. It shows
4	that when Congress wants to say making
5	available, they say making available.
6	If you look in Chapter 9 regarding
7	semiconductors, when referring to
8	"distribute," we do define "distribute" there
9	to include distribution or offers to
10	distribute. So, the language is pretty clear
11	when it needs to be.
12	Ultimately, I think what some of
13	the previous commenters indicated, this is
14	just about litigation burden and the
15	allegation that it might be harder to prove
16	actual distribution than it is to prove making
17	available.
18	And yet, some of the end-user
19	cases that we are looking at, making available
20	is viewed in some of these cases as sufficient
21	evidence to satisfy a civil liability burden

that distribution actually happened.

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So, ultimately, the use of all of this legislative history, which we don't actually know the parties didn't find -- all we know is that they didn't find it or they didn't see fit to cite it, right? -- to come to an outcome that is supposed to make an alleged evidentiary burden more convenient I don't think is very persuasive.

If we are going to go pointing to places where the evidentiary burden is outside some acceptable standard deviation, you know, you can just as easily make the same case about statutory damages. In statutory damages, the evidentiary burden is very easy. One is required to make no evidence of injury.

So, given that that hasn't been sufficient, hasn't provided sufficient motivation to change statutory damages, I don't see why an allegedly elevated burden on the allegation in the cause of action with respect to just actual distribution is that onerous or at least so onerous as to require

1 a change.

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MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you very much. And I think we will get a chance to explore those in a little bit more detail in the next panel, which addresses some of these same issues, because we didn't get a chance to explore those issues fully in this panel.

I am going to go next to Mr.

DeAnna.

MR. DeANNA: Thanks.

I just want to quickly note that in the case of Diversey a library was found to have infringed by simply cataloguing this item that was in their collections. And if that, in fact, is something that is going to hold or continue, the impact on what we do, that is, preserve, preserve things for the future, sustain them while they are in copyright and beyond their copyright protections, is very much at risk. Because the cataloguing process, the documenting of these items in a catalogue system is an absolutely essential

1 step prior to digitizing these in libraries 2 and archives for preservation. You take that out and you have chilled the whole act of 3 4 preservation, and you have a collection of 5 analog materials deteriorating. 6 And I will say that a lot of these 7 issues will continue into the digital realm as 8 materials are produced and distributed -- I shouldn't even say that -- digitally, that 9 libraries and archives will continue to have 10 11 these collections there that are no longer 12 marketplace items that they need to sustain. 13 And so, being able to catalogue them and have 14 metadata on them is an essential aspect of 15 what we do. 16 Thank you. 17 MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you very 18 much. 19 I'll go to Professor Ginsburg next, and then, Mr. Beiter. And then, we will 20

end with Mr. Menell, actually, because he did

have his -- and then, if there are no audience

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1	participants, I will go to Professor Lunney.
2	PROFESSOR GINSBURG: Yes, I think
3	Nancy made an important point about another
4	gap in the positive law, that it is not clear
5	that the display right, which is part of the
6	making available right, is fully covered by
7	virtue of decisions like Perfect 10.
8	And this gets into a topic which
9	perhaps you had intended to raise as a
10	concrete example and was addressed by a number
11	of the comments, which is, is linking a making
12	available? In the international panel we can
13	talk about ECJ's [European Court of Justice]
14	recent decision.
15	I want to refer particularly to
16	the comments of the Digital Public Library of
17	America because it is absolutely true that
18	linking is a very important function, in the
19	library context, very important public
20	benefits.
21	Does it follow that if linking
22	were to be considered a form of making

available, that would be the end of libraries,
and so forth? And I think not because we have
Section 512(d). I don't think any of the
comments referred to Section 512(d), which
states that "A service provider," which that
term has been interpreted so extremely broadly
in the case law, that I think it would pretty
clearly cover a library. "A service provider
shall not be liable for monetary relief, or,
except as provided for, injunctive or other
equitable relief, for infringement of
copyright" so distribution right; display
right, excuse me "by reason of the provider
referring or linking users to an online
location containing infringing material or
infringing activity, by using information
location tools, including hypertext link, if
the service provider" then complies with the
notice and takedown provisions.
So, I think that if one were to
say that at least certain kinds of linking,
such as the framing that occurred in the

Perfect 10 case, was a form of making
available, that is I think not necessarily a
problem because that is what Section 512(d) is
for.
MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you very
much.
I am going to actually have to
close it with Mr. Beiter, so that everybody I
saw earlier and then, I am going to open it
up to the audience for a few minutes, if they
have any final responses to some of our
questions. If you do, please line up now at
the podium, and then, we will have about five
minutes of audience remarks. And if we have
any time, which I doubt we will do, we will go
back to any participants that I wasn't able to
call on. And obviously, in the next panel we
will be able to continue our exploration of
this issue.
Mr. Beiter?
MR. BEITER: Well, speaking now
specifically about the public performance

right, I think we are in agreement that
Congress did express the idea that it believed
that the rights then extant in the copyright
statute were sufficiently broad to encompass
the making available right. Unfortunately
from the public performance standpoint, the
courts have since interpreted that right more
narrowly. Generally, it involves decisions
that are not technologically neutral, going
back to the ASCAP AOL decision in the rate
court, where there was a bright line set
between downloads which are distributions and
streaming which is public performance.
Although that may stand as precedent, as my
son informs me, the technology has overtaken
that decision, and that there is
contemporaneous ability to listen as you
download, as we all know now.
And then, the more recent
Cablevision and Aereo cases, again, not
technologically neutral, which I believe is a
hallmark of the WIPO Treaties when it comes to

making available right, the focus again being on the technology by which the end-user avails him or herself of the work, and determining that one transmission, each transmission being private, even though there would be maybe multiple transmissions, an entire business model, built upon multiple transmissions.

So, from SESAC's perspective, the public performance right has been narrowed, and the question of whether it still encompasses its share of the making available right under the treaties is in question.

One other thing I wanted to say,
the terminology in the panel and the papers
today, there has been reference to end-users
and I think, alternatively, to consumers. You
know, words are important, and I think
definitions are important. And I think my
sense, as a non-legalistic sense, a consumer
is somebody, in my mind, who pays for
something, pays for the end-product, pays for
the service.

1	And although these end-users, not
2	all of these end-users may be consumers, and
3	I think there is a certain patina of
4	legitimacy and benevolence in being a
5	consumer, and I don't think that that is
6	necessarily to be applied to all end-users.
7	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you very
8	much.
9	And I want to thank all of the
LO	participants.
L1	We actually are a little bit over
L2	time as well. So, I don't think we have any
L3	time to go back to any of the participants,
L4	but we will have an audience session at the
L5	end of the day in which we can explore these
L6	issues further.
L7	Do we have anybody from the
L8	audience who wants to make remarks in response
L9	to anything that was raised?
20	(No response.)
21	All right. We will have a very,
22	very short 15-minute break and come back at 11

1	o'clock with our next session.
2	Thank you very much.
3	(Whereupon, the foregoing matter
4	went off the record at 10:48 a.m. and went
5	back on the record at 11:02 a.m.)
6	MS. STRONG: Thank you, everybody,
7	for joining us for panel two of today's
8	hearing.
9	As you heard in the first panel,
10	the discussion is about the existing rights
11	under Title 17, and this is part two of that
12	same panel, the same objectives.
13	What I would like to do right now
14	for the record is if we can just go around the
15	dais and the platform, and if you would just
16	introduce your name and your affiliation?
17	Thank you.
18	MR. BAND: I'm Jonathan Band for
19	the Library Copyright Alliance.
20	MR. DiMONA: I'm Joe DiMona, Vice
21	President of Legal Affairs with BMI, the music
22	licensing company.

1	MR. HALPERT: I'm Jim Halpert.
2	I'm General Counsel to the Internet Commerce
3	Coalition.
4	MR. HUSICK: I'm Lawrence Husick.
5	I'm a member of the Delaware County,
6	Pennsylvania IP Roundtable, here speaking
7	solely on my own behalf.
8	MR. KNIFE: I'm Lee Knife. I am
9	the Executive Director of the Digital Media
10	Association.
11	MR. KUPFERSCHMID: Keith
12	Kupferschmid, General Counsel and Senior Vice
13	President for Intellectual Property, for the
14	Software and Information Industry Association.
15	MS. LYONS: Patrice Lyons, General
16	Counsel, Corporation for National Research
17	Initiatives.
18	MS. MOY: Laura Moy, Staff
19	Attorney at Public Knowledge.
20	MR. ROSENTHAL: Jay Rosenthal,
21	Senior Vice President and General Counsel at
22	the National Music Publishers' Association.

1	MR. SHEFFNER: Ben Sheffner, Vice
2	President, Legal Affairs, the Motion Picture
3	Association of America.
4	MR. TEPP: Steve Tepp, on behalf
5	of the Global IP Center at the U.S. Chamber of
6	Commerce.
7	MS. STRONG: Thank you all very
8	much.
9	We look forward to this panel,
LO	which will cover much of the similar issues,
L1	at least in terms of questions, that you heard
L2	on the first session. However, of course, we
L3	have a different panel; we have different
L 4	roles of expertise. So, we look forward to an
L5	engaging question and discussion.
L6	But I would like to start off this
L7	panel with the same question that we presented
L8	in Panel 1, which is exploring the role of the
L9	legislative history. What should that role
20	be, especially as we have seen and have heard
21	from the prior panel about the courts'
22	difficulty in either accessing or

1 understanding some of the legislative history 2 involving the 1976 Act as amended. So, with that, I open the floor 3 4 for, what should the role of legislative 5 history be? 6 Mr. Band? 7 So, just to kick things MR. BAND: off, my father is a professor of comparative 8 9 literature. And so, I grew up in a household 10 where no text was clear; everything had levels 11 of meaning. And so, I think, as a practical 12 matter, the plain language means what it says 13 when you agree with what you think it says, 14 and, otherwise, you would want to always look 15 at the legislative history. 16 So, I think, as a practical 17 matter, you are always going to look at 18 whatever sources of information that are there 19 to help you interpret what you are looking at. 20 And then, as a litigator, you will either use

helpful you will say is not authoritative or

what is helpful and whatever that is not

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1	is somehow not worthy of being looked at.
2	MS. STRONG: Thank you.
3	Mr. Kupferschmid?
4	MR. KUPFERSCHMID: Thank you.
5	I'm far from an expert on
6	legislative history, and I sort of defer in
7	that regard to the folks on the first panel.
8	But some of the statements said
9	there, for instance, that terms we are talking
10	about here were created, were drafted at a
11	time where we didn't really envision the
12	digital landscape, the environment that we are
13	in today.
14	And so, I think by the very nature
15	you see us trying to apply terms that were
16	created in the analog world to a digital
17	world. And by their very nature, there is
18	going to be some ambiguity. How do you apply
19	those? What do those mean in this context?
20	And because of that, I think
21	legislative history plays a big role to find
22	out what the intent behind those terms is.

1 So, where somebody says, "Well, you know, this 2 term is clear on its face," well, it might have been clear on its face back in the analog 3 4 world, but I don't think you can say that 5 anymore, given how much has changed between 6 now and the 1976 Act. 7 MS. STRONG: Ms. Lyons? Well, having 8 MS. LYONS: Yes. 9 been around at the 1976 Act, I notice that 10 some terminology goes well before. They talk 11 about publication under 1909, which was 12 clearly the dividing line between whether you 13 made copies available, and that was physical, 14 because they distinguished that from 15 broadcasting. 16 Now, with the 1976 Act, we did, 17 with all due respect, get into digital because 18 we had actually had many experiments going on. 19

with all due respect, get into digital because we had actually had many experiments going on. We had the whole holding up of some of them at the last minute, some of the considerations.

And then, we had the special consideration afterwards for what it meant to be a computer

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1	program.
2	So, I would say that in the
3	computer program/computer database, it was
4	clearly coming up in the last days of the 1976
5	Act. And then, it was spot-on for the
6	discussions just following.
7	MS. STRONG: Thank you.
8	Mr. Tepp?
9	MR. TEPP: Thanks.
LO	We heard some claims in the prior
L1	panel that the statute is utterly clear and
L2	requires no reference to the legislative
L3	history. And the interpretation that was
L 4	offered, curiously enough, is contrary to the
L5	interpretation that for the past 15-plus years
L6	has been taken by the Copyright Office, the
L7	successive Administrations, and Congresses,
L8	through control of different political
L9	parties.
20	So, it seems that there is,
21	indeed, some difference of opinion. There is
22	certainly a legislative and statutory basis to

conclude that the distribution right, which is

I think the central issue here, does cover or
is implicated by acts of making available.

That could be through the term "to authorize,"
qualifying the 106 text, as well as through
the definition of "publication."

But the fact that the United States Government, writ all, has accepted both in terms of its implementation of the WIPO Internet Treaties as well as successive free trade agreements, that that is what U.S. law covers, and we did not yet get into the Charming Betsy Doctrine, which, of course, instructs where there is some question of statutory interpretation of domestic law, the interpretation that keeps the United States in compliance with its international obligations is the strongly preferred interpretation. that is a quite venerable doctrine, dating back nearly to the founding of the Republic. All those mitigate at the very

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1 probably much further, to conclude that U.S. 2 law does, in fact, at this time, and has all along, included a making available right as an 3 4 element of the distribution right. 5 Thank you. 6 MS. STRONG: Mr. DiMona? 7 MR. DiMONA: Thanks, Maria. I would like to bring this around 8 to the public performing right. I know a lot 9 10 has been talked about the distribution right 11 this morning already, but BMI represents the 12 performance rights in music. 13 I think the legislative history is 14 very important and helpful and instructive in 15 the public performing right. I think we have 16 a number of things that happily come together. 17 We have a very, very broadly-18 worded public performing right. We have 19 legislative history that supports that broad 20 ruling and amplifies on it greatly. And we 21 have a very broadly-worded international 2.2 treaty that also agrees.

The problem is a couple of the
courts have come out with decisions that don't
agree with any of those things, and those
decisions arise primarily in some commercial
context, which I hope we will have the
opportunity to talk about a little bit later
in the course of this panel.

But I think the legislative
history is helpful. I also want to bring out
the fact that some of these commercial
contexts, where we think the performing right
has been unduly curtailed, have their root in
people complaining that, "Well, there
shouldn't be two fees for one act," or, "There
shouldn't be a multiplicity of rights."

I think fundamental to the 1976

Act was the idea that, yes, there are multiple copyright rights. They can be separately alienated. They can be bundled in different fashions. And so, that is an important part of this where Congress said, yes, there can be multiple rights. And there's plenty of

1	instances in commercial reality where more
2	than one right is paid for one seeming
3	activity or bundle of activities. And
4	hopefully, we will get into that.
5	But the short answer is, yes, the
6	legislative history is quite important.
7	MS. STRONG: Thank you.
8	Continuing on, I guess, to follow
9	on again some of the earlier discussions,
LO	could we have your views on that relationship
L1	between publication and distribution in our
L2	law and as the terms are used? I think we
L3	heard some discussion on that this morning.
L 4	To the extent a lot of the players here on
L5	this particular dais also represent
L6	corporations, not just the academic community,
L7	I would like to particularly know if you have
L8	any legal views that have affected your
L9	ability to generate new business models.
20	Ms. Lyons?
21	MS. LYONS: Yes, and I am going to
22	come back on this periodically because I have

been working with the internet community now
for almost 30 years or so and watched the
evolution of the technology and the difficulty
between the copyright law and the patent law.

And some of the concepts -- for example, you have a software program that performs a method, all right? And some of them argue -- I remember I was on this one -- you were talking about, and I will try to keep focused on your question, publication versus distribution. If you are looking at what it means to publish in that environment, it is a process. So, it is not like you have something that you, then, put from here to there. It is a process. It is a software process.

So, if you look at some of the discussion this morning -- and I will stop here -- it is that you have to look at what you are talking about. There seemed to be a notion that you downloaded, say, a file.

Well, a file is just a logical way of linking

through a concept or a tag, which just happens to be called a folder or file. But you are not really talking about running the file.

You perform or run the program in which works may be embodied.

Just to give you a brief comment,

I was on this copyright subcommittee for one
of the bar associations that are
participating. And there is a big copyright
case out in California between two major
corporations, and they chose to leave all the
patent claims out. Well, you know, if you
went to back and, then, you tried to compare
the two, it might have really helped.

But, okay, we looked at the copyright. And I had a so-called Subcommittee on Copyright. It got down into somebody saying on the phone call, "Well, a book is a copyright work." And I said, "Well, how many copyright lawyers are on the call?" It was like a dozen folks. They were all patent lawyers. Okay?

And so, I said, all right, let's
look at the copyright statute. You have
literary works and, then, you have the
expression of that work, and you have it
structured. And in the old days, the old days
of print on paper, that used to be English
fixed on paper and print. But, if you get rid
of that and you have the value, and you are
managing that value, and you are representing
it in some digital form of expression, then I
said, let's start the dialog. "No, no, no, a
book is a copyright work." I chose to
disagree.
MR. AMER: Just to follow up a
little bit on this question about the
relationship between publication and
distribution, do any of you see any

little bit on this question about the
relationship between publication and
distribution, do any of you see any
significance to the language in 101, the
definition of "publication," which says that
"the offering to distribute copies or
phonorecords" constitutes publication. Does
that suggest that Congress intended the two to

have different meanings?

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I guess Mr. Band.

MR. BAND: Well, I guess the main focus of our concern, which is my client's concern, in this whole area has to do with some of the cases that were mentioned in the previous panel, the Hotaling decision and the Diversey decision, and whether simply having a book on the shelf constitutes a distribution and, therefore, can contribute to liability, and that really becomes a problem as a practical matter.

And where you see those cases, the reason those cases came up was really because of a statute of limitations problem. I mean, there had been probably an infringing reproduction, but that may have happened many years ago. And so, there was an effort to say, well, okay, we want to hold someone liable. How are we going to hold them liable? And they sort of jerry-rigged this notion that somehow, by having a book on the shelf, that

is sort of like this ongoing distribution that, then, contributes to liability.

And so, getting back to your question, I mean, I think the concern here is that you have certain -- you know, there is a structure of rights and, then, there is also a notion of limitations, where it is exceptions or in this case the statute of limitations, to confine the scope of those rights and the ability to bring actions against it.

And so, so much of what is going on here is trying to find a way around what is really going on. So, it is either to find a way to assess liability after the statute of limitations or to find liability when it is hard to prove the infringement and you are trying to lessen the evidentiary burden.

And so, I think we need to really say, what's going on here and what are we really trying to do? So, in terms of saying, what did Congress intend, well, Congress

didn't intend anything. We all know that. It is sort of what comes out of -- I think we can say that in this room here, too.

(Laughter.)

I mean, it is sort of like what comes out of a process of bargains and negotiations and deals that happen over time and that leads to all kinds of inconsistencies that, then, are thrown in the lap of the court. And the court has to sort of figure out, well, how do I -- so, the notion of you have one definition and another definition, and they don't necessarily make sense. To think that there was some overriding intelligence that sort of said that they do make sense and they are clear -- we know they aren't clear here. And so, we don't need to pretend that they are. It is a matter of trying to figure out how do we make the best we can out of the sausage or, more importantly, figure out what is the best way going forward.

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1	MR. AMER: And I think definitely
2	we are going to talk about the statute of
3	limitations implications, if not in this
4	panel, then in the afternoon.
5	I think Mr. Kupferschmid.
6	MR. KUPFERSCHMID: Thank you.
7	And before I address your
8	question, actually, I think I will go back and
9	answer a little bit of Maria's question as
10	well. I just have one sort of caveat for my
11	comments on this panel and the next panel I
12	will be on, which is that SIIA [Software &
13	Information Industry Association] represents
14	technology companies that make software and
15	information products, sort of the serious side
16	of copyright, if you will.
17	(Laughter.)
18	MS. STRONG: As opposed to the
19	MR. KUPFERSCHMID: Entertainment
20	side. Sorry. The entertainment side.
21	So, anyway, in terms of what I
22	will be talking about, it is really focused

more on the distribution right because it is pretty darned hard to perform software or an information product, for that matter.

So, with that in mind, let me try to answer the question. If you look back at the legislative history, both the Senate and the House reports, where they considered the terms "distribution" and "publication," it was pretty clear they considered them to be synonymous.

If you look at the language of the report, and I will quote here, they refer to "the exclusive rights of reproduction, adaptation, publication, performance, and display." So, they don't say "distribution"; they use the word "publication" instead.

And there's other references in the report in that regard as well. So, they thought, I think, that they were or they used them synonymously. And that is why I think the definition is, Kevin, as you point out, I think it is significant, because there is no

1	definition of "distribution," but there is of
2	"publication." And so, that is kind of all we
3	have to rely on, and that definition of
4	"publication" does include offers to
5	distribute.
6	As Jonathan mentioned, at the end
7	of the day, all we have is what is in front of
8	us and the language we have to interpret the
9	best we can. I think he was not assuming a
LO	level of intelligence. I will assume there is
L1	a level of intelligence here and try to
L2	interpret what those terms meant or mean.
L3	MR. AMER: I think Mr. Husick
L4	am I saying that right? was next.
L5	MR. HUSICK: Yes. My impression,
L6	having read the legislative history, is that
L7	we are dealing with a problem that the
L8	information industry knows all too well, the
L9	problem of backward compatibility.
20	And that is that, under the 1909
21	Act what you were concerned with was
22	publication. And so, the discussion was

framed in terms of publication, and only later did the term "distribution" come up and make its way into the exclusive rights enumerated.

And so, it is not entirely clear in reading the legislative history or in referring to any of the other preexisting materials, dating all the way back to the early 1960s, that anyone had any idea that those two were different, but, more importantly, that they had any idea that they could be different in the digital domain.

And so, if we are faced with the conundrum of what they thought, we need to face up to the idea that they may not have thought about it at all, and that it is, therefore, up to us to think about it carefully and, if appropriate, call on Congress, maybe not to reword the statute, but just maybe to give us a little bit more legislative history and tell us, if it is even conceivable, tell us what the sense of Congress might be.

MR. AMER: Mr. Tepp?

MR. TEPP: Thank you.

2.2

I think the last two comments illustrate clearly what is obvious to anyone who looks at the history of copyright, which is that the notion of distribution, the notion of publication are inextricably intertwined. So that, when on the previous panel certain panelists quoted, and repeatedly, the language of the distribution right, "sale or other transfer of ownership by rental, lease, or lending," well, that is, of course, also the definition of publication. And the definition of publication, as we have just been saying, also explicitly includes offering to distribute copies.

Now, in the statute, publication is different from distribution. In the history, they are probably not. At the very, very least, this, again, is good cause for the Office to look into the legislative history to achieve better clarity where the statute lacks

that clarity.

2.2

And in terms of practical effects here, what I would like to note is that the harm of the current situation, where we have a split in the courts, where we have the Copyright Office, the Administration, and Congress saying one thing, we have commentators and some courts saying another thing, that is not good for the copyright system generally.

We will never have absolute clarity, but improved clarity would be beneficial to everyone with a stake in these issues. To the extent that the Copyright Office's previous statement on this was of a relatively informal nature, certainly, this proceeding and whatever results of it would be an opportunity to provide a repetition of the Copyright Office's views but within a more formal document with a more vibrant analysis behind it that would be more likely to be given deference in future court cases; and,

1	thus, give us better clarity.
2	Thank you.
3	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you.
4	And I have a quick follow-up
5	question, but I know there are a couple of
6	people waiting in terms of the publication
7	versus distribution and the legislative
8	history about that evolution.
9	Is there anything in the
10	legislative history that suggests that
11	Congress somehow was intending to limit
12	distribution in some way, more so than the
13	understanding of publication or to publish at
14	the time, or, as we had discussed before, were
15	those really intended to be synonymous? Is
16	there actually anything suggesting that there
17	was an intent to limit distribution in a
18	manner that "to publish" was not limited?
19	MR. AMER: Ms. Lyons?
20	MS. LYONS: Yes. There has been
21	some confusion. I remember the publication
22	cases, because if you published without notice

of copyright, it was the dividing line; it was a bright line. But it wasn't so bright; there was fuzziness along the edges. As in any human endeavor, nothing is crystal clear.

So, particularly in the broadcasting area, what did it mean? And there was some uncertainty. You know, the limited publication, the publication to the general public, what did that mean?

So, in the legislative history, particularly the House report -- somebody was mentioning life ends with the House report -well, it was pretty authoritative, as I recall. They do have a specific provision with respect to broadcasting. They clarified that point, that distribution, in the sense that if no copy changes hands -- and they meant copy in the physical, tangible sense -if no copy changes hands, there is not a publication, as I recall. I don't have the wording before me. I would have to look it up.

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1	MS. CLAGGETT: Were there any
2	responses to that or was there anybody else
3	waiting to respond to that initial question,
4	the previous question that Kevin just asked?
5	MR. AMER: Oh, Mr. Halpert?
6	MR. HALPERT: Steve was kind
7	enough to speak about practical effects. And
8	I think while the legislative history is what
9	it is, and there is a pretty strong argument
10	that the statute is ambiguous here, one needs
11	to be mindful, also, of having an offer to
12	make content available producing under the
13	current statutory damage regime a massive,
14	massive liability that would probably violate
15	due process.
16	So, even if one were to accept the
17	premise that the legislative history should
18	apply and this right should exist, we need to
19	think practically what that effect will be.
20	And the Copyright Office should not make a
21	recommendation that unequivocally says
22	offering works for a download, per se becomes

1	a trigger for starting to calculate what would
2	be astronomical statutory damages, without any
3	requirement that the rights owner actually
4	prove their case that works actually were
5	downloaded or streamed to a different source.
6	It is easy enough to do that by
7	going to the site or source and obtaining
8	works through, basically, an enforcement test.
9	But if one all of a sudden wipes away that
10	element of proof, under the huge statutory
11	damages that exist now and the very, very long
12	term of copyright, it winds up being quite a
13	different calculus and I think would put some
14	pressure on the overall structure of the Act.
15	That is not to say that, if
16	somebody does upload a work, for example, for
17	download, that they shouldn't be subject to
18	injunctive relief or some other remedy. But
19	simply mechanically applying this could
20	produce some absurd results down the road.
21	MR. AMER: Thank you.
22	So, I think it was Ms. Lyons.

MS. LYONS: Yes, please.

2.2

I believe my colleague here mentioned something about a book on the shelf. You don't download a book. You have a copyright work that may be expressed in the form, and the data structure is the print on paper, but if you get rid of that, you have the value.

Over the recent years, since the nineties, when we were working with the Association of American Publishers, and later with the International Publishers Association, and we helped them stand up the International DOI [Digital Object Identifier] Foundation, which has now been joined with the movie and cable folk, you represent that information as a data structure, and a machine-independent data structure that can be persistently identifiable. And then, you can perform operations on it.

And so, most of the discussion is not perform or distribute. You access to

1	perform stated operations on a sequence of
2	bits, so the performance of operations. And
3	then, you get smack-dab into, well, what is
4	the structuring of this information? Are
5	there patents involved? And are you
6	performing somebody's patented method?
7	So, it would be very interesting
8	to brief you on some of these newer methods.
9	This goes back to when Pat Schroeder was
10	leading the Association of American
11	Publishers, and I see Allan Adler. He could
12	probably share some more information about
13	that with you.
14	MS. STRONG: Just a follow-up
15	there before we move on, just so I am clear on
16	your point, because it sounds like you are
17	talking a lot about data structures. Is it
18	your contention that an electronic or digital
19	copy of a book is not a copyrighted work?
20	MS. LYONS: Well, first of all, a
21	copy is a physical object in the law, all
22	right, except if you are talking about copy as

1	a reproduction. And that has always been
2	confusing to folks.
3	You know, you have this
4	definition. All right? And if you tie it
5	back to distribution of a copy, in my humble
6	opinion, they meant physical object.
7	And in the WIPO Treaties and the
8	comment to Article 6, they say tangible
9	object.
LO	So, they have been dancing around
L1	the need, really, to address what is actually
L2	happening now in the internet environment,
L3	because that is what has gotten people really;
L 4	it has gotten their interest.
L5	I have now gone into many
L6	discussions about how you would apply this in
L7	other areas. Copyright really was the first
L8	one out of the gate to address this. Now you
L9	have banking and health and whatever.
20	So, what I am saying is that you
21	have the digital representation of information
22	of various forms, and you structure that

1	information in ways that it can be accessed
2	and processed. You can perform operations on
3	it.
4	And then, you can identify
5	different things. You can identify the target
6	of the process. And so, whether or not there
7	is a publication, making available, usually,
8	we talk about access to perform operations,
9	but that access may not be just simply a
10	download. It is interactive. You know, you
11	can perform, say, Angry Birds or a distributed
12	program. And that is really a software
13	program that is based on and incorporates
14	maybe video, graphics, music, but it is
15	basically software.
16	So, the focus of what you are
17	talking about, I would just humbly suggest
18	that maybe that could be shifted a little bit.
19	MR. AMER: Mr. Tepp? Then, Mr.
20	Sheffner, and then, Mr. Band.
21	MR. TEPP: Thank you.
22	So, just to put the focus back on

what the issue that the Copyright Office has convened this process for is, it is the threshold question of whether U.S. law provides a making available right in full.

And there are, of course, a collection of rights in U.S. law that provide elements of that. The one that has gotten the most attention this morning is the distribution right, though, of course, not the only one.

Questions of statutory damages
that several panelists have now raised in a
rather polemic fashion are really not the
subject today. And as Professor Ginsburg on
the previous panel pointed out, there may well
be ways in which some of the concerns that are
being raised could be addressed.

If there is no threshold implication of an exclusive right by making available, then there is no issue; there is no adequate protection; we are likely not in compliance with our international obligations, which I will discuss in a later panel.

But I don't think the Office should be influenced or distracted in its question that it is looking at now by claims about statutory damages, with which I don't necessarily agree. There are other processes that this Office may undertake and that another body is already undertaking to look into those questions. And I will be happy to prove people who disagree with me wrong in those proceedings.

Thank you.

MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you, Steven.

on the issue of statutory damages broadly, although it has been raised in some question in terms of the interrelationship between statutory damages and whether there is a fear of making available. But, as you point out, the Patent and Trademark Office is looking specifically at the issue of statutory damages under the Green Paper process.

MR. HALPERT: If I could make one

1	point in response to that, the specific charge
2	is for feasibility of creating this right,
3	which also goes to the practical implications.
4	Again, I am not disputing the existence of the
5	right, but I think that part of the study
6	needs to examine feasibility. And simply
7	saying some other entity is undertaking in a
8	multi-stakeholder process a discussion about
9	this issue does not absolve the Copyright
10	Office of a responsibility to consider the
11	practicality, just as some of the
12	practicalities of other proposals the
13	Copyright Office does weigh. And I think it
14	is entirely appropriate here.
15	MR. AMER: Okay. Mr. Sheffner?
16	MR. SHEFFNER: Yes, I actually
17	wanted to respond to Mr. Halpert's previous
18	point, which you just reiterated, about
19	practical effects.
20	So, in determining whether the
21	current statute includes a making available
22	right, we have all these interpretative tools.

We start with the plain language of the statute. Then, we go into legislative history. Professor Menell has done a heroic job in digging up a lot of material that no one else had found. And as long as there is only one Justice Scalia, rather than nine Justice Scalias, litigators are going to cite legislative history.

We, then, have what Steve referred

We, then, have what Steve referred to earlier, the Charming Betsy Doctrine, which I think is critically important in this area. Basically, it says, if the statute is at all ambiguous, it should be interpreted in a manner consistent with our international obligations.

And then, another thing the courts will look at, another sort of interpretative tool, of course, is looking at the practical effects or the policy.

And I am also going to cite

Professor Menell who said something at a

speech, a talk I heard him give a couple of

years ago, which has really stuck in my mind, which is, when we are thinking about this, why in the world would we want a legal system which says that, if you have a shared folder and you have a file consisting of a recently-released motion picture or song or a piece of software, why in the world would we want a legal system which says that is perfectly okay?

You are sharing with potentially millions of other people on this peer-to-peer network. What policy reason is there to say that is not violating anybody's rights? It is a rhetorical question, obviously. I think the answer is pretty clear.

And even Mr. Halpert, I think, in his previous comments acknowledged that you should be able to get an injunction to stop somebody from having that file sit there in their shared folder, which I would certainly agree with.

But, again, there is no policy

1 justification for saying, yes, that's a 2 perfectly legal and fine activity, to be 3 having a file in their shared folder, making 4 it available to potentially millions of people 5 who are also part of that peer-to-peer 6 network. 7 MR. AMER: Thank you. Mr. Band? 8 9 MR. BAND: So, first, just 10 responding to something that someone earlier 11 said that also was mentioned on the first panel, which is sort of like, again, one of 12 13 these things looming in the background. I 14 think the proponents of saying that a 15 distribution covers digital transmissions, it 16 is like be careful what you wish for. Because 17 -- and this is certainly what was implicit in 18 the earlier panel -- but that, then, really 19 gets into the whole issue of digital first 20 sale. 21 I mean, if somehow, to the extent 2.2 that the first sale doctrine is about the

exhaustion of the distribution right, then
that would certainly suggest that, once it is
transmitted to me, then I have the right to
resell it if the copy that I got was
distributed to me. So, that is the first
point. So, that really needs to be thought
through: to what extent does saying that it
is a distribution, a digital distribution is
a distribution within the meaning of Section
106?

But the second point -- and this gets to Ben's point -- I mean, I completely agree that, if something is in the share, if there is a work that is in the share folder, that would certainly look like something that should be actionable. But I would think that that would be actionable, first and foremost, under the reproduction right.

And this, again, gets to what we were talking about in the previous -- or what they were talking about in the previous panel, about who is doing it. I mean, you don't have

to worry about the end-user who is downloading it. It certainly would seem to me that the person who is uploading it, who uploads it into their share folder, that that is a reproduction and that that, presumably, would be an infringement because I can't imagine that they had the right to upload that copy into the share folder.

And to the extent that they had a license, if they even bought that work under the license, I am sure the license did not authorize them to upload to the share folder. So, that seems to me to take care of it right there.

And, still, you get to the statute of limitations. If it was just sitting there for three years and no one ever accessed it, then maybe we settle because the reproduction happened three years ago, and that is the end of it, unless there are ongoing copies being made because of the nature of the way the computer is working.

1	So, I think that there are ways of
2	getting to all of the rights. There are ways
3	of preventing all of the infringing activities
4	we are talking about. We just don't need to
5	start distending certain rights because, if we
6	do that, then we have all kinds of
7	implications, that some might be good for some
8	people, but they also might be very bad for
9	some people.
10	MR. AMER: I think Mr. Husick was
11	next, and then, Mr. Halpert.
12	MR. HUSICK: In response to Mr.
13	Sheffner's question, I think he has put the
14	rabbit in the hat by saying "recent." The
15	reason that we might want a regime that looks
16	like that is that copyright is for most people
17	forever, certainly in excess of their
18	remaining lifetimes.
19	And here, an analogy to patent law
20	is especially apt. I am a registered patent
21	attorney. In patents we have a requirement
22	that you file. We have a requirement that you

record transfers. We have a clearance system that works, and we have a rights system that at least arguably works.

I will note, parenthetically, that many of the people who are on this panel with me, and were on the previous panel, would in a patent context be referred to as trolls because they neither create the works nor perform them, but merely seek to collect rents for them. And we are engaged on the patent side in that discussion right now.

The reason that we might want a regime like that is because end-users -- and I am the founder of several nonprofit ventures and foundations where we are consumers, as well as an attorney who represents producers of IP -- the reason is that it is almost impossible to clear certain works; that it is impossible to know whether a work is, in fact, still under copyright protection in many contexts. And I mean economically impossible because the cost of clearance far exceeds the

1	value of most of the works.
2	And so, we might well want a
3	regime that protects end-users while going
4	after the real guilty actors, in this case
5	those who facilitate mass copyright
6	infringement.
7	MR. AMER: Thank you.
8	We are going to go to Mr. Halpert,
9	then Mr. Kupferschmid, then Ms. Lyons. Then,
LO	I think we will move on to another question.
L1	MR. HALPERT: Actually, I will
L2	pass at this time.
L3	MR. AMER: Okay. Mr.
L4	Kupferschmid?
L5	MR. KUPFERSCHMID: I just wanted
L6	to address a couple of points that Jonathan
L7	made.
L8	One about, first, even though
L9	these aren't really copies, I am just going
20	to, for this group here but, on first sale,
21	obviously, that is a much longer discussion
22	here. But, of course, combining two points

that Jonathan made, you also do have reproduction that is occurring at the other end when you are making a digital transmission of a work. And that needs to be considered in the context of the first sale doctrine.

More importantly, I want to raise the issue of something uploaded to a shared folder which was asked. And Jonathan suggested that -- or maybe not suggested -- said that it would be covered by a reproduction right. Well, that is not necessarily the case, especially in this world of cloud computing now we live in, where it could be a very legitimate reproduction, but you may be distributing that by providing access to it, making it available to a whole bunch of other people.

So, it may not be an illegal distribution. You may be sharing that access code or otherwise providing access greater than you have the authority to do, in which case you don't have this falling under the

reproduction right, but it would fall under
the distribution right, as well as other -you know, it could be an anti-circumvention
violation. It could be a violation of the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. There's a whole
bunch of other things that could come into
play here.

MS. LYONS: The whole idea of

MS. LYONS: The whole idea of files and folders, in the early internet when they were doing the work to stand it up, the identifier resolved to ports on machines, was really the real original internet of things.

You had a computer, one right there. Okay?

So, then, Tim Berners-Lee came along and did a very easy, understandable way to have procedures, that you didn't have to necessarily know about how to get to certain information and their location.

So, the notion of files and folders came in more with the web. If the web came along today, it would probably be just an app, just to put things into perspective.

So, the whole notion of having
folders and files, I think we have gone beyond
that with the Apple App Store and the various
other projects out there where you can have
running programs that are based on or
incorporate preexisting copyright works. But,
then, they are converted into new forms of
expression.

So, I will come back on this later because the one right I find is the conversion, the making of the derivative work. This came up in Aereo where you had transcoding. You had going from one to another, and that was, in my view, making derivative works.

And so, that is the kind of thing
I think really, if we are going to reconsider
this, and talking about the existing rights,
to what extent the existing right of
derivative work, making a derivative work, may
address some of the issues that you are
talking about and trying to pigeonhole into

1	the old copies.
2	MR. AMER: Thank you.
3	We had a mention of oh, did you
4	have a comment on the previous? Sorry. Go
5	ahead.
6	MS. MOY: Sorry. Yes. I just
7	wanted to respond quickly to Ben's statement
8	that there is no policy reason to not want an
9	exclusive right that would cover someone
10	placing something in their shared drive.
11	I just wanted to say that I
12	know others have mentioned cloud computing as
13	well there are situations where, for
14	example, someone working at a company might
15	back up their hard drive to a drive that is
16	accessible to others on the network, or
17	situations where someone may legally download
18	copies of articles that they have access to
19	and place that research, for example, in a
20	folder on a drive that other members of the
21	company have access to.
22	So, I just think that there is a

1	real slippery slope problem here that does
2	present a policy justification not to extend
3	a right to that situation that Ben describes.
4	MR. AMER: Okay. I think that may
5	lead us into another question. And this
6	touches, obviously, on a topic for the
7	afternoon.
8	But there was some disagreement on
9	the last panel about what it is that the WIPO
10	Treaties actually require. There seems to be
11	broad agreement that the United States is in
12	compliance, but not uniform agreement
13	necessarily about what compliance means.
14	And so, I wonder if any of you
15	have views as to whether the treaties allow
16	member states to require evidence of an actual
17	distribution or do the treaties require member
18	states to impose liability only for the
19	offering of a work?
20	Mr. Tepp?
21	MR. TEPP: Without stealing
22	thunder from myself for the last panel of the

1	day, I will just say that the term "making
2	available" has a plain meaning, and it's
3	making available.
4	MR. AMER: I think Mr. Band.
5	MR. BAND: Well, except what is
6	very interesting is, when it says "making
7	available, then, underneath it, the actual
8	text looks an awful lot like what we call the
9	distribution right about, again, distributing
10	copies. And it is very clear that they are
11	talking about making copies available.
12	And so, I think that I am sure
13	that there is a principle of statutory
14	construction out there, and if there isn't,
15	there should be, that treaties should be
16	interpreted in their narrowest possible way.
17	(Laughter.)
18	And I think that
19	MS. STRONG: Maybe somebody will
20	answer whether there is such a doctrine.
21	MR. BAND: But it seems that it is
22	a pretty the language of the treaty is

1	simple, direct, pretty bare-bones. And so, it
2	seems to me that to start suggesting that the
3	treaty meant to go far beyond what is obvious
4	from its terms, and again, it seems very clear
5	that it is really in Article 6 that it is
6	talking about making copies available. The
7	simplest and the plain language to me is that
8	it is talking about making physical copies,
9	and that is all that it was applying to.
10	MS. CLAGGETT: Steve, I think you
11	have a response to that?
12	MR. TEPP: Yes, and this came up
13	in the last panel. It is a misreading of the
14	treaty. Article 6 is not the making available
15	right at issue here. It uses the term "making
16	available" in regards to what is understood
17	and the negotiating history. And I will get
18	into it in the last panel of the day.
19	It is the distribution right. And
20	they had to word it that way because of the
21	way some countries apply their distribution
22	right more narrowly than the United States

1	does. Article 8 is the making available right
2	that we are referring to for this purpose.
3	MR. BAND: What is called the
4	right to communicate, right?
5	MR. TEPP: It is a subset of
6	in, actually, the WCT, it is explicitly a
7	subset of the communication right, yes. And
8	in the WPPT, it is set out separately from the
9	communication to the public right, where the
LO	communication to the public right has more
L1	flexibility in terms of national
L2	implementation and there is no such
L3	flexibility with regard to the making
L 4	available right in the WPPT, that it must be
L5	an exclusive right.
L6	So, Article 6 is a non sequitur
L7	here.
L8	MR. AMER: Mr. DiMona?
L9	MR. DiMONA: Thank you.
20	And I will say that I am a little
21	bit uneasy sitting in between the library
22	representative and the internet commerce

1	representative, but I know I have got Jay and
2	Ben and Steve down at the end there.
3	MR. HALPERT: We are all here
4	seeking truth.
5	(Laughter.)
6	I am quite centrist, actually, in
7	my view. So, feel comfortable.
8	MR. DiMONA: So, my understanding
9	is that the treaty compels the right of making
LO	available in both the communication right,
L1	which would be the performing right here in
L2	this country, and the distribution right. It
L3	is very plain that making available means the
L4	offering, not requiring a distribution.
L5	And, you know, I just think that
L6	there have been cases here. For example, my
L7	colleague Sam Mosenkis from ASCAP handed me
L8	the FilmOn X case, for example, which involved
L9	the Aereo-type service. And the court there
20	found that FilmOn X's service violates the
21	exclusive right to perform the copyrighted
22	work by making available copyrighted

1	performances, so that any member of the public
2	can access them at any time they want.
3	So, there are courts here who have
4	agreed that the performing right in our
5	country meets this. I think it is pretty
6	clear.
7	MR. AMER: Mr. Husick? Oh, that's
8	from before?
9	Ms. Lyons?
LO	MS. LYONS: Yes, I have noted in
L1	the past that Article 6 definitely refers to
L2	tangible copies, at least if you take into
L3	account what you might consider the
L 4	legislative history of that provision.
L5	And you would have to get into
L6	if I scratched my head, I used to work in
L7	intergovernmental organizations the Vienna
L8	Convention on the Law of Treaties, wanted to
L9	take into account the legislative history, or
20	whatever, but I am not briefed on that today
21	to give you a clear answer on it. But I could
22	do that.

1	Let's play a fantasy game of
2	soccer. Okay? And we are going to have music
3	and lights, and it is going to be distributed
4	play. Everybody has to have certain elements
5	that they are going to so-called download.
6	And there is going to be actually simulations
7	of plays that various people can play roles.
8	So, all of this is not made
9	available insofar as you can access it to
10	perform certain operations and you can play
11	different roles. And if there is music, if
12	there is lights, if there is whatever, you are
13	looking at programs that are operating and
14	running it in a distributed environment.
15	So, if we are going to do
16	something, looking at the copyright law today,
17	and not look at the actual technical
18	implementations that are taking place out
19	there in the internet, then it may be that you
20	could run against concepts in copyright that
21	are being defined in the patent law for you.

I happened to bring along a recent

case, Ancora Technologies v. Apple. It is a
Federal Circuit case from March 2014. They
get into the notion of what it means to be a
computer program, and they defined it in terms
of just instructions, not statements and
instructions. So, they are differing. They
are trying to redefine copyright law there.
They talk about performing methods, and they
talk about the concept of copy, which is
definitely something in play in the first
panel and this panel.

And they talk in terms of volatile memory versus non-volatile memory. And they kind of are agreeing, to one of the ordinary skill in the art, a volatile memory is memory whose data is not maintained when the power is removed, and the non-volatile memory is memory whose data is maintained when the power is removed.

Now, oftentimes instead of volatile versus non-volatile, they talk about static versus dynamic. So, when a copy, so-

called for copyright purposes and getting
back to your question about European Treaties,
if you go into the discussions about uploads
to satellites and cable communications, they
don't have the same concept of copy. The
reason they don't is statutorily they are not
required, as the U.S. was, to have fixation in
tangible form as the point of attachment for
copyright protection. So, a lot of them, the
work is protected, just as if you get up and
sing a song; it doesn't have to be fixed.

So, we pay a lot more attention to the fixation in tangible form than they would. So, when you have these kinds of conversations, which used to be my job several years back, about what it means to be communication of broadcast programming -- they were talking about direct satellite broadcasting at the time I was directly involved -- the communication right, the communication to the public, which in the United States is covered by the public

1	performance.
2	And here, you have to look into
3	the definition where they talk not just about
4	transmit, but communication more broadly.
5	Because there is the definition of transmit,
6	which is more an analog-based concept;
7	whereas, images and sounds are received beyond
8	the place where they were sent, or something
9	to that effect.
LO	But when you get into the digital
L1	representation, what you are talking about is
L2	the data structures moving in commerce from A
L3	to B. And they may be based on or incorporate
L 4	preexisting audiovisual works or music, but it
L5	is not what is being communicated.
L6	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you.
L7	MS. LYONS: So, communication is a
L8	better concept here.
L9	MR. AMER: Thank you.
20	I think, picking up on the last
21	question about what it is that the Treaties
22	require, there has been some discussion of the

1	Charming Betsy Doctrine. And so, I think the
2	question is, assuming that the treaties do
3	require members to cover the offering to
4	distribute, is it reasonable to construe the
5	distribution right for purposes of the
6	Charming Betsy Doctrine is it a reasonable
7	construction to construe our law as providing
8	that right? And if so, is that dispositive?
9	Does that essentially answer the question, if
10	that is a reasonable interpretation?
11	Mr. Kupferschmid?
12	MR. KUPFERSCHMID: So, we have got
13	a tough question here because you are asking
14	us, do we comply with an international treaty
15	that requires us to provide a right of making
16	available? And I will disagree with Steve
17	here a little bit, not entirely, but a little
18	bit, in saying, making available? I don't
19	know exactly what that means.
20	I think the treaty describes it a
21	little bit, but there's a lot of questions
22	inherent in the terminology "making

available, right? So, we have got that ambiguity.

We have got ambiguities in our own law in terms of what it means to distribute something, what the right of distribution covers and doesn't cover.

And so, there's, I think, a lot of wiggle room in terms of do we comply or don't we comply with our international obligations.

I am going to take a little bit what I think is somewhat of a minority view here.

I went through the cases, like I said, limited to really just looking at the distribution cases and whether you needed to actually distribute something or to download it, rather, or just merely making it available, is that sufficient? And in looking through all those cases, I thought the vast majority of those cases did cover -- the court did come out and say there was a making available right.

Now, to do that, you have to give

1 some definition. You have got to define a 2 little bit what it means to make available. 3 And the two filters that I saw that the courts were generally using, if you apply these two 4 5 filters throughout all these cases, virtually 6 all of them say this is a making available 7 right. 8 The first one is, has the 9 transferor completed all the steps necessary 10 for a public distribution, so that the only 11 steps that are further necessary to transfer 12 ownership are those required by the 13 transferee? Okay? So, it is up there. 14 Anyone can come at any time and download the 15 material. 16 And then, the other criteria, 17 which comes up I think more often, is that, 18 underlying, the alleged infringer must have 19 had the capacity to transfer a copy. And by 20 that, I mean he must have possessed a copy. 21 Okay? 22 So, for instance, I can say, "Hey,

1 I would like to sell you Lee's car." 2 have I made his car available to you? Well, I don't own his car. I don't have any right 3 4 to make his car --5 MS. CLAGGETT: And beyond that, 6 not only do you not own the car, but you don't 7 actually have the car in your possession. 8 MR. KUPFERSCHMID: Yes, exactly. 9 And so, I think you see a lot of cases where 10 people will interpret as, okay, there's no 11 making available right. But if you apply 12 these two filters, you will see that it 13 actually did come out on the right end. And 14 either maybe the plaintiff just sued the wrong 15 party; maybe secondary liability theories come 16 into play because they provide the means for 17 making available as opposed to making it 18 available. 19 So, I think looking through that 20 lens, because making it available is not as 21 clear, at least in terms of the treaty, the 22 WCT, it is not so clear as some people may

1	think.
2	MR. AMER: Mr. Band?
3	MR. BAND: So, of course, I
4	disagree with the premise of your question.
5	But, having made that clear, so assuming that
6	the treaties do require what you say, what you
7	are assuming that they require, then I would
8	say that our case law, again, quite clearly
9	satisfies that because there have been all
10	these cases where sort of the offering has
11	been considered to be sufficient to lead to
12	distribution liability.
13	Now, again, I might disagree with
14	the reasoning in some or maybe all of those
15	cases, but, unfortunately, I am not a judge,
16	so what I think doesn't really matter.
17	But I think the point is that,
18	first, as a general matter, we always comply
19	with our international obligations, right?
20	That is always the case, as Karyn
21	MS. CLAGGETT: Exactly.
22	MR. BAND: We always do that.

1	Second of all, I think even in
2	this specific case, regardless of how you
3	interpret the obligations of the WCT, I think
4	either way, we are complying with them.
5	Rightly or wrongly, we are complying with
6	them.
7	MR. AMER: I think Mr. Halpert.
8	MR. HALPERT: Thank you.
9	I would just like to add to
LO	Keith's very good comment about the scope of
L1	the right of making available.
L2	To the extent that one were
L3	actually to try to insert it into the
L4	Copyright Act, again, there are ways that we
L5	can achieve compliance with international
L6	norms without doing this. But I want to be
L7	very clear about the lack of clarity with this
L8	term, and I think some fairly serious
L9	constitutional issues, if it were to be
20	codified in U.S. law.
21	And I think as we talk about a
22	"right of making available" here in a sort of

1 loose way, it is important not to lose sight
2 of these.

First of all, the right of making available would be very different than the existing rights in the Copyright Act. It would encompass both distribution and public performance. So, the question would be, why would we do something that overlapped with existing rights to that extent?

Secondly, the degree of activity that is required to engage in any of the acts that are specifically limited by Section 106 is missing. You can have the effect of making information available -- this goes to the secondary liability point that Keith made -- simply by not implementing a copy control technology that a particular copyright owner or a copyright troll would want you to implement.

This would have implications for hardware, for software, and possibly service-based offerings that were not subject to some

either fair use or limitations on liability in Section 512. And it would, I think, implicate First Amendment concerns because it would go to, as used by plaintiffs, would go to whether you restricted access to information, because the opposite of making information available, the way not to make information available is to restrict access.

So, it would create a bias toward filtering or blocking content and, also, potentially create liability simply for using ordinary software that has the effect of making copies. Even writing a journalistic article that mentions the availability of infringing work somewhere on the internet could be deemed to be making information available.

So, my point is that it is an unconstitutionally vague term if codified in U.S. law, and we need to be very clear about what we are talking about, rather than assuming, simply assuming, yes, we are

1	fulfilling the international obligations; that
2	this is, in and of itself, a freestanding
3	right, as would be interpreted by U.S. courts
4	in ordinary copyright proceedings.
5	And this goes in a core way to the
6	feasibility of attempting to codify this in
7	U.S. law. And I think there would be a very
8	serious drag on innovation if it were to be
9	codified in U.S. law.
10	And I apologize that I am bringing
11	this up on this panel.
12	MS. CLAGGETT: Yes, because I was
13	going to say, we are going to explore that a
14	little bit in more detail in terms of the
15	panel after lunch, in terms of the benefits of
16	clarification, if any, as well as any
17	potential downside of actually codifying
18	something specifically in our law.
19	MR. AMER: I think Mr. Husick was
20	next, and then, Mr. Sheffner, then Ms. Lyons.
21	Mr. DiMona has a comment. And then, I think
22	we will go to another question. Oh, and then,

1 Steve Tepp.

2.2

MR. HUSICK: Just to expand a little bit on what Keith said earlier, as a practical matter, I can name any collection of bits on any storage medium or network anything I want. And so, it is to the copyright owner to demonstrate that a copy has been made without authorization.

matter, the work either has to be reproduced or performed in order to assure yourself of that. Because format transformation means that you can't just fingerprint the file; you can't just do an MD5 checksum and say, "Yes, that's the same file," because all you are doing is inviting format transformation as a matter of process.

And so, as a practical matter, a defendant will be able to say, if you create a freestanding right in which there is no requirement to verify the identity of the work, that you have simply not met your prima

1	facie burden because I may have a file on my
2	iPad right now named "zerodarkthirty.m4v," and
3	I may not, but it may not be the work that
4	everyone thinks I'm referring to.
5	MR. AMER: I think Mr. Sheffner
6	was next.
7	MR. SHEFFNER: So, the question
8	that I raised my flag to respond to is, does
9	current law put us in compliance or in
LO	violation of our international treaty
L1	obligations? And I will admit I am not an
L2	international lawyer.
L3	So, I asked the question, well,
L 4	what exactly does it mean to be in compliance
L5	with our treaty obligations? And just to
L6	repeat the position that we took in our
L7	written submission, we believe that the
L8	statute as properly interpreted does keep us
L9	in compliance with our international treaty
20	obligations.
21	Now there has been discussion that
22	the case law, the split of the case law as to

whether merely making something available by, for example, putting a work in your shared folder and making it available to others on a peer-to-peer network is itself an act of infringement. There is a split in the courts whether, as I think Keith said, that the vast majority go in favor of the plaintiff. There is a minority in favor of the defendant.

So, I would say that, under some of those interpretations, we would not be in compliance with our treaty obligations. But, again, as properly interpreted, it would be.

I realize this is bleeding into the second panel, but we are not calling for a change in the statute at this point. I think it is very important to watch the development in those cases, to make sure the courts interpret that properly for, among other reasons, keeping us in compliance with our treaty obligations under Charming Betsy.

But, again, to reiterate some suggestion that we made in our written

1	comments, we do think it would be very
2	helpful, coming out of this process, for the
3	Copyright Office to state clearly what it
4	believes would be a proper interpretation of
5	the law, the statute, and, again, one that
6	would keep us in compliance with our treaty
7	obligations.
8	MR. AMER: Thank you.
9	Ms. Lyons?
10	MS. LYONS: Yes, please. I am
11	going to discuss a bit your points you made.
12	What does it mean to be a copy? I
13	said earlier that a file is a method of
14	logically linking. It is a tag system. It is
15	not a copyright work. It is not even the
16	expression of the work. So, you are not
17	downloading; you are not copying files.
18	You know, rebuttal time will come.
19	So, what is the form of expression
20	we are talking about? We are talking about
21	the digital representation of the work. The
22	work is incorporeal; the literary work, it has

to be expressed in some form.

2.2

If you express it in the form of a computer program, which is I think the normal way on the internet that information is made available and processed, and you perform operations on this symbolic language, represented in the form, and, in fact, it is your bits. You know, when you convert that symbolic logic to binary form, that is when you get into the world of the data structuring, the data structures. We call them digital objects.

We recently had an X.1255

recommendation adopted at the ITU

[International Telecommunication Union] in

Geneva, where the governments of the world

decided on "digital entity" as the way forward

for this machine-independent data structure.

So, if you have this, the work incorporeal, you are not downloading the work per se. You are downloading the expression of the work as it has been incorporated in some

1	other form. And so, you are making this
2	derivative work.
3	You also talked about format
4	transformation. This gets into the broadcast
5	case, the Aereo. They received the signal
6	from the State Department, not the State
7	Department I'm in Washington; I'm sorry
8	the Empire State Building. And they had their
9	antennas there, and they took it.
10	I have some of the articles I read
11	about their technical methods. They actually
12	transcoded. In other words, they converted
13	the information. So, they made another
14	derivative work and perhaps several derivative
15	works in the process of making that
16	information available.
17	So, if you want to look at what it
18	means to be making available, then you have to
19	get into the technology of what you are
20	talking about.
21	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you, Ms.
22	Lyons.

1	MS. LYONS: Otherwise, it is going
2	to run out of steam.
3	Thank you. Thank you.
4	MR. AMER: Mr. DiMona was next, I
5	believe.
6	MR. DiMONA: Thank you.
7	In my opinion, the World Copyright
8	Treaty, the main goal of this particular part
9	of it was to bring interactivity squarely
10	within the scope of copyright, to make it very
11	clear that interactive, on-demand services
12	were within the concept of the communication
13	right; whereas, the older European laws were
14	more broadcast-oriented.
15	And in doing that, they also steer
16	the law towards the liability of the service
17	provider that is making available the works
18	for people to download. And that point is
19	tied up with the offering.
20	I think it is pretty clear. I
21	think that some of the criticism that you
22	heard this morning about cloud computing and

1	First Amendment, to me, are sort of red
2	herring arguments in this context. It is just
3	trying to create concerns and confusion.
4	I think cloud computing systems
5	can and should be licensed. I think the
6	courts and Congress could easily make the
7	difference between commercial services that
8	are broadly making copyrighted content
9	available and certain unusual circumstances
10	where somebody who works for a business
11	accidentally put an article into the company's
12	cloud computing system, and some other person
13	in the company read it. You know, I don't
14	think that that is the focus of this.
15	I think those types of situations
16	aren't really what is understood by a broad
17	making available right. And I just think that
18	First Amendment concerns really shouldn't be
19	worried about here. Fair use and other
20	doctrines handle those type of situations.
21	MR. AMER: Thank you.
22	Mr. Tepp?

MR. TEPP: Thank you.

2.2

Let me begin by being clear that I am not advocating recodification of making available right in U.S. law. The argument is it is already in there; it has been in there. There is no need to recodify it. And I don't necessarily agree with some of the claims that were made about supposed harm that would occur if it were re-codified.

But getting back to the core
question of whether the Charming Betsy
Doctrine controls, of course, some other
panelists have said, well, there is some
flexibility and some lack of clarity. Of
course, there is some flexibility in
implementing the making available right. I
will get into some of the more detailed
discussion of that in the later panel on this
very subject.

But when the alternative that is being offered is categorically that making a work available does not implicate any

1	exclusive right in the United States copyright
2	law, it is very hard to see how we would be in
3	compliance with a making available right in
4	the treaty that we have signed onto and
5	implemented.
6	So, when we have a statute that is
7	less than crystal clear and a doctrine of
8	avoiding interpretations that bring us into
9	non-compliance, that doctrine does seem
10	sufficient to be determinative, but I hasten
11	to add, it doesn't need to be determinative
12	because the legislative history of U.S. law
13	also leads us to the same conclusion.
14	Thank you.
15	MR. AMER: Mr. Halpert?
16	MR. HALPERT: And I think that I
17	ultimately agree with Mr. Tepp, but the key
18	question is: what does this term actually mean
19	in the context of U.S. law? And the First
20	Amendment and other innovation implications of
21	this are not to be ignored.
22	And so, your initial response,

"What does the right of making available mean
to say?," "It means making works available,"
isn't really adequate to address this concern.
And it also doesn't address the potential due
process concerns with multiplying statutory
damages of, say, \$80,000 per work that is
compiled to come up with some multimillion
dollar figure against somebody who, yes, is
violating copyright, but the scale of the
sanction could be absolutely massive. It also
could have some deterrence on entities if the
make available right applies to secondary
liability that are innovating, trying to come
up with good business models.
So, again, the injunction, a basic
ginglo-work type of gangtion would be

So, again, the injunction, a basic single-work type of sanction would be appropriate, but I think we need to be careful in approaching this right to make available and assuming the broadest possible interpretation, particularly given how litigious the U.S. legal system is, and in many ways quite different than other national

1 regimes around the world that have adopted 2 this sort of right to make available. And understanding how this works 3 4 in context is extremely important, and I think 5 it would be helpful to be a good deal more 6 precise about what the meaning of the term 7 actually is in the context of U.S. law, 8 accepting your point that we should be in compliance and the Copyright Act should be 9 10 interpreted in a way that puts us in 11 compliance with our international obligations. 12 MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you very 13 much. 14 I think we only have about 15 15 minutes left, and we did want to, again, give 16 the opportunity for the audience to respond to 17 anything that was raised on the panel. 18 I think we just have one or two 19 more final questions from people here at the table, and then, we will turn it over for the 20

last five or ten minutes to see if there are

any audience questions or remarks in response

21

1	to the discussion.
2	MS. STRONG: Thank you.
3	I think it is time, as our time
4	wanes, to turn a little more toward the
5	quantum of evidence that is needed in these
6	cases. And we have heard a little bit in the
7	first panel, and I think Mr. Band mentioned
8	the Diversey and Hotaling case earlier.
9	But I would like to hear your
LO	views on the quantum of evidence that is
L1	needed for the making available case in the
L2	case under 106(3) of our law and your thoughts
L3	on the line of cases, including Diversey and
L 4	National Car. And what would have been or
L5	what should be, in your view, the result if
L6	those cases apply in the non-tangible realm?
L7	Because those were more the tangible realm.
L8	MR. AMER: Mr. Sheffner?
L9	MR. SHEFFNER: Sure. I think to
20	answer this question, you need to look and
21	I am going to stick to the peer-to-peer
22	context you need to understand how the

technology works. So, all the different members or people who have signed up to participate in this peer-to-peer network each have on their computer a shared folder. They have the files that they want to share with other members of the network sitting in a particular folder.

An outsider, anybody, can sign up to be a member of the network and can see what is in any of the peer's shared folders. So, they know what that particular peer is making available to other participants in the network.

What they can't see, however, is the actual transfers from one peer to the next. So, that is why we have this situation where it is really easy to know what somebody is making available, but we don't necessarily know, we don't have a way to know what they are actually transferring from one peer to the other. So, that is why we are in this situation.

1	And one of the reasons why we
2	can't see what one peer is transferring to the
3	other is because the operators and designers
4	of these peer-to-peer systems don't want you
5	to know. The main reason they don't want you
6	to know is because this whole thing was
7	designed to infringe copyright, and they don't
8	want people to get caught.
9	So, we are left with a situation
10	where they have designed these networks not to
11	create evidence or not to store evidence. So,
12	the only thing that we can know is what
13	somebody is making available.
14	Now courts have recognized, to go
15	back to my previous answer, this is not a
16	situation where you want to just say, "Oh,
17	sorry, the law doesn't cover that." So, they
18	have done various things.
19	Some of them have said, "Well, if
20	you have an investigator do a download, that
21	counts as an unauthorized distribution."

That's fine.

We have some, like Judge Gertner
in the London-Sire v. Does case, who say,
"Well, making available itself is not
distribution. However, it is a logical
evidentiary inference that, if I have a bunch
of files in my shared folder and I am a member
of a peer-to-peer network, that they actually
are being transferred." So, at least at the
initial stages of the litigation, that is good
enough.

I am glad we have those doctrines, especially in light of some of the case law which has said that merely making available is not distribution itself. But they don't go far enough. And again, the law should recognize, for all the reasons we have talked about so far, but, in addition, because of these evidentiary reasons, that merely making copyrighted works available on a peer-to-peer network is itself an act of distribution.

MR. AMER: Can I ask you a quick follow-up? And others are welcome to respond

to this, too.

2.2

We had a panelist this morning say that, as a practical matter, it doesn't make that much difference whether you require evidence of distribution because in practice what plaintiffs typically will do is have an investigator download the file in order to verify its authenticity.

I just would be interested in your views as to that, if evidence of distribution is really required as a practical matter.

MR. SHEFFNER: Well, I would say many courts do allow that sort of evidence to count, a download by an investigator or, say, a "buy" by an investigator will count as an unauthorized distribution. But the courts are not unanimous on that point.

So, I think it is important -- and again, courts are not unanimous on the point that Judge Gertner made -- so it is important to have that backstop. And I would hate for courts' sort of unwillingness to allow those

1 sort of alternate methods of proof to hinder 2 a copyright owner's ability to enforce their rights. 3 4 MR. AMER: Thank you. 5 Mr. Kupferschmid I think was next. 6 MR. KUPFERSCHMID: So, Maria asked 7 about the National Car Rental case. I want to 8 address that because I think that has little 9 to no bearing on the discussion here. That is 10 a sort of somewhat complicated fact pattern. 11 And the court in that case held that the 12 making of the programs, the software programs, available for use for a third party did not 13 14 constitute distribution. 15 So, this case is distinguishable 16 from other cases involving the scope of 17 distribution rights because in this case 18 Computer Associates' claim involved 19 inappropriate use of the software. A copy of 20 the software was not transferred, was not 21 offered to the third party -- I think it was 2.2 EDS, if I remember correctly -- nor made

1	available to them. All they did was use it
2	for their benefit.
3	So, really, that is not making it
4	available. It is just using the software;
5	they were using the software, National Car
6	Rental, not the third party here. They never
7	gave this offer to the third party. They
8	never offered it to them.
9	So, in that context, what we are
10	talking about here, this case is largely
11	irrelevant I think.
12	MR. AMER: Mr. Halpert?
13	MR. HALPERT: Thank you. Sorry
14	about this.
15	It does seem to me that the
16	investigator example is an utterly
17	straightforward application of a distribution,
18	and the courts that are refusing to recognize
19	that would benefit from a Copyright Office
20	report that said that this is a form of
21	distribution.
22	Where I have some question and

1	doubt is whether, for purposes of calculating
2	statutory damages, which normally have to be
3	proven by the plaintiff pretty specifically,
4	one can simply count up the number of files
5	that were uploaded and say, "Yes, all of those
6	were, in fact, made available," and we should
7	have a calculus multiplying by whatever the
8	figure is going to be for all those works.
9	But it seems to me that if one
10	can't prove in a closed network of the sort
11	that Ben was describing that files were shared
12	among other users, perforce, there has to be
13	a form of proof with at least one party who is
14	communicating with somebody in this illegal
15	network that, in fact, works were distributed
16	or made available, whatever word it is one
17	would like to use.
18	MR. AMER: Thank you.
19	So, I think we are going to end
20	with Mr. Band, Mr. Husick, and then, Ms.
21	Lyons, and then, open it up to the audience.
22	MR. BAND: Well, it seems to me,

as I said before, that in the kinds of cases that the rights-holders seem to be concerned about, that the reproduction right on its face would take care of the problem. And to the extent that you have certain international obligations that have certain labels to them, again, we have things parallel to that. And whether we get to the same result by principles of secondary liability, as was discussed in the earlier panel, or reproduction right, or whatever, it really doesn't matter, I mean as long as there is a way to enforce one's rights.

And it is certainly in the situation that Ben was describing where you have this peer-to-peer network and someone is making all these files available for sharing, you know, again, I just don't see how that could not be seen as an infringement of the reproduction right. Chances are those copies were themselves infringing when the person got it. And even if they weren't, if they were

1	licensed, they were not licensed to be shared
2	with everyone. So, by putting them into the
3	share file, you are breaching the license and
4	you are probably, again, exceeding the terms
5	of the license agreement and infringing the
6	reproduction right, and so forth.
7	So, it just seems to me that you
8	have more than enough there. If you want to
9	pile on and, then, say, okay, if the
10	investigator downloads a copy, again, if the
11	court wants to call that a distribution, fine.
12	I don't really think that is a distribution.
13	I think that that is the making of another
14	copy and that there is a contributory
15	infringement, whatever. I mean, the point is
16	that there are more than enough tools to get
17	at that, and we don't need to sort of, again,
18	distort the existing rights to cover that
19	situation. We get there anyway.
20	MS. CHARLESWORTH: I just had a
21	follow-up for Mr. Band.
22	But when we think about what the

1	harm is here, isn't the harm the fact that the
2	file is being distributed to thousands or
3	millions of users? In other words, you are
4	positing that the law should focus on the
5	reproduction right and the uploaded
6	reproduction, the single reproduction. But,
7	I mean, does that really track what the real
8	issue and harm is to the copyright owner?
9	MR. BAND: But you're assuming, of
10	course, that it has been reproduced. I mean,
11	you are assuming that it has been
12	MS. CHARLESWORTH: Yes, I am
12 13	MS. CHARLESWORTH: Yes, I am assuming that in a peer-to-peer let's
13	assuming that in a peer-to-peer let's
13 14	assuming that in a peer-to-peer let's assume that the file has, in fact, been widely
13 14 15	assuming that in a peer-to-peer let's assume that the file has, in fact, been widely shared. But to take Mr. Sheffner's
13 14 15 16	assuming that in a peer-to-peer let's assume that the file has, in fact, been widely shared. But to take Mr. Sheffner's explanation, you can't really demonstrate
13 14 15 16 17	assuming that in a peer-to-peer let's assume that the file has, in fact, been widely shared. But to take Mr. Sheffner's explanation, you can't really demonstrate that.
13 14 15 16 17	assuming that in a peer-to-peer let's assume that the file has, in fact, been widely shared. But to take Mr. Sheffner's explanation, you can't really demonstrate that. But I am saying what the copyright
13 14 15 16 17 18	assuming that in a peer-to-peer let's assume that the file has, in fact, been widely shared. But to take Mr. Sheffner's explanation, you can't really demonstrate that. But I am saying what the copyright owner is concerned about is the widespread

in the dissemination?

MR. BAND: Right, but to the extent we get into the remedies, I mean, because you are not going to be able to prove actuals regardless, you are in the statutory damages area anyway, and so it really makes no difference whether it is a reproduction, infringement of the reproduction right or an infringement of the distribution right. I mean, I think that the plaintiff is going to bring evidence that it was part of this network.

And frankly, you know, I might disagree with others -- and this is my own personal opinion -- but the damages, the statutory damages, in principle, that have been assessed in these cases, some of these cases, to the extent that there is a way to suggest that these are the only copies of the stuff available online, and so forth, you know, the damages, to the extent that they are

consistent with what the range that Congress has given, you know, Jammie Thomas took her chances and she got caught, and that is life.

But I really don't see a problem with, you know, if there are statutory damages available for infringement of the reproduction right, that seems to be sufficient. I mean, you don't get, the rights-holder doesn't get more statutory damages. I mean, it is the same \$150,000 maximum.

MS. CLAGGETT: And we are getting really close to the end, and I did want to see if we had any final audience participation from people who are waiting. But I think we had two more people to speak very, very briefly, and then, we will see if anybody from the audience wants to respond to anything that was mentioned on the panel.

MR. HUSICK: Just a very quick comment that we seem to be focused on the minority of courts that are not willing to accept investigator evidence. We have a way

of correcting that, and that is we appeal
those cases until we get a clear statement of
the law. We don't need to go monkeying with
things. That will develop in due course in
good time, Justice Scalia notwithstanding.

MR. AMER: Ms. Lyons?

MS. LYONS: Yes, and there are methods being developed -- that Apple case I mentioned had to do with licenses -- a method of having programs that would go in, not just to the application programs, but to the actual BIOS to check whether they were in conformance with license requirements.

But, more generally, and I know
they say it is not the file; it is the
information represented in digital form. And
if you structure it as a data structure that
is persistently identifiable, then I would
suggest we could get into a discussion of what
it means to be a copyright notice in this
context. Because the copyright notice as it
now is, I would suggest, it is pretty

1	meaningless.
2	And it would be interesting to
3	have a way, once you had this information and
4	it is not being transferred, you're going in
5	to process it, that you could actually, then,
6	see here is the notice, and you can actually
7	have along with it in the data structure
8	itself boundary conditions for use.
9	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you very
LO	much.
L1	I think at this time we are going
L2	to turn it over to see if there are any
L3	audience comments. And it seems like we do
L4	have two.
L5	Just a reminder, if you could just
L6	keep your comments to two minutes, and we will
L7	be right on time in terms of closing this
L8	session.
L9	PROFESSOR MENELL: Okay. Well, it
20	is really a clarification question. Mr. Band
21	is making some assumptions in deciding that
22	the copy that is on the host computer is a

1 violation of the reproduction right. 2 But the way in which a lot of file sharing technology works is you may have 3 ripped a CD, and I know you would defend that, 4 and I would defend that as being a fair use. 5 6 There is no violation. 7 And so, what happens is they, then, download or acquire a program that will 8 then make their hard drive available. 9 10 that is what a peer-to-peer service becomes. 11 So, there is no 106(1) technical violation 12 really until someone else downloads. And that 13 is why 106(3) serves a very valuable role in 14 dealing with that situation, which is the 15 common situation. 16 We don't know -- I mean, we do 17 through hashtags perhaps know that the client 18 computer did have an illegal copy, but in many 19 cases that is not going to be easily provable. 20 So, 106(3) does -- and I want to 21 distinguish that from the argument that was 2.2 made on the first panel by Mr. Bridges. Mr.

Bridges was saying that a forensic copy would not be enough. He wants proof of some third party, and that is very hard to come by, for the reason Mr. Sheffner raises. And so, I think common sense would get us to a 106(3) cause of action here as well.

MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you.

Professor Ginsburg?

PROFESSOR GINSBURG: I wanted to address a remark of Jonathan's which was also in Andrew Bridges's written comments, which is the superficially-appealing symmetry of saying that, if you accept a digital distribution doctrine, then you have to accept a digital first sale doctrine. And I think that that at first blush sounds pretty good, but actually doesn't work because Section 109(a), in its references to "that copy" and "a particular copy," is the codification of the longstanding doctrine that distinguishes between physical copies and the incorporeal rights. So, it is the flip side of Section 202.

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1	And 109(a) makes perfect sense
2	when you think about it in the context of
3	chattel rights versus incorporeal copyright.
4	Section 106(3) doesn't say it says "copies"
5	it doesn't say that particular copy. It
6	doesn't say that copy. And that is because
7	the language in 106(3) can cover a non-
8	physical chattel; whereas, I believe that
9	109(a) is all about physical chattels.
10	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you very much.
11	I think we have one final comment,
12	and then, we are going to close and break for
13	lunch.
14	MR. BRIDGES: I just wanted to
15	discuss the concern about the difficulties of
16	proof for plaintiffs and the suggestion from
17	Ms. Charlesworth that, well, but that file may
18	have been shared with lots of people.
19	Implicit in that was the suggestion that maybe
20	we need to presume it has been shared with
21	lots of people because one can't prove the
22	actual dissemination to others.

My concern is, as a litigator
and statutory damages are relevant here we
are talking about \$150,000 per work infringed.
And plaintiffs come into court saying, "Well,
we're alleging 10,000 works infringed. Please
don't make us prove that we really own all
10,000." And they're saying, "Please don't
make us prove that the violation actually
occurred. Let's have a deemed distribution,
please. Oh, and please don't make us prove
actual harm; we want a presumption of
irreparable harm. And, oh, please don't make
us prove damages; we get statutory damages."
So, we have an entire regime here
where plaintiffs get to claim \$150,000 per
work infringed without having to prove
anything. Why don't we just declare 300
million infringers in the United States? And
then, we can work backwards to see who should
pay what.
But if you are going to have a
system that really allows getting all the way

1	to the end of the case with hardly any actual
2	proof, then I think we have got a crazy
3	system. And that is one reason I am concerned
4	about the respect for copyright law, as we
5	twist things more and more and more in favor
6	of those who are asserting claims.
7	Thank you.
8	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you very much.
9	And we want to thank the panelists
10	who have served on this session. This has
11	been very, very informative.
12	Just some housecleaning: we are
13	going to take a lunch break from 12:30 to
14	1:45, and then, we will be back in this room
15	for Session 3, which will look into the
16	benefits of clarification and whether there is
17	any benefit or downside from trying to tinker
18	with Title 17.
19	Thank you very much.
20	(Whereupon, the foregoing matter
21	went off the record for lunch at 12:34 p.m.
22	and went back on the record at 1:46 p.m.)

1	A-F-T-E-R-N-O-O-N S-E-S-S-I-O-N
2	1:46 p.m.
3	MS. CLAGGETT: Okay. Thank you
4	very much. We, I think, had a very, very
5	informative first half of the day where we
6	talked about how the current exclusive rights
7	in Title 17 do cover a making available right
8	in our law. But we also had a number of
9	comments that acknowledged that courts have
10	struggled to really understand the contours of
L1	such a right.
L2	And so now, on this panel we
L3	really want to focus to some practical issues
14	with respect to how U.S. courts have
L5	considered the making available right and
L6	whether it would be of some benefit to the
17	courts, to parties and litigants, and others,
18	to have further clarification in our law in
L9	terms of how the United States does implement
20	a making available right.
21	So, I am going, just as we did the
22	other panels, I am going to start with just

1	asking everyone to identify themselves just by
2	their name and their affiliation. We are not
3	going to have opening remarks. And then, we
4	will start off with some questions.
5	I will start first with Allan.
6	MR. ADLER: Allan Adler. I'm
7	General Counsel and Vice President for
8	Government Affairs for the Association of
9	American Publishers.
10	MS. AISTARS: Sandra Aistars, CEO
11	of the Copyright Alliance.
12	MR. BAND: Jonathan Band, Library
13	Copyright Alliance.
14	MR. BARNES: Hi. I'm Gregory
15	Barnes. I'm General Counsel of Digital Media
16	Association.
17	MR. BEITER: John Beiter, still
18	with the Law Firm of Shackelford, Zumwalt &
19	Hayes, still representing SESAC.
20	MR. BRIDGES: Andrew Bridges. I'm
21	an internet and copyright litigator in San
22	Francisco and Silicon Valley.

1	MR. KUPFERSCHMID: Keith
2	Kupferschmid, General Counsel and Senior Vice
3	President for Intellectual Property for the
4	Software and Information Industry Association.
5	MS. LYONS: Patrice Lyons, General
6	Counsel, Corporation for National Research
7	Initiatives.
8	PROFESSOR MENELL: Peter Menell,
9	University of California at Berkeley School of
10	Law.
11	MS. MOY: Laura Moy, Public
12	Knowledge.
13	MS. WOLFF: Nancy Wolff with PACA,
14	the Digital Media Licensing Association, an
15	association that is involved in licensing
16	images primarily.
17	MS. CLAGGETT: Great. Thank you
18	very much.
19	I think we are going to start off
20	first with just a very broad question. Then,
21	we will see if panelists want to respond. And
22	then, we will drill down into some specific

1 issues.

2.2

So, in terms of the initial broad question for all the panelists, I just wanted to ask -- again, we had some discussion earlier today about courts struggling to actually assess how or whether we have a making available right in our law. For example, what type of actual evidence is necessary to prove a distribution under our law?

So, the broad question I have

first is whether there would be any benefit to

parties, to litigants, to users even, from

further clarification, either through

legislative amendment or through a Copyright

Office report in this area.

Sandra?

MS. AISTARS: I guess I would start by saying that in an ideal world we might have legislation or a statute that would be drafted a bit more clearly. But, given the circumstances in which we find ourselves, it

1	is probably not realistic to redraft the
2	statute as it currently exists.
3	However, I do think it would be
4	helpful to have further guidance from the
5	Copyright Office, perhaps setting out more
6	specifically the evidentiary requirements, the
7	specific attributes of the various rights
8	involved in Section 106, and how the making
9	available right is implemented through those.
10	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you.
11	Do I have anyone else?
12	John Beiter?
13	MR. BEITER: Thank you.
14	The comments that SESAC submitted
15	were joint comments with ASCAP, BMI, the Music
16	Publishers, and the Songwriters Guild of
17	America. I am speaking for SESAC, but the
18	comments are joint.
19	These organizations believe that
20	the making available right is already implicit
21	in the enumerated rights in 106, but believe
22	that some clarification might be in order.

1	MS. CLAGGETT: And when you say
2	"clarification," do you have a distinction
3	between clarification through a legislative
4	change or clarification by the Copyright
5	MR. BEITER: Yes, legislatively.
6	We don't think it would be an expansion of
7	rights because we believe those rights are
8	already there. Possibly including a phrase
9	specifically invoking making available in the
LO	list of exclusive rights.
L1	MS. CLAGGETT: I think next is Ms.
L2	Wolff, and then, Professor Menell.
L3	MS. WOLFF: I think when you look
L 4	at the display right and the way courts have
L5	interpreted on the internet, there may be a
L6	time soon where they may need some
L7	clarification. Because the display right for
L8	visual art is really the only right they have
L9	online, and if the display right can be
20	circumvented by technology, so, in effect, any
21	website user can have the benefit of a full
22	visual display, but by clever framing never

have to license because it doesn't reside on their server. And if the courts continue to require that a copy be made on the server of the website that is taking advantage, you know, the benefit of the visual display, it could eventually eviscerate completely any kind of licensing or any display right for visual artists.

So, I think if this broadening of

-- and maybe "broadening" is the wrong word -but if technology is continued to be
developed, so that there are ways of framing
or displaying images, and there's never an
infringer down the road that you could ever
obtain any kind of judgment against, you could
put all the images in some foreign offshore
country, we will really have a problem if
there is no more licensing model for our
visual images. And I think that is, with
technology advancing, something that there is
a lot of concerns within the industry.

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Professor Menell?

PROFESSOR MENELL: In light of the conversation this morning, I think that there was nearly unanimous agreement -- I won't say "unanimous"; there was one member of this panel that I think disagreed -- but I think the idea that you could establish a violation of 106 by showing that someone has taken a copyrighted work and put it into a folder or some internet-accessible location from which the work can be accessed by the public, which gets into a whole bunch of other issues, but those are, I think, being worked out in other venues right now, that having that clearly established would greatly simplify litigation that is going on in many different parts of the system. As I mentioned earlier, it would

clarify the joinder issues. It would, I think, dramatically reduce some of the discovery costs. There are a whole bunch of

sort of aspects of what we are talking about
today that reverberate through the entire
litigation system.

That said, I certainly think that it would be unwise for Congress to do this without also taking on issues such as remedies. I think on the panel this morning we heard from the Library of Congress that to expose libraries to potentially wide-range liability because of repositories that they have, you know, if we are going to discourage preservation materials, those are all things that I think would be unfortunate, unwise, and time-sensitive. The longer we wait to clarify these rights, the less preservation there will be.

And so, I would try to identify all of the issues that are reasonably closely related. And I will also add that, once you are opening up remedies, that also opens up 512; it opens up orphan works. There are a lot of different parts of the system.

1	So, I don't think we can easily
2	cabin this issue. And I, as a scholar,
3	wouldn't want to see that. I would like to
4	see a much broader engagement.
5	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you very
6	much.
7	Mr. Band?
8	MR. BAND: So, I think I agree
9	with what Peter just said. You know, the hip
10	bone is connected to the thigh bone, and so
11	forth. So, certainly, on one level you can
12	say, yes, you know, clarification is always a
13	good thing because there's always some
14	ambiguity and uncertainty.
15	But to start sort of clarifying
16	the nature of this right would require
17	redefining the other rights to make sure you
18	don't have unnecessary overlap, and you have
19	to think about the impact on contracts and,
20	then, you have to say, well, is it just
21	prospective, retrospective?
22	And then, statutory damages I

think clearly would be part of the discussion and, then, exceptions. So, it gets very, very confusing very quickly, and you have to say, you know, is the situation so bad that it is worth, to use another overused metaphor, just like picking at one thread in a knitted sweater and, then, the whole thing will fall apart?

so, I think, as a practical matter, and here I agree with Sandra, maybe there is some ambiguity, but we are probably better off letting the courts deal with the cases as they arise, as opposed to trying to deal with it legislatively, because the only way to deal with it would be to really deal with all the moving pieces at the same time.

And I think to the extent the option then, if we are not doing legislative amendment, then we are saying, oh, clarification in the Copyright Office. But I think, to some extent, it is the same problem, meaning the Copyright Office needs to be very

cognizant that sort of squeezing over here,
again, to use another metaphor, it is like
squeezing this part of the balloon will cause
something else to move somewhere else.

And so, you have to be very careful, start saying, you know, "We think this." Then, you have to sort of think of all the possible ramifications, and not all of them going through what we have already talked about here. But, as I said, what about the impact on first sale?

that there is an argument as to why this would not -- you could interpret this in one way, so that it would not have an implication for first sale, but I think that that is something that would be litigated. I mean, I think that there is a very good argument that -- you know, she has her argument, and I think someone would come up with a counter-argument based on the statute. And so, again, you have to tread very, very carefully in this area.

1	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you very
2	much.
3	I think we have Mr. Beiter next.
4	Okay, so I am going to go with Mr. Bridges,
5	Ms. Lyons, Mr. Kupferschmid.
6	MR. BRIDGES: Thank you.
7	I think that courts do a good job
8	of working kinks out over time. Maybe it
9	takes longer than some people would like, but
10	I do think that law tends to get clarified
11	over time and the more courts work with
12	things.
13	I need to confess to some real
14	cynicism in copyright policymaking when I hear
15	the words "clarification," "harmonization,"
16	and "rationalization," because I have never
17	encountered in my recent memory any occasion
18	where those drove at any object other than
19	expanding the powers and rights of copyright
20	owners.
21	And I have heard one instance
22	today in the display right: what I heard from

my friend Nancy involved a case that I

litigated and won, Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com.

And what I am hearing from her on the

"clarification" is actually she wants a

different outcome. I don't consider that to

be a clarification; I consider that to be a

change.

I am concerned as to what stakeholders the Copyright Office has closest at heart, and to what extent the professionals who tend to congregate inside the Beltway would be driving that process, when I do think that copyright law is for the nation, and for the entire nation, and that is its first beneficiary. And so, the enthusiasm that I perceive here among certain persons for the Copyright Office to make a statement is one that, frankly, I don't share.

MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you very much. I will not make a comment other than that, we hold you all very close to our hearts.

1	(Laughter.)
2	And that is why we seek public
3	comments from everyone and anyone who actually
4	wants to submit them to our office.
5	MR. BRIDGES: And I very much
6	appreciate that.
7	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you.
8	I think Mr. Kupferschmid, and
9	then, Ms. Lyons, and then, Mr. Glazier.
10	MR. KUPFERSCHMID: All right.
11	Thank you.
12	As I mentioned in the earlier
13	panel I was on, we do not think that any type
14	of further clarification or amendment to the
15	statute is necessary. If you look at the
16	cases, the overwhelming, vast majority of the
17	cases, using the sort of two filters I put in
18	place earlier I can repeat them if people
19	want me to using those filters, I think
20	that the vast majority of cases prove that
21	there is this making available right under
22	U.S. copyright.

So, if you are asking me, do I
think it is necessary for some kind of
amendment or clarification, the answer is
absolutely not, certainly not in the
legislation area.

If you are asking, would there be
a benefit to clarification, sure, why not? I

a benefit to clarification, sure, why not? I mean, just to further clarify things, but certainly not legislatively. I mean, it would have to be some type of statement.

There is also the possibility that danger comes with the clarification; what we think is a clarification actually sort of further confuses the issue. And therefore, if you are asking, would I prefer that such clarification, if it comes, come from the Congress or the Copyright Office, I would choose the Copyright Office, just for that purpose.

But you ultimately have to ask, where do we stop? I mean, there are a bunch of different areas in copyright law that could

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1	stand to be clarified. And so, why are we
2	just picking on this particular area?
3	And then, lastly, I just want to
4	address the Hotaling case Professor Menell
5	referred to and the gentleman this morning,
6	also mentioned, about worry about potential
7	chilling effects on libraries. I mean, that
8	case is 17 years old. So, if there is some
9	chilling effect, let's see what it is and
10	let's see if there's something that needs to
11	be addressed. There ought to be sufficient
12	evidence, if there is some type of chilling
13	effect, by this point.
14	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you very
15	much.
16	Ms. Lyons I think was next.
17	MS. LYONS: Yes, please. Thank
18	you.
19	This is very good you're holding
20	this right now to take the temperature of the
21	room, see what they think.
22	Going back historically, it is

sort of a generational thing, you revise the copyright statute. And sometimes war would intervene historically, and so, they would put it off for 10 years or more. But, on cycles of 20 years, usually; now we are well beyond that.

Technology changed dramatically.

Like when broadcasting came in, it was necessary to reevaluate the law. There are many provisions of the law that could be impacted on the concept of copy, for example.

If that is kind of made something other than what it was, I think, really intended to be, then that could ripple to many things. The first sale doctrine, they had the Section 104 proceeding a few years.

If the making available right, on the other hand, is going to fall on the communication to the public, the public performance right, then you are going to get into, are we going to slap compulsory licenses on the whole thing, when maybe you are really

1	talking about performing computer programs,
2	and you just don't know that this is the new
3	kind of expression that you are dealing with.
4	So, my suggestion would be that
5	maybe it is way overdue, that they have
6	studies. You know, the Copyright Office used
7	to do this in the past. They would have
8	studies, and Congress would mandate that they
9	do this, not just for particular issues
10	MS. CLAGGETT: We still do.
11	MS. LYONS: but more generally.
12	Okay. Now I will get to my point
13	more generally, so that you could actually
14	look at the interrelationship between the
15	different pieces. Otherwise, you are just
16	going to poke your finger and it will have
17	ripple effects that may be unintended.
18	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you very
19	much.
20	I think I am going to go to Mr.
21	Glazier, Ms. Wolff, Mr. Barnes, and Mr.
22	Beiter.

MR. GLAZIER: Thank you.

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Until it gets to a point where the courts start interpreting the law in a manner different than Congress intended, there is no reason for Congress to amend the law. I don't think we are to the point yet where courts have interpreted the distribution right or the performance right in a manner that is so different than what Congress intended in trying to make sure that we were complying with the WIPO Treaties, when this was being debated in 1996, that we are yet to the point where Congress needs to go in and amend to correct the courts who have now veered away from the original intention.

The intention was made pretty clear. It is not like this question wasn't debated, and debated very extensively, during the treaty negotiations by the PTO and the NII [National Information Infrastructure] report, by the Committee during the hearing process, and the drafting practice for the

implementation legislation. And the consensus was that, for the broader rights in 106, we were in compliance; making available was covered, and that within the patchwork of distribution, reproduction, and performance, there was no need to re-skew or otherwise affect standing meanings at the time.

But when Congress revisited specific situations where electronic theft was the subject, and they wanted to address whether or not distribution, for example, covered making available, they were quite specific. So, in the NET Act, when Congress was looking at the response to the LaMacchia case, where I think we called them "bulletin boards," which was described in Section 506 as making available on a computer network to members of the public or accessible to members of the public, they basically described the making available right in the context of Section 506 and the criminal copyright law, specifically adapting making available to that

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particular context and showing what their intention was. And the Copyright Register at the time was pretty clear about what she thought the intentions were.

So, I think the idea of relating this to other elements in the copyright law, like first sale, are political markers which are part of the legislative process that might indicate, if Congress was ever going to do this, we want to make sure this is put on the table as a tradeoff. I don't think they are actually related to the subject that Congress identified, that the Copyright Office identified.

So, I do think it is a great idea for the Copyright Office to reiterate after these court cases what it believes the law is and what Congress intended. I think the Copyright Office is the guardian of the national interest when it comes to copyright law and policy, and the Copyright Office does that job pretty well.

1	And if, for some reason beyond the
2	guidance that has already been given by the
3	Copyright Office in the past, and I hope after
4	this process, the courts still veer away in a
5	direction that was unintended by Congress,
6	perhaps Chairman Goodlatte, who was the author
7	of the NET Act, where they very clearly
8	spelled out what making available meant vis-a-
9	vis a computer network and accessibility to
10	members of the public, will once again clarify
11	it, if he has to. But I don't think we are
12	there yet.
13	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you very
14	much.
15	I think we had Ms. Wolff, and
16	then, Mr. Barnes, and then, Mr. Beiter.
17	MS. WOLFF: To go back to the
18	display right, and I am not sure now today
19	that a visual artist has much of a display
20	right when you look at the type of framing
21	that is involved that has advanced much
22	further than even it was in the Perfect 10 v.

Amazon case. At that time, you got a small thumbnail. When you clicked on it, you went directly to the website where the image was located, and the website was grayed-out.

Now, with the current-way image searches, when you click on the thumbnail, you don't get any reference to the website; you just get a high-res visual of the image. And for many people, that is all you need, and that is the display right. That is what gets licensed, and that is the enhancement of that web page, is that visual image.

So, I think things have changed even since the Perfect 10 v. Amazon case, and not every court has agreed that that is the right way to look at it. You have the Flava Works v. Gunter case in Illinois.

So, I think that sort of the per se linking of the reproduction with the display is something that is not in the Act, and the courts have tied them together. And I think that maybe could possibly be clarified

1 by even the Copyright Office, and looking at 2 each one of these six rights are distinct, and you can have a violation of one without a 3 4 violation of the other. 5 MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you very 6 much. 7 I think we had Mr. Barnes, and then, Mr. Beiter. 8 9 MR. BARNES: Yes. I am a little 10 confused now because I agree with most of what 11 Mitch has said, which is atypical. 12 What I will say, though, is I 13 think the way the question was initially 14 posited, "courts struggling" I guess the way 15 it was framed, I don't know if courts have 16 struggled that much. I think if you look at 17 what most of the comments you guys have 18 received on this topic thus far as indicators, 19 I mean, most people feel like they have got it 20 right thus far, and they have been able to 21 deal with the situation, and it has allowed 2.2 for the flexibility that most U.S. authorities have acknowledged in the bundled rights.

And so, I don't know if at this point we need a clarification via the Copyright Office and/or through legislation. What I really hear as kind of this underlying theme is, you know, we want you guys to stand ready in case we lose certain decisions and we are not happy with the outcome. And I don't know if that is the right way to approach this problem.

What I will say, though, is, if
there is going to be clarification, I think it
has to come through the legislative system and
it can't come through just some type of
advisory opinion offered by the Copyright
Office because, as Jonathan pointed out, I
mean, there are a lot of related components
that attach to this that will be affected, and
statutory damages just being one that has been
discussed. I mean, the Copyright Office on
those topics can only discuss recommendations.
They can't make changes in law and they can't

1	advise the courts necessarily to apply
2	statutory damages in a different fashion.
3	So, I think it is very dangerous
4	for the Copyright Office to kind of go in that
5	direction. I think if it is going to be
6	handled, it would have to be handled by the
7	legislative system, which, then, can look at
8	several different components.
9	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you very
LO	much.
L1	I think we had Mr. Beiter, and
L2	then, Ms. Aistars.
L3	MR. BEITER: I promised Jay
L4	Rosenthal that I would say this. But when the
L5	topic came up a while back about who are the
L6	stakeholders most near and dear to the hearts
L7	of the people in this room, I would be really
L8	be remiss if I didn't say that our
L9	organizations represent songwriters, and I am
20	thinking about the guy who is sitting in
21	Nashville right now writing a song and
22	struggling with the second verse. Those are

1	the stakeholders; I am going to use the word
2	"author" because that is what they are. And
3	any gathering like this that doesn't note that
4	is well, we always should.
5	Secondly, we also believe that the
6	Copyright Office, it would be very helpful if
7	the Copyright Office would provide some
8	guidance concerning the existence of the
9	making available right within the exclusive
10	rights under 106.
11	And thirdly, again, we are not
12	thinking in terms of expanding rights. If it
13	becomes necessary to take a legislative route,
14	we believe that a clarification of what we
15	believe is already existing could be easily
16	accomplished with some language in 106.
17	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you very
18	much.
19	Ms. Aistars?
20	MS. AISTARS: I just wanted to
21	comment on what my colleague Mr. Barnes said.
22	Two things.

One, we actually did say quite
clearly in our comments that we do want both
the Copyright Office and Congress to stand
ready in case the courts do rule in certain
cases, in particular, with regard to the
public performance right, in ways that put us
in a situation where we no longer comply with
our treaty obligations and where we no longer
have an effective public performance right.
And so, that is, indeed, our position on the
issues. I don't think that that is anything
to be ashamed about or to try to hide.

Secondly, as far as why I think
this isn't necessarily the time for
legislation, and why I would prefer the first
step to be guidance coming from the Copyright
Office -- and Jonathan Bend alluded to this in
his comments as well -- the one area of
flexibility I think that clarification from
the Copyright Office affords us is that what
you do does not necessarily change how issues
are dealt with in contract law between

1	parties, existing contracts between parties.
2	And my worry is that, if we start
3	changing definitions without an adequate
4	understanding of existing contractual
5	relationships that have grown up over many,
6	many decades, that we actually disrupt a
7	licensing system that is working fairly well
8	and put ourselves in a situation where it
9	becomes even more challenging to effectively
10	license rights.
11	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you.
12	Mr. Beiter? Oh, you didn't have
13	anything?
14	MS. STRONG: As a follow-up
15	question, and I will pose a hypothetical,
16	would any of your views change with respect to
17	the need for potential clarification if the
18	Supreme Court were to rule in the Aereo case
19	in a position contrary to the brief filed by
20	the United States government?
21	MS. AISTARS: My position would
22	not change. That was what I was referring to.

1	MS. STRONG: Even after the Aereo
2	case?
3	MS. AISTARS: Uh-hum.
4	MS. STRONG: Yes?
5	MS. CLAGGETT: Yes, I think she
6	was saying that her position was that
7	MS. AISTARS: No, no. So, my
8	position was, if the courts rule incorrectly
9	in cases dealing with the public performance
10	right, namely, Aereo, we may very well be
11	seeking legislation to address that issue.
12	MS. STRONG: Thank you. I just
13	wanted to make sure we are putting all the
14	pieces on your view together.
15	Others?
16	MS. CLAGGETT: Ms. Lyons?
17	MS. LYONS: Yes, I will reiterate
18	because I think it would be even more urgent
19	to start the process now. Because, basically,
20	in my view some of the basic technical issues
21	weren't briefed to the Court. So, the Court
22	judges on what it is presented.

And if the whole notion of	
transcoding or the making of the derivative	е
work in this context, it is uninformed as	to
what may be actually happening. And so, the	he
pattern may play a big role in this. And	yet,
that could dominate copyright in ways, and	it
already is, as a matter of fact. Over the	
last couple of years, maybe the last 20 years	ars,
there is an imbalance really between copyr	ight
and patent.	
And when you get into the	

And when you get into the performance right, for example, performing a patented method, and you represent that with a patented data structure, well, you see, that used to be called expression of a work, and you used to have public domain ways of doing that.

And so, a novel, for example, is a public domain way of structuring a literary work. And if it is fixed on paper, people can actually write novels in that form.

But when you get into managing

1	information in the internet environment, the
2	data structures themselves, although we have
3	a data structure we have made available in the
4	public domain, there are many different
5	highly-patented ways of doing that.
6	So, to what extent the basic
7	rights under copyright are being severely
8	restricted without actually examining the
9	technical background? So, I reiterate, I
LO	think this is a timely point at which to
L1	fundamentally rethink what we are doing.
L2	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you very
L3	much.
L4	I am going to go to Mr. Band, and
L5	then, Mr. Glazier.
L6	MR. BAND: Sure. So, in response
L7	to Maria's hypothetical, I think a lot would
L8	depend on exactly what the reasoning of the
L9	Court was. If, in the highly-unlikely event
20	that they issued a ruling that was sort of so
21	sweeping that it really would encompass cloud
22	computing, then, yes. Then, I would think

that we would want a statutory change.

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involved.

But if they were to adopt

something more narrow, something along the

lines of what the SG was recommending, then I

don't think that, even though I may or may not

agree with all the reasoning of the Court, I

would think that at that point it would be

probably not necessary for Congress to get

I mean, again, it is always a bit of a -- there is this notion that, well, when Congress gets involved and they clarify, that you really have clarity. And I think you only get a little bit of clarity. I think there's always going to be new fact patterns, new situations.

And again, Aereo is a perfect
example where, you know, building on what
Patrice was saying, one of the problems was,
because of the strange way Cablevision was
litigated and the issues that were never
resolved in Cablevision because of the

stipulation, that led Aereo to be litigated in a very strange way.

And so, you don't have in Aereo -none of the courts looked at the most basic
issue, which was, who was doing this, right,
the whole issue of who was the volitional
actor? There is no decision on that.

So, in many ways, what the Supreme Court really should do is remand and figure out who is the volitional actor, but that is probably not going to happen.

But the point is that, you know, it doesn't matter what the statute says, given that in that case it is not clear, and all the briefs are sort of talking past each other, because there is no ruling as to who was the volitional actor, and, obviously, if ultimately Aereo is the volitional actor, they lose. If the users are the volitional actor, I think Aereo wins. And who cares what the transmit clause says?

But I think that that is the

1	point, is that you might not like the result.
2	You go to Congress. You come up with some
3	kind of clarification. But, then, there is
4	going to be the next case, new fact pattern,
5	and we are not necessarily going to be any
6	better off than we were with the existing
7	statutory framework.
8	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you.
9	I am going to go to Mr. Glazier,
10	and then, Professor Menell.
11	MR. GLAZIER: Thank you.
12	I think the question in Aereo, if
13	Congress had to amend the law, might focus a
14	little bit more precisely on what "to the
15	public" means than it does on "making
16	available" or "distribution" or "performance"
17	or "right of communication."
18	You know, in that case I don't
19	think that the concept of making available is
20	as much at stake as are you making it
21	available to the public. And right now,
22	whether it is the distribution right or the

performance right or transmission in 106(6),

"to the public" is the key piece there. And

even where Congress clarified the distribution

right in the NET Act for purposes of Section

506, it was to make available on a computer

network accessible to the public.

So, I think if Congress were to open up the Copyright Act because of Aereo in order to address the issue in Aereo in the government's brief, it would have to focus on whether or not what Aereo did was actually a one-to-many public act, even though they tried to get around it by using 1950s technology in a 2014 sort of a cloud computing case.

If the question is, while the patient is on the table are there opportunities to address other acts within the copyright law, whether it is for politics and tradeoff, which I think are some of the things that Jonathan has put on the table, or things that might need to be clarified, like Professor Menell has put on the table, I think

that is a little bit of a related, but
separate question. But I am not sure that
Aereo itself, it might be the catalyst, but I
am not sure that it itself raises the making
available question, nor should it be
interpreted by anybody that a result in Aereo
somehow means we don't have a making available
right.

MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you.

Professor Menell?

PROFESSOR MENELL: I tend to agree with Register Pallante's call for a much broader review of the entire copyright statute. And I realize that we are here for a more limited purpose, but I feel that this is going to take some time and we have, I think, good reason. I think we are well past the period which the 1976 Act is obsolete on so many dimensions. We have come up with a whole bunch of kludgy solutions. We are relying on courts to come up with other kludges.

And while this is happening, we are losing a lot of the public. And I say that because this is not the crowd where that broader public is present.

And Andrew's point about, you know, he is worried that we won't have the right people in the room, and that this process is -- when you go back to the 1960s, it was a pretty open process. It is true that it didn't include consumer groups and some other groups because that was less in play. Today it is in play, and I think that we are a country that is democratically-governed. And so, I worry about the path dependence of waiting for the Supreme Court to do things and Congress to react.

I think Congress can be proactive.

We are long past a point at which Congress
should be looking at these issues. Just let
me pick a specific example that relates very
closely.

So, the last time we looked at

damages was in 1999. It was the Digital

Deterrence Act, and it was focused on a very
particular pathology. It was a pathology of
perhaps a bulletin board service that is
putting video games up. The software industry
was perhaps united with the recording industry
and the motion picture industry. And that was
the target.

Within a year of that legislation,
Napster happened. And Napster completely
changed the terms of the debate. And I don't
think anyone who was coming up with that
regime was thinking about the issues, and so,
making available followed after that.

So, we can say courts might get
this right, but, meanwhile, the world -- and
I don't mean that in just kind of a general
way -- I mean, I think we have an opportunity
to lead on this issue. We ought to lead on
this issue. We have leading industries.

And I realize right now there is a lot of nervousness because no one wants to

1 open up the Pandora's box. But Register 2 Pallante has already done that, and the Patent 3 Office is starting to do that. And I hope that Congress will see that this is not an 4 5 issue where we want to just wait and react. 6 I think we have a lot of facts, a 7 lot of knowledge, and the process that 8 unfolded 50 years ago could be replicated on It doesn't have to take 20 9 a shorter time. 10 It could happen much sooner. years. But it would take several years. And this process I 11 12 think is really helping. And I would love to have a discussion. 13 14 I mean, no one is quite willing to 15 do it, but I do feel that there are a whole 16 bunch of really valuable improvements that we 17 could make, and it could get perhaps a 18 stronger takedown regime, but much more 19 rational damages. And making available is 20 intertwined with that. 21 MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you. And the

only thing I would just clarify is just that,

yes, the Copyright Office, Register Pallante did mention a review of the entire statute.

How that review ends up, as to whether there should be or there is a need for legislative change is something I think we have not concluded, and certainly Congress is still considering that as well.

Did I have anybody else to respond? Oh, Mr. Adler?

MR. ADLER: I thought it was very interesting that, when you asked the question, you didn't pose it in terms of whether or not the Aereo decision came out the wrong way or in a way that you would not have supported.

You mentioned the United States' position.

And I think, on this issue, the
United States government, the Executive Branch
is really vested. For 16 years, they have
adhered to the same position that they took
originally, which was that the umbrella
approach would work in terms of the United
States honoring its obligations as a signator

to the WIPO Treaties.

attractive at that time because I think there was still a certain resonance from the fact that some 20-odd years earlier we had done the same thing. As part of the United States accession to Berne, it accepted the responsibility of moral rights by saying that, well, we already have that embodied in a number of areas of federal law and state law, and they pointed to defamation law, rights of publicity, privacy, and a variety of things like that.

I think what simply happened here is that this turned out to be a tougher issue because so much has changed around the basic premise, unlike what happened with moral rights, where there was relatively little change around the basic premise that said moral rights could be addressed through an umbrella approach.

So, I think that it is really

critical that, to the extent that the position on this issue of the Executive Branch of government as far as I know has not changed at all, and, in fact, I suppose some would argue that the government has doubled down in terms of carrying its position forward into international trade agreements that it has with respect to the view that at least the United States government, for purposes of trade policy, believes it knows and understands what the making available right is.

I would hope that, before we turn this issue over to the kind of food fight environment that would ultimately ensue if Congress were asked to try to deal with this issue among the many other aspects of copyright review that it ultimately may consider as fodder for legislative revision, I would think that the United States government could do a great service by making sure that in every case where this issue

arises they introduce a brief stating their position with respect to the making available right.

If they cannot present their position as to why the umbrella approach is still a valid way of the United States complying with its obligations with respect to this right, then I think we probably have crossed the threshold that might call for congressional action.

But, until that happens, I don't think that the actions of less than a handful of lower-level federal courts, the actions basically of just a few judges, should ultimately determine that this issue has to be thrown back to Congress, and that the Executive Branch, which advised Congress on the umbrella approach, and the Congress, which accepted that approach and has stood by it all these years, should be suddenly sent back to the drawing board because a few federal judges got the issue wrong.

1	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you, Mr.
2	Adler.
3	I think it is Mr. Band next.
4	MR. BAND: So, I might agree with
5	what Allan said; I might not. I am not sure
6	100 percent.
7	(Laughter.)
8	But I will say that I don't think
9	that the government needs to be intervening in
10	every single case where the making available
11	right comes up. You know, there are many
12	treaty obligations and, arguably, you could
13	say that the U.S. Government needs to get
14	involved in all of them by that logic. And I
15	just don't think that that is the case.
16	And I think, again, in this case,
17	you know, I have always thought that the
18	notion that somehow what the Court does in
19	Aereo has anything to do with the
20	international obligations concerning the
21	public performance, again, is sort of
22	misplaced.

How a court rules in any given case turns on those specific facts, and, you know, the treaty obligations go much more to statutes and what Congress does, rather than what happens in any given case.

And again, I would like to reiterate, especially in this case, given that if the Court were to find that the volitional actor is the user, and that there is significance to all of these dime-sized antennas, then I think that that is fine. And that is the way the Court rules, and it is not a public performance because it is not public. And that has nothing to do with what our treaty obligations are because the Court has interpreted that there is this intermediary intervening copy, and that makes a difference.

And I don't see why any treaty obligation would have an impact on that interpretation, frankly, of the facts. And so, I think this notion always that, oh, ruling this way or ruling that way will

1	somehow interfere with our international
2	obligations, I think that that is you know,
3	cases turn on facts, and the specific facts
4	make a difference.
5	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you very
6	much.
7	I think we will go into a slightly
8	related question. So, I think a number of
9	panelists have mentioned that they would not
L0	necessarily think that there needed to be
L1	legislative change, that clarification might
L2	come from Copyright Office guidance, for
L3	example.
L4	And so, one question we had would
L5	be, is there any consensus or agreement as to
L6	what that Copyright Office guidance should
L7	look like in terms of making available? Is
L8	there a consensus in terms of what U.S. law
L9	covers in that instance?
20	And so, we talked about these
21	issues a little bit in the earlier panels, but
22	I wanted to kind of go back to some of the

1	specific examples that we weren't able to
2	finish discussing before.
3	So, for example, in the case of
4	someone who puts a digital file in a share
5	folder, would the Copyright Office or would a
6	guidance saying that that is, in fact, a
7	violation of the distribution right be
8	something that the panel would agree is
9	appropriate? So, I will just throw it out
10	there, and then, we can talk about some of
11	those other specific examples that we didn't
12	get a chance to talk about, like linking and
13	other things like that.
14	So, I wanted to just open it up
15	with a general question, and then, look at
16	specific activities if we were going to
17	provide guidance in this area.
18	I will start with Mr. Bridges,
19	then Ms. Lyons.
20	MR. BRIDGES: Thank you.
21	I will start with a question,
22	frankly, on a matter where I think I know a

1 little bit, but I may be ignorant. Has the 2 Copyright Office issued guidance as to whether a purely-online website is published? 3 4 MS. CLAGGETT: No, I don't believe 5 that we have. 6 MR. BRIDGES: I think that is 7 because it touches the very issue here. 8 Because the Copyright Office has issued guidance that says, "For a publication to 9 10 occur, there must have been a distribution of 11 copies to the public by sale or other transfer 12 of ownership, rental, lease, or lending, or an offer to do the same." 13 14 And so, if we are going to build 15 this discussion around publication, the fact 16 that the Copyright Office, on the fundamental building block of the discussion here has not 17 18 taken a position, or if the position is there, 19 it is the works that are available only online 20 have not been published, then I don't think we 21 are talking about mere Copyright Office 2.2 clarification, but we are talking about an

1 adjustment and possibly a change in Copyright 2 Office guidance on some issues. 3 This takes us back to the point 4 Ms. Lyons made, which is once we start going into this, there are all sorts of unintended 5 6 consequences. And then, will the Copyright 7 Office take a position on whether "copy" in 8 Section 109 for the so-called first sale doctrine means the same thing as "copy" in 9 10 Section 106(3)? 11 I think once we want to go down 12 this -- my view is on guidance -- guidance should not be a vehicle for changing 13 14 established positions or for putting a system 15 out of equilibrium by focusing on the burning 16 issue du jour. 17 MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you. 18 Ms. Lyons? 19 MS. LYONS: Thank you. 20 Copyright guidance and statutory 21 interpretation, I remember the regulatory 2.2 proceedings when I used to be in the Office of General Counsel at Copyright, and then, there would be litigation afterwards, everybody:

"How could you make that decision?" and that sort of thing.

so, a careful evaluation, rather than trying to get into statutory guidance, which is somewhat similar to regulatory proceedings, might be a more advisable way to consider here, especially when making available may be viewed as a type of public performance. And if you get into that, there is -- I mentioned today the patent law -- but there is an even bigger morass. It is the communications law, and what does it mean to be broadcast and cable and TV?

I have been following several proceedings at the FCC where they are trying to grapple with this very issue. Because when you have information that is structured using the internet protocols, and it is made available through what you might call broadcast facilities, just maybe whatever

computational facility you might have, and take the labels away and look at the functionality, what is actually happening, you may come out with a better way to approach it.

Because, otherwise, you open the door where people are going to get frustrated and they are going to say, "Well, we're going to use it anyhow and nobody is going to get paid." And you are not to be going litigating everywhere.

I was in a meeting in Europe where a big telco group had invited me as a copyright expert. And actually, somebody from a U.S. university got up in this rather small group and suggested there should be a compulsory license for everything on the internet. Well, you see, I took a pause, counted to 10, and then, addressed the issue.

So, the temptation is there to say, "Oh, this is too hard." And so, whatever they consider the broadcast, the 111, and all the licenses and public performance, they

1	really need to step back and see, if you are
2	going to consider this a public performance,
3	and making available appears to be in that
4	kind of genre, what are you going to do? Are
5	you going to, then, say, "Here's a better way
6	to do it?" And you can't ask the FCC for
7	guidance as to what is cable and broadcast in
8	that context because maybe they really don't
9	know right now.
10	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you.
11	Mr. Band?
12	MR. BAND: So, addressing
13	specifically the issue that Maria asked I
14	think it was Maria who asked it about
15	consensus with respect to putting a work in
16	the share file, you know, I think there
17	probably would be a degree of consensus that
18	that is implicated by 106, but what part of
19	106 there might be disagreement on.
20	So, not to sound too much like a
21	broken record, you know, I would view that as
22	certainly the courts have found that to be a

distribution right, you know, an infringement of the distribution right. I think it would probably be better to classify it as an infringement of the reproduction right.

And here, I just want to respond briefly to the question that Professor Menell asked at the end of the last session, when I made the same point, which is it does seem to me that it is more of a timing issue. In other words, if a user first uploads or first installs peer-to-peer software, and then, after that, places a work on their hard drive, and by virtue of the peer-to-peer software, that work sort of by default is automatically in the share file and automatically is made available, it seems to me that that probably would be an infringement of the reproduction right.

It could be, if the order was reversed, in other words, that the work was on the hard drive first, and then, the software, the peer-to-peer software was placed. Maybe

that wouldn't, in that specific case there wouldn't be an infringement of the reproduction right with respect to the music file that was already on the hard drive.

But, presumably, a person is going to keep on adding more music after they already have the peer-to-peer software on their computer. And it would seem to me that when you do add more music files already you already have that, the file sharing software on your computer, that anytime you add it in a way that sort of automatically makes it available, that that would be or should be seen as an infringement right. And so, again, it seems to me that that takes care of the problem.

MS. CLAGGETT: I guess we have got a number of people. So, I am just going to go kind of down here, because I didn't reference the specific order, but I will go with Ms.

Moy, Professor Menell, Mr. Kupferschmid, and then, Mr. Glazier.

MS. MOY: All right. Thank you.

So, I think in the last panel I brought up the issue of cloud computing and the possibility that a broader making available right would cover uses of cloud computing that we would have no intention of covering.

So, I don't know whether or not we are in consensus with respect to this, but I think that any clarification coming out of the Copyright Office would have to consider very carefully what happens in the situation where someone saves a PowerPoint presentation with a copyrighted image on a drive that is accessible to members of a company with, say, 500 employees? Or what happens if somebody backs up their hard drive to a shared network? Or what happens if someone accidentally indexes a folder that is in their Dropbox that contains copyrighted works, to make it available publicly through a link on the web, even though they don't share that link? What

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1	happens in each one of these situations?
2	And I think someone else mentioned
3	on the last panel that I don't think anybody
4	who is in favor of a broader making available
5	right would want to cover these types of
6	instances. But I think that it is very
7	important that we consider those and make sure
8	that, if we are going to clarify that some
9	placing of copyrighted works in a shared
10	folder constitutes distribution under 106,
11	then we need to make sure that it doesn't
12	cover those other uses.
13	MS. CLAGGETT: Professor Menell?
14	PROFESSOR MENELL: How you
15	accomplish this goal of assisting courts and
16	assisting Congress is an interesting question
17	of governance. You know, what is the role of
18	the Copyright Office in this complex web of
19	institutions?
20	I think there is a tiered set of
21	approaches. But one approach might be to,
22	through an official document that has I

will use the Orphan Works Study as an example

-- that provides a very scholarly approach to

the issue, that tries to sort of look out at

all of the work that has been done, and to try

to organize that, so that courts and lawyers

can access that. I think that is sort of a

low level of intervention.

And especially in this area, the reason I entitled my article "In Search of Copyright's Lost Ark" is because I think we have lost some of that institutional memory. It is now there, and I think that people are going to reference it increasingly. And so, to help to make that more accessible to the public.

It was interesting to me, just because two members of the Copyright Office, staff who I have great admiration for, David Carson and Rob Kasunic, both wrote excellent articles about this problem leading up to it.

But we have lost connection, the institutional memory, and that is what had

happened even by 1976. So, to the extent that you are playing just sort of an archival role, you will help that process.

Now some Justices and judges might not consider this pertinent. We have heard a lot about whether or not legislative history is appropriate. I think that we are inevitably drawn to getting behind that curtain, that we want to see what people were talking about and how they thought about it.

And I think when you do that, often it does achieve clarity. And so, this is kind of a very low-level intervention that I don't think anyone could really object to. You are just telling the history of how a law came to be, in which the Copyright Office was the central actor. And so, I don't know that it requires you to do that much more than what I and Professor Nimmer have tried to do, but it does matter that it comes from an institution like this.

There are, I think, steps above

1	that. And we have heard reasons why perhaps
2	those steps ought not to be taken, at least
3	aggressively or immediately.
4	My instinct is to try to see how
5	the Green Paper process plays out in
6	conjunction with some of the things that
7	Representative Goodlatte is doing and what you
8	are doing, but building towards what was
9	referred to earlier as really trying to set
10	forth the group of studies that would enable
11	the nation to look at this set of questions.
12	But if you are looking for what
13	can be done in the short-run, I think just
14	providing that history would be a valuable
15	service.
16	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you very
17	much.
18	Mr. Kupferschmid?
19	MR. KUPFERSCHMID: We asked what
20	Copyright Office guidance should look like.
21	I will go back to my earlier answer, which I
22	don't think the Copyright Office I don't

think it is necessary to provide any clarification or guidance here. There is a real risk that, when you do so, you may create, inadvertently create, a whole new can of worms or level of confusion.

But, to the extent you decide otherwise, I think, actually, Mr. Adler had a good example or a good suggestion about filing briefs, maybe not every case, but in certain more complicated cases or something, which gives the Copyright Office the ability to look at the factual scenario in that case and determine how it should apply.

But if the Copyright Office were to go down this path in terms of defining or clarifying what it means, or the making available right, what it means to make something available, you have got to define what that term means. What does it mean to make something available? What types of actions? What are the parameters of doing so with the limitations? And that, like I said,

I think that is fairly difficult.

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I want to raise some other issues that people -- or address some other issues that people said. Mr. Bridges mentioned, well, in order to do that, you have to define copy as being consistent, with 106(3) and 109 have to be consistent. And that is just not the case.

I mean, the first sale doctrine,

109, talks about the particular copy. So, we
will move on from there and save that
discussion of the first sale doctrine for
another day.

Jonathan, in addressing the shared file issue where they are copying a shared file, reverts back to sort of that it should be a violation of the reproduction right. And that is somewhat antiquated thinking because of the cloud computing issue where you have something that is legally, legitimately put up in the cloud, is not illegal reproduction, but access to that may be limited to one person or

a group of people. But, then, access is provided to that much greater to what is supposed to be provided, and that is exactly the type of scenario where we need a distribution right to cover that type of situation.

And then, lastly, Laura had mentioned the situation of somebody who accidentally uploads a work onto a shared file. It sort of reminded me of that old Steve Martin bit, you know, "Oops, I forgot murder was against the law."

(Laughter.)

And then, eventually, she says the error was discovered and corrected. I mean, we are going to get that excuse on every single case if that were the situation.

"Oops, I didn't know. I did it accidentally."

I mean, that issue, the state of mind or the intent will go to damages. It has not been, should not be a role, play a role in copyright, unless you are talking about

1 secondary liability, which we are not in this 2 case. 3 So, in terms of the academic 4 articles or software somebody put on a shared 5 file, know what you're doing. Know who you 6 are letting access to your computer and your 7 I mean, that is good practice, aside from copyright. 8 9 MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you. 10 And I think I am just going to go 11 down the row in terms of order. So, Mr. 12 Glazier, then Mr. Bridges, Mr. Barnes, Ms. 13 Aistars, and Mr. Adler. And then, I will come 14 back to Ms. Moy. 15 MR. GLAZIER: Thank you. 16 I think maybe "quidance" is the wrong word because it almost makes it sound 17 18 like a business advisory opinion or something 19 from the Department of Justice where you are 20 commenting on whether it is okay for somebody 21 to proceed with a particular business plan or 2.2 whether they are or aren't going to be liable

1 under it.

2.2

And I think you can't do that because you can't make that guarantee of enforcement. And I think maybe "opinion" is the better word, and I do think it is pretty necessary because the Copyright Office has issued an opinion on this in the past during the development of the legislation and beyond that. And now, you have a handful of district courts who have issued opinions that do not mesh with the stated public opinion of the expert agency during that time.

so, I do think it is time for an updated opinion where the Copyright Office specifically addresses why it still believes what it believes, if it does, despite the handful of cases that have come out and tried to apply the umbrella approach to the particular facts of those cases.

And I do think it is necessary to get into what the Supreme Court has said, and you have said this in the past, has said about

the link between distribution and publication because it can be quite circular. And you sort of brought this up, where we certainly believe that distribution in 106(3) broadly includes general publication, and that publication is defined and distribution is not. And I know they covered this this morning, but publication really does explicitly cover offering to distribute, but requires some distribution.

So, the whole thing is circular.

You have addressed this before. You have talked about why making available exists in the umbrella approach. And I think it is necessary to just -- I won't even use the word "clarify" -- to update the opinion to specifically note why that approach is still the opinion of the expert agency today, despite a few district court opinions that seem to, when applied, these particular facts go in a different direction.

MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you.

1	Mr. Bridges and Mr. Barnes, and
2	then, Ms. Aistars and Mr. Adler.
3	MR. BRIDGES: Sure. Well, I sort
4	of like the concept of investigation that both
5	Ms. Lyons and Professor Menell suggested. But
6	the question is, what should we be
7	investigating?
8	I have heard earlier today
9	statements that, well, maybe the Copyright Act
10	is obsolete or maybe it hasn't kept up with
11	the times or maybe the changes in technology
12	are putting undue pressure on things, and we
13	need to understand how to address new
14	challenges like Bit Torrent and the like.
15	I think the way to do that is not
16	to do historical research in how we got from
17	the 1909 Act to this obsolete 1976 Act. I
18	think that, if we are going to investigate
19	things, let's investigate requiring fact,
20	evidence-based criteria. What at this date
21	promotes "the Progress of Science and the
22	useful Arts ?" Isn't that the

1 enterprise?

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Let's understand how this discussion fits into the copyright's constitutional purpose. Let's look for evidence-based discussions, not sort of necessarily partisan predictions of how people will themselves react, if certain things happen and don't happen. But do a broader fact-based investigation of that nature, and then, there can be some guidance about whether the current conditions measured by that standard justify congressional action or not, and then, whether the conditions justify some other response.

But it seems to me, I agree an investigation is appropriate, but I think the unique virtue and competence of the Copyright Office is to measure these questions according to the constitutional purpose of copyright and to make evidence-based decisions.

MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you very much.

Mr. Barnes?

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MR. BARNES: Yes, I think we should probably stay away from some of the titles just in general. So, when you call it clarification, guidance, or opinions, I think automatically you are going to get certain s stakeholders that are concerned because you are going to position them as winners or losers automatically.

I think Professor Menell's framework is really valid, looking at historical background as a starting point.

And the reason I think that is important is because Members of Congress -- there is a lot of turnover on the Judiciary Committee and within the Congress at large.

And so, Andrew is a good friend, and I often agree with him. But it is important to educate the Members because a lot of them don't have an historical background and that framework to understand how we got to where we are today. And I think that would be

helpful. And this is a very technical area of law, most people know. So, I think that is a good starting point.

I think what I would add to this report, which is what I would just call it, on this topic of making available is an issuespotting area. So, we have talked about -- I think there was a back-and-forth between Andrew and Keith just about the definition of copy.

And so, we should look at certain things that would have to be decided if Congress was going to change the law, and that can be flagged for Members, so that they can look at that. But I would stay away from actually making strong recommendations. I mean, you obviously could include in this report a back-and-forth about where certain stakeholders are. So, at least that way, Members of Congress kind of get a sense of where the constituencies are at large.

But I would stop short of doing

1	the actual hard recommendation. And I think
2	there are a couple of reasons you want to do
3	that. And it is simply because technology
4	changes, business models adapt and evolve, and
5	where you draw the line in this report is
6	going to be debated for years to come through
7	litigation, and it is probably not going to
8	suffice five years from now. And so, maybe it
9	is better to just stop at that point in the
10	report and, then, have Members of Congress
11	take it up from there.
12	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you.
13	Ms. Aistars?
14	MS. AISTARS: Thanks.
15	I guess I would start by asking
16	the question, who is your audience when you
17	are issuing guidance? And my answer to that
18	would be that the courts are your audience,
19	the courts, the clerks, and the judges writing
20	the opinions.
21	And so, in issuing guidance, I
22	guess I would begin by considering the

umbrella approach, commenting on why it still applies, why it still works, perhaps reviewing the scope of rights under each of the implied rights, the evidentiary requirements for each, and commenting on the existing case law and providing some rationale for understanding that case law under the rubric that you have provided for the courts to consider.

And maybe conclude with explaining how to, in general terms, continue to rule in a fashion that upholds our obligations internationally and that remains consistent with the congressional intent generally.

What I would not suggest is taking a very granular approach and trying to imagine all of the different scenarios that might come up and commenting on, well, this is in and this is out, and if you place a file in your share folder before you have installed software versus after, you know, no disrespect intended to Jonathan, but I just think that is a very difficult exercise to engage in.

Regardless of how you come out on the results,
you are just never going to be able to imagine
all the possible scenarios and factual
situations.

The other comment that I would make is with regard to the cloud computing concerns that have been raised. I share some of the views that Keith Kupferschmid expressed. I guess I would say it is not clear to me why this situation is any different than any other business situation that businesses find themselves in with regards to employees behaving appropriately in the workplace.

You know, it is no different to me than making sure that they are not making hundreds of copies of an article and distributing them in analog form. It is just a different iteration of the same problem, and businesses have dealt with that over the years, you know, quite readily, either by getting CCC licenses or by issuing best

1 practices and educating their employees as to 2 what is appropriate and what is not. 3 don't see it as any different of a problem. 4 MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you very 5 much. 6 Before I move on to Mr. Adler, I 7 will just point out that we have about 15 8 minutes left in this session. So, I think I 9 am going to go back around to all the people 10 who have their flags up now for final remarks. 11 And then, we will open it up and see if there 12 are any audience comments. Mr. Adler? 13 14 Yes, I just wanted to MR. ADLER: 15 make two points. One sort of builds on the 16 point I made before and, then, is amplified by 17 what Mitch suggested and what Sandra had 18 suggested. 19 The legislative history that 20 Professor Menell unearthed is very 21 interesting. It is also very revealing about 2.2 the evolution of these concepts in the

1 | Copyright Act.

2.2

But, ultimately, I think we find ourselves in the position that we are in because the people who espouse the umbrella approach basically failed us in the sense that their approach ignored basic rules of statutory construction and, also, made a very essential etymological mistake. They simply seem to have assumed that the making available right and the terminology use was basically redundant with the idea of distribution. Of course, we now know it is not.

There is an overlap, to be sure, as there is an overlap with public performance and display. But, clearly, generally speaking, when a legislature uses different words, one doesn't assume that they are merely asserting the same idea and using different words to do it.

The idea that the WIPO Treaties established making available as a new right, but merely that it was redundant of the

existing right of distribution, makes no sense in the international context and it makes even less sense with respect to the way in which the U.S. would treat the question of whether or not that right already existed in U.S. law.

And I see the error here as one that very recently occurred by the Supreme Court in the Kirtsaeng case, and was pointed out, interestingly, by one-third of the majority in that decision, indicating that really, as far as the makeup of the Court was concerned, that majority opinion was wrong.

Justice Kagan, with Justice Alito in agreement, pointed out that they were stuck with the Supreme Court's Quality King decision in which the Court simply assumed that importation is a form of distribution, nothing more. And because distribution is subject to the first sale doctrine as a limitation, so must importation right in the same way.

But, as she pointed out, if they had recognized that importation differs from

distribution in key ways, and certainly would differ with respect to the way it might interplay with the first sale doctrine, if there is an interplay at all, you would come out with a very different result that actually would have made very sensible law and sensible policy.

And I think the same thing is true here. And this is, again, the burden I think initially of the United States government in terms of taking positions as to what its advocacy of the umbrella approach to codification or the lack of need of codification of a making available right means, to be able to articulate to the courts how making available differs from and is not merely redundant of distribution or publication, for that matter.

And I think if that were done, it would open the door to being able to make the appropriate distinctions between the way making available interacts with distribution,

the way it interacts with public performance, the way it interacts with display. If you were to pick any 20 people off the street and ask them if they knew what it meant to make something available, they probably would give you a very reasonable and fairly consistent answer to that question. We have kind of tortured this because it is a legal concept and it has far-reaching applications when applied by the courts.

And then, the other point I was going to make goes back to, again, my friend Jonathan's dogged insistence that the reproduction right resolves all of these issues. Again, it loses sight -- and I think, Jacqueline, your question this morning pointed that out -- it loses sight of the fact that, when we began looking at the question of how existing copyright law would work or wouldn't work in the digital era -- remember the quaintly-named Information Superhighway studies that were done in 1995 led by Vice

President Gore after he discovered the internet?

Basically, when they were doing that, the thing that they understood more than anything else as the central concept that made their need to study those questions so important was the realization that the same act violating the same rights that had existed in the analog world, but now occurring in the digital environment would have exponentially greater harm.

And so, there was a need to consider their application in different contexts, but also in different terms. And so, for example, when Jonathan says that this all could be treated very simply if we just focused on the fact that reproduction is involved, so let's forget about making available, let's even forget about distribution, and just call it a violation of the reproduction right. So, essentially, everything gets reduced to the making of a

single copy, and that is the scope of the violation, regardless of the exponential level of harm that could result when that happens online.

And it seems to me that we have talked a great deal about this in terms of its relation to statutory damages, but, remember, there is another whole area of remedies to consider here. And that is the area of injunctive relief. Because injunctive relief is an equitable doctrine, it is perfectly legitimate for judges in those cases to be able to consider that, when somebody places copyrighted work into a shared folder online, are they doing so in reckless disregard of a reasonably foreseeable harm that is likely to That is something that is perfectly occur? within the right of a federal judge to consider in shaping injunctive relief.

And I think we need to think more about that aspect of this issue when we think about the importance of why making available

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1	was established as a separate right, and not
2	merely something that was repetitive or
3	redundant of existing rights.
4	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you very
5	much.
6	And I guess we have a few more
7	flags. As I said, we are going to try to see
8	if we have a few moments for audience
9	participation. But I think I had said Ms. Moy
LO	next, and then, I will go back and start with
L1	Ms. Wolff, Professor Menell, Ms. Lyons, and
L2	then, end with Mr. Band.
L3	MS. MOY: I am just trying to
L 4	bring us back to thinking about the situations
L5	where perhaps no distribution has actually
L6	occurred, and we are just looking at offering
L7	something to the public.
L8	And as Public Knowledge explained
L9	in our comments, we don't think that there
20	should be an exclusive right to cover that
21	situation. But, that aside, if we are going
22	to decide to cover that, I do think that we

need to take into consideration the average user. And other members of this panel have said that they don't think that the average user would accidentally index something that is a copyrighted work on a shared drive or that they should just have company best practices or just best practices generally to prevent copyrighted works from ending up on shared drives.

But I think it is the situation
where someone, for example, puts together a
PowerPoint presentation that includes a
copyrighted image and saves it on a networked
drive. It is something that is going to occur
all the time. It occurs all the time now.

And I think if you think that that doesn't occur, then you are out of touch with the average user. You are greatly overestimating the sophistication of the average user.

And if we think that every one of those instances is a copyright violation, I

1	think that that is at odds with copyright's
2	intent to promote the progress of science and
3	useful arts, and it is also at odds with the
4	treaty.
5	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you very
6	much.
7	Ms. Wolff?
8	MS. WOLFF: Well, I will give you
9	a very easy broad license for that image, and
10	you will have no problem.
11	(Laughter.)
12	You can do that within your
13	company. I mean, to me, that is just
14	licensing, and you take care of it when you
15	start and you think about your uses.
16	But I just want to sort of go back
17	to the original question. Do we think the
18	umbrella approach still works today? And I
19	think it only does if the courts correctly
20	understand and interpret the six exclusive
21	rights that we have.
22	And I think in some areas we do

fail, and I go back to the display right. I think we do fail there, and how we try to give either guidance, opinion, or wait for the courts. And I think we have to remember that the Constitution does talk about authors, and authors can be a general user and they can be individual artists. They can be visual artists. They can be songwriters. And they can't always afford to go to the Supreme Court and wait to make law change.

And I think if there is any way to have clarity or have any type of whatever you call it, opinions, to make it clear that we have each of these six exclusive rights, and that they are separate and you can violate the public right to display without having a reproduction, I mean all those things I think would be very helpful because judges are generalists and they don't always get things right. And they only look at the papers they do have in front of them.

So, if it means having the

1	government present briefs, like they did in
2	the recent Alaska Stock v. HMH case, it is
3	just helpful for going back to Copyright
4	Office practices and what people expect their
5	rights are. I mean, people, visual artists do
6	expect that they do have the right to public
7	display their work and to control those
8	rights.
9	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you very
10	much.
11	Professor Menell?
12	PROFESSOR MENELL: The Copyright
13	Office has historically played some essential
14	roles in our entire cultural history. So, I
15	look at this question and I say, well, there
16	isn't one hat; there are multiple hats that
17	you need to be focused on. And one is
18	fidelity to law, that the Copyright Office is
19	part of the knowledge that guides courts and
20	the public.
21	And so, I believe that being much
22	more open about how judges can access the law

1	it is very hard for lawyers to make some of
2	the arguments that I, as a scholar, can make.
3	Part of the reason I file briefs in the courts
4	is because the courts are going to be
5	suspicious when something gets pulled out of
6	a legislative history. I try to be very
7	thorough in the work that I do. I never want
8	someone to say, "You missed something."
9	And I think the Copyright Office
10	is a place that can do that with a high degree
11	of fidelity. It has those records. It can
12	and should maintain an institutional memory.
13	And I will point out something
14	that no one has picked up on, but it was in
15	this research I found. The Geneva Phonogram
16	Convention, it was a very interesting part of
17	the history that led to specific language in
18	the Sound Recording Amendments Act of 1971
19	having to do with making available.
20	And so, I don't go to the more
21	recent treaties. I go all the way back there,
22	and the U.S. took a pretty aggressive position

1	in order to establish serious protection for
2	phonograms. And so, that is part of our
3	history, and I think it does inform these
4	issues. And some of the language that wound
5	up in the 1976 Act grew out of that whole
6	little sideshow, but it is a really
7	interesting sideshow. That is one hat.
8	The other hat is as a legislative
9	counselor, and the entire 1976 Act grew out of
10	the Copyright Office as really the drafter,
11	the drafting institution doing events like
12	this. And I think that that ought to be
13	sketched out.
14	And I realize you have principals
15	that you respond to in Congress, but I think
16	that they could perhaps benefit from hearing
17	sort of a more systematic approach to how we
18	are going to get at perhaps the evidence-based
19	decision making that Andrew referred to.
20	But I will say, as someone who was

in a recent NAS study about evidence-based

decision making, I am skeptical, even as a

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social scientist, that we are going to get the answers to all the questions that we want through empirical studies. The data is very hard to get at, and the data can't deal with a whole bunch of hypothetical scenarios.

The problem, when I look out into the content world today, is that I worry increasingly about how advertising is now the dominant modality for paying for our culture.

And Madison Avenue shouldn't be the way in which art comes about. It should come about through markets with the consumers, people who value those works.

And so, it is not hard to put together an empirical study showing, look, these industries are doing better than they used to do. But, when artists are being told, "You need to have these product placements, and we need to do this and that," that I think corrupts the entire system.

So, I do think empirical evidence is going to be very important, but I think it

1	is really important not to just accept
2	traditional measures. We have to go back to
3	what copyright was about, which was creating
4	a marketplace for the creativity that would
5	come up through a true marketplace, and not
6	this I think much limited marketplace that is
7	driven by media.
8	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you very
9	much.
10	I think we have three people
11	remaining, but only a few minutes. So, if I
12	could ask everyone to just be very brief?
13	Yes, please, Ms. Lyons.
14	MS. LYONS: Just a backup thought,
15	since 1976, the Act was adopted, there have
16	been important developments in the
17	computational capabilities and networking, and
18	I think we will all recognize that that is the
19	case. And oftentimes, people talk about a
20	copyright work as if it is a music work rather
21	than the representation of that work in some
22	digital form.

And we have been working with the copyright industries for many years now to develop ways of structuring the data, so that it would be identifiable and you can manage the licensing rights in the network environment.

And in this context, I have been giving some consideration to, if copy is found to just be the tangible, which I suspect may be where it comes out, that there might be alternate bases for exploring, if you have a digital object or other similar data structure that is uniquely and persistently identifiable, and there is some way in the registry system to keep hash of that, that it could be a logical equivalent of a copy.

And this comes into play

particularly when you are in a volatile

processing environment, because if you are

playing a video game that has preexisting

works that are incorporated in that, there may

be new works that are generated on the fly,

1	just as is happening. So, you might want to
2	consider that.
3	And in conjunction with that, how
4	to identify that it is protected? So, the
5	notice of copyright really truly needs to be
6	reevaluated. In its current form, it doesn't
7	perform that useful function at all.
8	And some sort of agreed standard
9	in the metadata, which would be acceptable
LO	under the Berne Convention they have a
L1	provision that would allow standardization of
L2	certain identification information may be
L3	a helpful start on that.
L 4	Now, for evaluation, just a quick,
L5	practical suggestion.
L6	MS. CLAGGETT: Very quickly,
L7	because I am going to have to push on.
L8	MS. LYONS: I am going to do it.
L9	You have use cases. I mean, I
20	have been to many standards groups, and they
21	have use cases. Well, instead of taking a
22	live litigation where people are at each

1 other, if you take a use case, the scenario of 2 things that are going on out there in the real internet environment and invite comment on the 3 different aspects, and start developing a 4 5 record of where people find things don't quite 6 fit properly, that is one you might think 7 about. 8 MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you very 9

much.

And then, I think in the last two minutes we will have the final comments from the participants, Mr. Glazier and, then, Mr. Band.

MR. GLAZIER: One thing more that I thought was pretty concerning, and that was that somehow the distribution right, right now, only covers when there is an actual transfer of a copy. And if you are offering for distribution, somehow that is not covered, and that making available would be a stretch. And we would be expanding rights if we covered something in a search folder or how people use

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1 the internet today.

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For enforcement purposes, if you had to have a snapshot picture of an actual transfer of a copy in order to enforce your rights, you would have no remedy at all. And so, the idea that putting something into a place on a computer network that is accessible to members of the public, as it states in Section 506, and offering it for distribution, under the definition of publication, which is at least equated, if not encompassed, within distribution, to say that that is not covered by the current distribution right I think is a big stretch. I would hate for that to be implied.

The constitutional mandate is to protect the exclusive -- we always forget that word -- the exclusive rights of authors, which as a consequence promotes science and the useful arts.

And so, I don't think people should get confused about offering for

1	distribution. It is definitely part of the
2	copyright law, and it is not a stretch or an
3	amendment to make it so.
4	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you.
5	We will conclude the panelists
6	with Mr. Band.
7	MR. BAND: So, I might not agree
8	with all of Mitch's interpretations, but
9	putting that aside, just very quickly, The
10	Washington Post yesterday had this big story
11	about all these reports that are issued that
12	no one reads.
13	MS. CLAGGETT: Don't say that
14	about the Copyright Office, please.
15	(Laughter.)
16	MR. BAND: And the truth, in my
17	view, the wrong conclusion, it said, well,
18	these are all useless and no reason I think
19	the problem is not that they are not read, but
20	that they are read, but they are read and they
21	are misused or taken out of context many years
22	later. And I think that that is something

that we really need to -- or not "me" -- you need to think about when you consider doing a study, report, analysis, whatever, in this area. How is it likely to be used, not only in the next five years, but how is it likely to be used in 25 years?

And I am just thinking about the

And I am just thinking about the report that the Copyright Office, I think it came out with it in 1983 about interpreting 108. And I think that it was -- interpretation was completely wrong.

But, putting that aside, I mean, that report, a 25-year-old, or whatever, however many years that is, a 30-year-old report, is an issue in ongoing litigation, you know, in a completely different factual context.

And so, I think that there is a danger to having these reports that, then, many, many years later, you know, again when the world changes, but still someone is going to say, "Oh, look at what the Copyright Office

or the expert agency said then."

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So, I think that that is a danger that you need to be aware of, especially in this context, why a report here as opposed to any one of the other 20 issues that you could easily be doing reports on?

And then, the final remark, just getting back to where we started, is that it is true that it is always important to know how we got to where we are and the roots and the legislative history and all the back-and-forth. But, at the end of the day, a judge has to decide. You know, it is up to the judge to make the decision how to apply the law to the fact.

And sort of all the legislative history is interesting, but at the end of the day it is their job, and I think we need to trust them and understand that we can't sort of micromanage what courts are going to do through reports, interpretations, legislation, you know, whatever. Judges are going to have

1	to apply the law to facts, and the facts are
2	always going to be changing. The technology
3	is always going to be evolving. And so, we
4	have to, at least some level, have trust that
5	they are going to do the right thing.
6	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you very
7	much.
8	Thank you to all of the panelists.
9	I am going to open it up and see
LO	if there is anybody from the audience.
L1	Professor Ginsburg?
L2	PROFESSOR GINSBURG: Hi.
L3	I don't want to weigh-in on the
L 4	institutional competence question. I just
L5	want to react to particularly Ms. Moy's
L6	comments because I think they take the making
L7	available right, or whatever we have, out of
L8	context, to the extent that we still have the
L9	fair use doctrine, we still have Section 512.
20	And I thought that a number of Ms. Moy's
21	examples were actually very good illustrations
22	of how in a making available right, digital

distribution, whatever you want to call it, they can play together with the fair use doctrine.

So, the example of lots of scientists, let's say, are working together in a peer-to-peer network or they are all uploading and downloading their files to a shared Dropbox folder. Well, that might be a terrific example of fair use. That might. It may be that any third-party copyrighted content is being made available to too large a number of people to constitute a non-public. But if it is non-commercial research, that is probably fair use.

And if it is commercial research, this is Texaco. So, how is it different whether the content is being distributed by photocopies to the R&D department of a forprofit enterprise or that same content is being made available through a shared storage locker in the cloud? So, I still think that, regardless, the fair use doctrine is very much

1	part of it.
2	And I think the photo in the
3	PowerPoint example, in addition to Nancy's
4	response, if you are showing that PowerPoint
5	to a large number of persons, such that it is
6	a public performance and Section 110(1)
7	doesn't apply, well, that is already a
8	violation of the public performance right.
9	So, I am not sure that every
LO	scenario which might look problematic if we
L1	said, "Oh, my goodness, that's a making
L2	available to the public, and it is a new
L3	violation," whether or not it is a prima facie
L 4	violation, it is not necessarily an
L5	infringement because of the fair use doctrine
L6	and other exceptions.
L7	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you very
L8	much.
L9	I want to thank all the panelists.
20	We are going to quickly set up for
21	Session 4, which will be a discussion of
22	foreign implementation and interpretation of

1	the WIPO Internet Treaties.
2	Thanks.
3	(Whereupon, the foregoing matter
4	went off the record at 3:22 p.m. and went back
5	on the record at 3:26 p.m.)
6	MS. CLAGGETT: Okay. Since I
7	think we ended a little bit late, we are going
8	to our seats to try to get this last panel,
9	this last formal panel with participants. And
10	then, we will have an audience participation
11	session.
12	MS. STRONG: So, good afternoon,
13	everybody. Thank you for attending the fourth
14	session of this afternoon's roundtable.
15	This one is on Foreign
16	Implementation and Interpretation of the WIPO
17	Treaties. We have eight distinguished
18	panelists.
19	And as in the prior sessions, we
20	will just go around the dais, and if you can
21	introduce yourself by name and affiliation?
22	And we will get started after that.

1	MS. CASTILLO: My name is Sofia
2	Castillo, and I am a Legal Fellow of the
3	Copyright Alliance.
4	MR. DiMONA: Joe DiMona, Vice
5	President, Legal Affairs, with BMI in New
6	York.
7	MR. GENETSKI: Christian Genetski,
8	General Counsel, Entertainment Software
9	Association.
10	MR. SCHRUERS: Matt Schruers,
11	Computer and Communications Industry
12	Association.
13	PROFESSOR LUNNEY: Glynn Lunney,
14	Tulane.
15	MR. ROSENTHAL: Jay Rosenthal,
16	Senior Vice President and General Counsel at
17	the National Music Publishers' Association.
18	PROFESSOR GINSBURG: Jane
19	Ginsburg, Columbia Law School.
20	MR. TEPP: Steve Tepp, on behalf
21	of the Global Intellectual Property Center of
22	the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.

1	MS. STRONG: Thank you all very
2	much.
3	As in prior sessions, we are going
4	to start with a general question or two, and
5	then, dive down into some specifics. So, I
6	would like to start off with the question of,
7	basically, how do foreign laws implement the
8	making available right? And I am going to be
9	very specific here. I am talking about WCT
10	Article 8 and WPPT Articles 10 and 14. And
11	how has such implementation provided, in your
12	view, either more or less clarity in these
13	countries in the context of digital
14	distribution? So, we are looking for
15	experience abroad on implementation of these
16	particular articles.
17	And if you can just tip your card?
18	And we will call on
19	Professor Lunney.
20	PROFESSOR LUNNEY: So, just to
21	start, to me, the process of sort of amending
22	the U.S. copyright law in order to comply with

1 this international treaty strikes me as just 2 a bit disingenuous. I don't see any of my friends from the European Union here. 3 4 haven't heard of any trade arbitrations 5 seeking to change our law in this respect. 6 So, I am not really sure it is the 7 international treaty that is driving this 8 particular examination of the making available 9 right.

European Union and the other countries that have adopted the making available right have gone through the same process with respect to internet uses that we have gone through under our public performance and distribution right. They have used a different linguistic framework. They have come to different answers in particular situations. They have come to the same answer in some situations.

So, on the Cablevision case, for example, where the Second Circuit held that to be not copyright infringement, we have the

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1 court in Singapore saying it is not copyright 2 infringement. The court in Germany initially saying it is not copyright infringement, and 3 4 then, coming back and saying, at least with 5 respect to the first retransmission from the 6 antenna to the subscriber's individual service 7 space, that is a retransmission, and courts in 8 Australia initially saying it is not, and then, changing their mind as well. 9 10 So, they have come to some 11 different outcomes in some areas, but, on the 12 whole, it is hard to see where their law is in 13 any sense preferable on these issues or 14 clearer on these issues than ours. And we 15 would have to go through the same sort of 10-16 to-15-year process of litigation to sort out what a making available right would like in 17 18 the United States, were we to adopt it. 19 Professor Ginsburg? MS. STRONG: 20 PROFESSOR GINSBURG: Thank you. 21 I guess we might start with Okay.

the text of the WCT before turning to how it

has been implemented. And the language of the WCT treats the making available right as an instance of the right of communication to the public.

So, "without prejudice" to a whole bunch of provisions of the Berne Convention, where the right of communication to the public is specified, "authors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing any communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless means, including the making available to the public of their works in such a way that the members of the public may access these works from a place and at a time individually chosen by them." That language is verbatim in Article 3 of the 2001 European Information Society Directive.

And I think that the "may access"

makes clear that this covers not only a

completed communication, but the prospect of
a communication, the offer of a communication.

I think there is a legitimate
question whether Article 8 adds something to
the Berne Convention. This is relevant to the
extent that if the making available right is
not implicitly in the Berne Convention, is
something new with the WIPO Copyright Treaty,
then failing to implement the WIPO Copyright
Treaty would not subject us to trade sanctions
under the TRIPS, which incorporates Berne, but
the WIPO Treaties are post-Berne.

But if one thinks that Article 8 is a clarification of what the meaning of right of communication to the public is, then the making available right is also subsumed within not only an international obligation, but an enforceable international obligation.

So, that is a threshold question.

Then, as to how it has been implemented or understood, Singapore is the only country that has found that a Cablevision/Aereo-type situation engages no right under copyright. Every other

jurisdiction has either, under the rubric of making available or other pieces of things, such as the Shift TV case in Germany that Glynn Lunney referred to, have found that there has been a violation of an exclusive right under copyright.

As for the European Union, the
European Court of Justice in the Svensson case
has now made totally clear that the offering
of a work, not merely the completed
transmission of a work, is a making available
to the public. The issue in Svensson ended up
turning on whether there was, for there to be
a communication to the public, whether there
was a "new public" when the content was
initially made available with authorization
from Website No. 1 and subsequent websites
linked to that content.

But on the front issue of whether or not making that content available via a link was a making available, that is now clear. And that position was also reiterated

1	more recently in the website-blocking case, in
2	the Telekabel Wien case that the ECJ decided
3	just about a month ago.
4	So, I think in terms of
5	international implementation, it is clear that
6	the offer, as well as the actual transmission
7	of content, is what the making available right
8	is all about.
9	One last comment, because I agree
LO	with Glynn on this. In the United States our
L1	approach, to put some things called
L2	"distribution," including digital, and other
L3	things in a box called "public performance,"
L 4	is something of an outlier. In most other
L5	countries, the concept of communication to the
L6	public covers digital communications, whether
L7	as a stream or as a download.
L8	MS. STRONG: Thank you very much.
L9	Mr. Tepp?
20	MR. TEPP: Thank you.
21	So, on the previous two panels
22	ago, there was some discussion of room for

interpretation of what making available means.

I think Professor Ginsburg has just quite
articulately pointed out that, insofar as the
question of making a work available, as within
the scope of the making available right, it
surely must be.

That is bolstered further by the text of the Guide to the Copyright and Related Rights Treaties Administered by WIPO, which is published by WIPO and which the Copyright Office referenced in its Notice of Inquiry for this process.

To the extent that commenters are offering the view that making available does not include making available, it seems to tax credulity. Or even more extremely, at least one commenter suggested that, if making available does include making available, it is, quote, "unprecedented." That seems hard to swallow.

To the extent that foreign laws, and we get into the particular question that

was posed, implement this right, it seems

consistent with the interpretation that making

available includes making available.

I did a brief survey using the WIPO Lex Database of Laws in preparation and tried to look at laws across geographic diversity and diversity of level of development, as well as diversity of whether or not they have actually ratified the WIPO Internet Treaties.

Albania, Australia, Brazil,
Canada, China, Ecuador, Egypt, the European
Union, Ghana, Japan, Nicaragua, and Pakistan,
the ones I looked at, and every one of those
has implemented a making available right. I
can't speak to every jot and tittle of their
implementation of that international law in
their national courts. Of course, there is
some room for national law and national
interpretation, but the fundamental question
of whether or not offering a work, making it
available to the public, is within the scope

1 of the making available right and should be 2 implicated under that right in order to comply 3 with the treaties, seems to be fairly clear, 4 both as a matter of the text of the treaty as 5 well as looking at how other countries have 6 implemented it. 7 Thank you. 8 MS. STRONG: Thank you. 9 Mr. DiMona? 10 MR. DiMONA: Thanks. Okay. 11 I think there are two areas where 12 the public performance right in the United States falls short of what is happening in 13 14 Europe. One has to do with the remote DVR-15 type situation that was addressed by the 16 Cablevision case, and the other has to do with the exemption for downloading from the public 17 18 performance right. 19 Taking the first one, we did in 20 our paper, I think we put in evidence from 21 various countries' laws that clearly show that 2.2 making available right in England and

Australia and Japan has been recognized on the communications side to include the mere offering as well as the actual performance.

And there is a case called the TVCatchup case in the European Union which dealt, I believe, with a very similar situation of the Cablevision case, and came out that it was a violation of the making available right.

And parenthetically, there have been a few district courts who agreed with that in the United States as well. So, I think that that is a problem with the Cablevision decision. Hinging the existence of the public performing right in the United States on whether or not a copy of a certain kind was made or whether a putatively individual copy was made, I think is just a bad law, a bad outcome.

With a server, the cost of memory getting cheaper and cheaper and cheaper, anybody can architect a system that creates

individual copies in order to avoid copyright.

And that is exactly what Aereo did. Having received the invitation, they said, okay, this is great; we will start providing subscription television with individual antennas. So, I think we are falling short there.

On the download issue, I think
that the court again, a Second Circuit
decision here, is wrong I think on the law,
also wrong on the technology. The Copyright
Act says, "public performance by any means,
process now known, or hereafter invented."
And the court came out with, well, it's a
transmission, but only if it is an audible
transmission, which is a special kind of
process. And I think that is inconsistent.

In Europe, as Professor Ginsburg
was saying, it has been recognized to be a
public performance, and collective societies
there can license both mechanical and
performance, and have been doing so for quite
a few years now. They treat both streams and

1 transmissions to be both rights. And so, you 2 know, I think that we are a little bit out of step there. 3 4 On the technology, I think also Professor Ginsburg this morning said that it 5 6 is not helpful to think of streams and 7 downloads as being radically poles apart. 8 can architect a download so that you can hear it right while it is going, while it is 9 10 downloading. You can, similarly, make copies 11 of streams. And there are a lot of variations 12 in the middle. So, I think we fall short here 13 on that issue as well. 14 MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you. 15 Mr. Rosenthal? 16 MR. ROSENTHAL: First of all, I 17 want to address Joe's comments about that 18 there is a real similarity, at least a growing 19 similarity, between the two types of rights we 20 are talking about here, the public 21 performance, the distribution, reproduction; 2.2 and that in Europe there certainly is a

different licensing format and a different process that they use to license these rights than we do over here.

Now the Copyright Office is addressing these issues in your study on licensing. You know, should we be bringing some of these rights together, and all of that? And that is fine, and that is for that particular procedure.

But, essentially, we shouldn't be looking at the fact that we are a little bit different over here, and all the debate we had this morning, as really being that significant in the overall points by Steve and made by Professor Ginsburg, that this does cover the right and we should move forward in trying to deal with it, whether through legislation eventually or not.

I'm not sure, looking at Europe and what they have done, because they have done it in many different ways, is that instructive to us. I think it is good that we

can look at the results over there and see
that they have come to some different results
than some over here.

Just one other point about international law and the issue of the free trade agreements. The free trade agreements did not really concern me that much in terms of us being really in violation of them until the situation has arisen with Antigua. And I think that we do have to and I think you have to take into context that now we have a situation where a country has brought an action against the United States for a violation of international law under WTO.

And now, they are engaging in a process where they are effectively giving away U.S. copyrighted works, not much, and it is Antigua, yes, you know. But the point is that, all of a sudden, the seriousness of our, let's say, looking at the free trade agreements and adhering to them in a way that would not get us into trouble with the WTO I

1 think is much more important now because of 2 that and should be taken into consideration, as you guys are reviewing these topics. 3 4 MS. STRONG: Thank you. 5 Mr. Schruers? 6 MR. SCHRUERS: So, Professor 7 Lunney started by pointing out that he wasn't 8 aware of any of our European colleagues sort of wringing their hands about the state of 9 10 U.S. law. And as he said that, I was thinking 11 that at least recently the shoe has been on 12 the other foot. Many here in the U.S. were 13 wringing hands about whether or not the 14 European Court of Justice Svensson opinion was 15 going to render a result whereby all 16 hyperlinks on the internet needed to be licensed. 17 18 And I think that would have been 19 an unfortunate and absurd result, which didn't 20 occur only because of a somewhat convoluted 21 opinion, which Professor Ginsburg alluded to, 2.2 which seemingly suggests that if the new

audience is coterminous with the original audience, then -- anyway, there are logical readings of the opinion; there are also very illogical readings of the opinion.

result, that would have come out of an implementation in communications to the public. And so, having seen us just narrowly dodge a bullet, I think -- I mean, we don't actually know how that is going to play out over time -- but assuming we have dodged the bullet, it seems a uniquely inopportune time to sort of revisit that issue here and sort of take on the same risk.

Certainly, it would do no favors for the credibility of copyright law to say that every link needs a license. And I don't think anybody wants that result to occur in U.S. copyright law. So, that is, I hope, a less probable outcome here.

But, again, in the sort of European example, in our preparations for the

European consultation that recently occurred, one of the things that I heard extensively was concerns about multiple demands for one exploitation of the work. I mean, we have that now in Europe. We have that to some degree here in the United States.

Any interpretation that appears to expand distribution, so that one exploitation of the work means that perhaps not only the reproduction and public performance rights are triggered, but, also, the making available right for a use of the work, as we are seeing in Europe.

That seems to me to be a very real risk, and it would be unfortunate if some report or statement from the Copyright Office were to be the impetus for a lot of rightsholders to say, "Ah, well, now these works have already been given to the public in some licensed manner, but perhaps my newfound making available rights means that I am entitled to take a cut for actions that people

1 thought were adequately licensed." 2 think that is a very real outcome and one that I am concerned about. 3 4 MS. STRONG: Thank you. 5 Next, Mr. Genetski, then Professor 6 Ginsburg. And then, I am going to have a 7 follow-up question about the structure of various copyright laws. 8 9 MR. GENETSKI: Thank you. 10 So, building on the point that 11 Matthew closed there with, and going back to 12 a specific example that Joe and Jay both raised as well, and coming at it from a 13 14 slightly different perspective, which is the 15 big question in front of us is whether there 16 is some action the Copyright Office should 17 take to recommend or as an impetus towards 18 legislative action on a making available right 19 here to be consistent with the WIPO Treaties. 20 And the perspective that I bring 21 on behalf of the video game industry is just 2.2 the practical business implication that might

result from including a making available notion or right, whether it is layered on as another item under 106 or it is incorporated into existing rights.

I think that looking at the foreign implementations, the different approaches that have been taken by different countries around the world, is instructive for us in thinking about what the consequences of any action here, other than sort of holding to what has seemed to be the overwhelming consensus point all day that we are in an okay spot now for the most part with the umbrella approach we have taken.

I would look at Canada, and
looking specifically at the issue that Joe
raised about, under the U.S. law, the
distinction between a download and a stream,
and a download being covered under
distribution right; stream being covered under
the public performance right. And the EU
taking a much different approach, which has

real implications for collection societies and licensing regimes.

Canada has, under a case that my trade association was the main plaintiff in, ESA v. SOCAN, took the same approach as U.S. law: it is a communication right, not public performance in Canada, but again split stream and download, had strong language about not stacking royalties, not layering the rights, collecting twice for the same act, as Matthew mentioned.

And in the wake of that decision and an overlap of just a few months, Canada passed its amendments to its Copyright Act, including incorporating a making available provision. Whether it is a separate right or not is the subject of a lot of debate now, but into its communication right, and solely within its communication right.

What that has spawned is, you know, within a year of a case that was litigated from the Copyright Board through

every intermediate court in Canada and,
ultimately, decided by the Canadian Supreme
Court, we are back to square one in the
Copyright Board again, starting over, having
arguments from very smart people on both sides
about what the implication of that making
available language being put into the
communication right is.

And I don't want to re-litigate the issue here today, but the point is we are going to go down that same road again to reach a resolution, and you have got very different interpretations about whether that upset the apple cart. There are a lot of existing licensing practices that the companies that I represent have built into their ability to incorporate music into their works. They thought they had clarity. So, a wellintentioned action has now meant we have got several more years of confusion on that issue. Admit it, you enjoyed MR. DiMONA:

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1	are looking forward to doing it a second time.
2	MS. STRONG: Thank you very much.
3	I would like to follow up on one
4	or two issues you raised, but, first,
5	Professor Ginsburg.
6	PROFESSOR GINSBURG: Yes, well, it
7	will be interesting to see what the Copyright
8	Board of Canada does, which I think it should
9	be doing shortly at this point, in determining
10	whether the enactment of a making available
11	right in Canada, whether that, in effect,
12	replaces the ESA/SOCAN case or incorporates
13	the ESA/SOCAN case.
14	Much of the debate in that case is
15	also about whether a making available right
16	includes prospective or the offering to
17	download of a download. So, that will be
18	another country's implementation to watch.
19	I just wanted to say something
20	more about Svensson. In Svensson, the "new
21	public" concept, which is not free of
22	controversy, came to the rescue because,

otherwise, it would have been extremely problematic. And I think it was for Europe a more elegant solution than implied license, which I think is perhaps the way we would go.

But it should also be recognized that in taking that route, the European Court of Justice ruled that it is a making available, but there is no new public if the initial communication from Website No. 1 was authorized. But, if that initial communication from Website No. 1 wasn't authorized, then it is a making available. It is a communication to the public, and it is a direct violation. It is not a theory of secondary liability.

In the first panel, we talked a little bit about whether these sorts of situations should be adjudicated as a matter of secondary liability. I think in the EU, one upshot of Svensson is that, if that initial communication was not an authorized communication, you have a direct violation,

1	and it is not based on secondary liability.
2	MS. STRONG: Thank you very much.
3	I actually was hoping to turn to
4	another question, but I see that there are two
5	flags up. So, Mr. Schruers?
6	MR. SCHRUERS: Yes, I will be
7	really quick. I think I agree with everything
8	Professor Ginsburg said about the
9	interpretation of Svensson. And I was sort of
10	thinking about how that would play right
11	now, we are sort of seeing a similar fact
12	pattern. I am a few days behind on the news,
13	but I have seen that Quentin Tarantino has
14	been litigating about a script that was made
15	available that was leaked.
16	Sort of applying this sort of
17	Svensson fact pattern, where you have got the
18	initial communication was not authorized, and
19	then, somebody linking to something that is
20	newsworthy, you know, I sort of see a
21	situation where you have people linking to
22	something of public note, that may well, under

making available, be a direct violation, where
we wouldn't want it to be.

And I find it very troubling to think that we, at a time when we, as I said, just dodged a bullet I think in Europe, that we want to sort of revisit and reintroduce that same uncertainty here, is troubling.

MS. STRONG: Thank you.

Professor Lunney?

PROFESSOR LUNNEY: I will try to be equally brief.

And so, my point would be that, instead of looking at what they have and what we have and saying, "Oh, they have this. That would be nice. Let's take it on," we need to look at the real-world consequences of adopting their approach. It may be more elegant, as Professor Ginsburg has said, but do we really want strict liability if you link to a site that is originally unauthorized? That puts the burden on the linker to know whether that original site is authorized or

1	unauthorized, as opposed to our current
2	secondary liability approach, which puts the
3	burden on the copyright owner to provide
4	notice, and then, follow with a takedown.
5	That procedure is not perfect, but
6	neither procedure is perfect, and we need to
7	compare their relative cost and benefits.
8	Just saying they have one and we have the
9	other doesn't advance the ball very far.
10	MS. STRONG: I think Professor
11	Ginsburg wants the last word.
12	PROFESSOR GINSBURG: 512(d), which
13	we have and they don't, the equivalent of
14	512(d) is a matter of interpretation so far,
15	and some national courts have come up with a
16	512(d) equivalent, but it is not yet
17	Europeanized.
18	And I should have mentioned in
19	that landscape that we also have 512(d) as a
20	part of the consideration of whether linking,
21	
	deep-linking or framing a website would be a

1 the patchwork of rights that we claim end up 2 being the equivalent of making available). MS. STRONG: 3 Thank you. 4 There are two big trains of thought that I would like to come back to. 5 6 And so, just to place a marker, one, I would 7 like to go back to a question that kind of 8 takes up on what Mr. Genetski was saying about real-world consequences with respect to 9 10 statutory design and how laws look. 11 And then, I would like to come 12 back to this question about linking and, more 13 importantly, the question of not all countries 14 have secondary liability principles, and then, 15 how does that work in their implementation of 16 the making available rights? 17 So, putting a pause on the second, 18 to go back to the first question I have -- and 19 I will take Professor Lunney's admonition that 20 we are not all international lawyers, so we 21 are going to focus the question here just on 2.2 their statutory language, not necessarily case 1 law.

There are countries around the
world that have very explicit ways in which
they break out the communications for public
right, especially in the area of works. So,
I have seen laws that will start with an
overarching chapeau of: here's the
communication to the public, and then, they
will list about anywhere between 10 to 15
rights. Sometimes it will include the express
making available right, if it has been more
recently amended. In other cases it won't.
So, this is not a new structure of listing
very descriptive rights. So, they will have
broadcasting, rebroadcasting, public
performance, loudspeaker. You will have a
very long list.
So, my question to the panel is,
what is your experience in terms of real-world
licensing issues in these foreign countries

and real-world perhaps enforcement issues with

respect to those countries that have these

1 very detailed communications to the public 2 structures in their law that obviously have a making available component? 3 I was wondering 4 if you have any views on that. 5 Professor Lunney? 6 PROFESSOR LUNNEY: Well, it is a 7 question of all what you're used to, right? 8 So, if that is what you have grown up with, then it seems right and just and the only 9 sensible way of doing it in the world. 10 11 you adjust your contract language 12 appropriately. 13 I think the concern that my two 14 commenters on the right raised is, if you 15 already have the contracts or licenses in 16 place, and then, you come along and change the 17 right structure, do you grandfather-in those 18 preexisting license arrangements? 19 Well, to follow up, I MS. STRONG: 20 think that is my exact question, because some 21 countries do have, and have had, these very 2.2 detailed right structures, and then, the way

1	in which they amended their law, as they
2	perhaps implemented their treaty obligations
3	when they joined the WCT, is to add,
4	basically, the last including phrase from WCT
5	Article 8. And so, that would upset
6	potentially the new and old contracts.
7	I was just wondering if anyone on
8	the panel had any additional specific
9	information on perhaps cases in which they
10	were involved happened.
11	MR. SCHRUERS: So, I will
12	apologize that I can't answer that question.
13	I mean, there are international scholars here
14	far more studied on the subject than I am.
15	But I will make, I hope, the
16	obvious point that, sort of the more circles
17	there are in the Venn diagram, the more
18	concerns there are about things falling
19	between the circles, one.
20	And then, the sort of problem that
21	Christian's example with SOCAN illustrates so
22	well. It is that multiple circles overlapping

and to do one exercise you have got to check multiple boxes. And then, as soon as you add another one to the equation, right, you get that many more times the number of potential conflicts, right? It is sort of "N" times "N" minus 1. And so, the larger entity, the more complex we have. We already have six enumerated rights and this will cause that much more complexity, should we undertake the issue, the change.

MS. STRONG: Thank you.

Ms. Castillo?

MS. CASTILLO: Yes. I also don't have international law expertise. So, I can't answer the exact question that you are asking. But I think in terms of things that could be helpful for the Copyright Office to take into account in terms of issuing some kind of guidance support, and referring back to the Charming Betsy Doctrine that was mentioned several times this morning where courts, where possible, should interpret statutes in

accordance with the text and the spirit of international treaties.

There are two things in the WCT that could be helpful. One is one that Professor Ginsburg has already referred to, and it is the use of the permissive language where they say, "by wire or wireless means, including the making available to the public of their works in such a way that members of the public may access these works from a place and at a time individually chosen by them."

So, basically, I think telling the courts that the use of that permissive language indicates that the offer of a work triggers the right, and that there is no international requirement for proof of actual access to the work. That might be helpful.

The other thing that might be helpful, looking in terms of determining the spirit of the treaty, is looking at the preamble. And sort of the first paragraph explains that the treaty seeks to develop and

1 maintain protection in a manner as effective 2 and uniform as possible to copyright owners. 3 And so, I think those two things 4 might be helpful for the Copyright Office to 5 take on any guidance that would be helpful to 6 the courts. 7 Thank you. 8 MS. STRONG: Thank you. 9 Mr. Rosenthal? 10 MR. ROSENTHAL: We haven't been 11 involved directly in any proceedings over 12 there. But, if you are asking how things are 13 licensed, the process, almost all the 14 countries have societies that engage in the 15 licensing of making available. And some of them break it down between their two different 16 17 societies, one like in France SACEM [Société 18 des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs de 19 Musique], and then, SDRM does the mechanicals, 20 SACEM doing the representation rights that 21 they speak of over there. 2.2 In Germany, GEMA does them both.

1 And I believe in the United Kingdom, I think 2 they are done both, but they have also merged recently. We can find out for you the exact 3 4 nature, if that is what you are asking. 5 We could also supplement your 6 record here by getting some information from 7 the international societies who represent 8 music publishers, ICMP [International Confederation of Music Publishers], maybe 9 10 CISAC [Confédération Internationale des 11 Sociétés d Auteurs et Compositeurs, also known 12 in English as the International Confederation 13 of Societies of Authors and Composers], about 14 this particular issue of how are they licensed 15 through the societies, if that would help. 16 MS. STRONG: Thank you. 17 Mr. Genetski? 18 MR. GENETSKI: I will start by 19 echoing the I am not the international law scholar disclaimer. But I think I can address 20

your question at a high level from the

perspective of the industry I represent.

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Because we look at this issue broadly and kind of from two different perspectives. So, our members, they create a lot of intellectual property. Strong copyright regimes are very important to us instinctively and practically.

when we go around the world to enforce those rights, typically, the analysis you will conduct, you won't start with the specific lists and the rights and how they are protected. You will start with, what's the problem that we are dealing with? How is the value of our intellectual property being compromised by a certain service or individual or group of individuals?

You know, instinctively, most of
the members come from the U.S. trade
associations. Our member companies will
approach that through their own lens and think
of our own Copyright Act first and sort of
intuitively understand what would be
infringing about the conduct here. And then,

you go to that list, and you go through the rights, and then, you go through the precedents in that country and the way those rights have been interpreted. And you try to match the activity to what makes it unlawful in a specific jurisdiction.

We really follow the same approach when we are sitting on the opposite side, which is we want to incorporate other copyrighted works into the audiovisual works, into a downloadable game. We want to have music.

So, there what we will do is
figure out what rights do we need to clear and
how do we clear them under certain
jurisdictions. And so, it is the same
practical approach, which goes back, again, to
the larger point of any change for the sake of
clarification, well-intentioned change, where
there is already fairly well-established
practices under current things can be
upsetting.

1	MS. STRONG: Thank you.
2	Let me turn back to a little bit
3	of what we were talking about with Svensson
4	and the whole issue of how the secondary
5	liability might relate to the effect of
6	enforcement or of the availability of the
7	making available right itself.
8	So, I mentioned earlier, not all
9	countries have a secondary liability concept.
10	I know it sounds shocking, but they don't.
11	And I guess a couple of questions.
12	Are you aware of any cases or practices in
13	those countries that do not have a secondary
14	liability concept and there has been making
15	available litigation, or perhaps the converse?
16	I am trying to figure out, and I would be
17	interested in getting more information from

22 Professor Ginsburg?

you might be able to provide.

the experts on that.

little bit of an example of Svensson, but I

was wondering if there are any other examples

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I think we have had a

1	PROFESSOR GINSBURG: I don't have
2	the citation, but I believe Spain does not
3	have the concept of secondary liability for
4	copyright infringement. And Spain has a very,
5	very high level of what is called
6	"unauthorized activity." They may even be on
7	our watch list. But they are kind of a
8	notorious example of an EU country that does
9	not recognize the doctrine.
LO	MS. STRONG: So, I guess I will
L1	take advantage of your knowledge there. How
L2	do you think in a future case Spain might
L3	respect the recent Svensson case?
L 4	PROFESSOR GINSBURG: Well, since
L5	it is not a theory of secondary liability,
L6	that's not a problem. The problem is what
L7	happens if you are providing
L8	instrumentalities, but it doesn't come within
L9	the ambit of the making available right.
20	So, if you are providing
21	instrumentalities for copying, but outside of
22	a making available context, that seems to be

1 a big hole.

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MS. STRONG: Yes. And there is probably some more experience here on the experience in Spain, but Spain does have, as you mentioned, a challenge problem with piracy in the online environment, and especially involving linking sites.

And so, I am curious to know how -- I am going to take that back. I quess let me go back to perhaps another region. are other countries in Latin America that also don't have a concept of secondary liability in the copyright context. I think there has been some struggle in some nations to try to extend just regular tort to that, but they have been unsuccessful. I was wondering if maybe in Latin America or in Asia whether anyone has any other ideas or information to provide to the record on how those countries are implementing making available.

Mr. Tepp?

MR. TEPP: I think, by and large,

making available gets implemented as a matter of direct liability. That seems more likely the circumstance under which it will come up. Obviously, there are some countries that don't have secondary liability at all. There are many countries that have secondary liability in forms that are significantly different than in the United States, through tort law, through aiding-and-abetting-type statutes on the criminal side.

But, of course, I think what I would urge you to keep in mind is that what you are being urged by some commenters is that making a work available should not and does not, some are arguing, implicate any exclusive right under U.S. law. Well, if there is no direct infringer, the secondary liability analysis is extremely brief. There is none.

So, I think the focus I would urge you to maintain is on the direct liability question and whether or not the United States is providing a making available right in a way

1	that complies with any plain meaning of that
2	term, if making a work available does not
3	implicate any exclusive right under U.S. law.
4	I don't see how it could.
5	MS. STRONG: Thank you.
6	Maybe if we can go back to some
7	higher-level questions on linking, are you
8	aware of any other countries' laws or
9	practices that make the distinction between
10	linking to legitimate materials and linking to
11	infringing materials? I mean, we have had
12	some discussion of Svensson, but I know this
13	probably will raise, again, the question or
14	the observation that Mr. Tepp on what could
15	possibly be direct liability, what would be
16	secondary liability.
17	So, in the area of linking to
18	different kinds of materials, do you have any
19	comments or observations?
20	(No response.)
21	MS. CLAGGETT: I was going to
22	actually say I don't have any further

1 questions, but that it is just 4:08. 2 actually only have a few more minutes left in this panel anyway. 3 4 Normally, we would say we would want to use those last couple of minutes for 5 6 audience participation, but we have an 7 audience participation session next. So, we probably don't need to do that. So, maybe 8 9 just one or two final questions, and then, we 10 will turn it over to the audience 11 participation. 12 MS. STRONG: I quess I will toss 13 out sort of another higher-level question. 14 Since the implementation of the treaties in 15 2002, we have reached the magic number of 90, 16 if that is a magic number, but that is quite a large number of member states for a 17 18 relatively young treaty. 19 Do you have any observations or general trends, either at the rate of 20 21 implementation or the regions of 22 implementation or the issues related to

1	implementation, given the recent decade of						
2	success, I would say, and the widespread						
3	adherence to the treaties?						
4	MS. CLAGGETT: I think Mr.						
5	Rosenthal looks like he wants to answer that						
6	question.						
7	(Laughter.)						
8	MR. ROSENTHAL: Well, I really						
9	don't. Actually, no.						
10	On all of these points, these are						
11	very, obviously, important questions. And I						
12	think that maybe if we were given some						
13	guidance beforehand on some of these						
14	questions, we might have been able to come to						
15	you with answers.						
16	If this is important to your						
17	deliberations, we will work on getting you						
18	some of the answers to this, and we can						
19	supplement, again, your record on these						
20	points. I mean, as you raise these questions,						
21	I am like, boy, this is something I would like						
22	to know more about.						

1	So, we are open to working with
2	you on that and getting you this from the
3	organizations in Europe and in Latin America
4	that can give you some good answers on it.
5	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you. We
6	appreciate that.
7	Mr. Tepp?
8	MR. TEPP: It is a very broad
9	question, essentially asking about
10	implementation both in national law and in
11	national courts in 90 different countries. I
12	am not prepared to speak categorically in
13	absolute terms as to 90 countries.
14	I can tell you that the work I
15	have done indicates that, overwhelmingly, the
16	implementation is consistent with the view
17	that offering a work, making it available, is
18	and does implicate an exclusive right under
19	national law, in compliance with the WIPO
20	Internet Treaties.
21	As I mentioned earlier, I also
22	found some countries that have not yet

officially ratified those treaties, but appear to have at least implemented the making available right, consistent, again, with that interpretation of the treaties.

And I agree with the observation that to have in such a short time so many countries adopt the treaties speaks to their importance.

and just sort of two points that I will make in the vein of closing remarks. One is there was a question raised earlier about whether any of our trading partners or other governments really care much about what U.S. law is on this point. I can speak from personal experience that the government of Japan has inquired about our compliance with the making available right, in particular, for years, and that it was important to them, and they are not entirely convinced that we are complying with it. And I understand why, although I, of course, when I was a representative of the U.S. government, always

1	maintained that we were pristine.						
2	My final point is that in this						
3	overall atmosphere of global challenges to						
4	copyright protection and enforcement, where we						
5	have 90 countries that have						
6	implemented/ratified the treaties, and the						
7	United States having to ask itself whether we						
8	actually fully comply with it, it is not a						
9	helpful situation for us to be in.						
10	The United States is looked to as						
11	a global leader in intellectual property						
12	generally and in copyright, in particular.						
13	And I think that it is important that we						
14	provide the best possible example of						
15	implementation and enforcement of obligations						
16	that we ask other countries to undertake to						
17	provide that sort of fair compensation to						
18	creative authors and industries.						
19	Thank you.						
20	MS. STRONG: Thank you.						
21	Professor Ginsburg?						
22	PROFESSOR GINSBURG: Japan did						

1 decide a Cablevision-like case and found that 2 it was a violation of their rights. Two further thoughts, one inspired 3 4 by Steve Tepp, which also gets back to the 5 Charming Betsy Doctrine. Because there seems 6 to be some disagreement about whether the 7 Charming Betsy Doctrine actually matters 8 because we have sometimes had a tendency to go 9 it our own way and not make every effort to 10 interpret our copyright law in light of 11 international obligations, assuming that we 12 agree about what those international 13 obligations are. 14 And we do have a somewhat 15 inglorious record when it comes to the Berne 16 Convention and, notably, moral rights. Ι think Steve has a point that it doesn't make 17 18 us look good to take a truculent attitude 19 towards our international obligations. 20 And also, the Supreme Court 21 attributed to Congress, when it came to the

Uruguay Round Amendments Act and the

restoration of copyright in foreign works

prematurely in the public domain in the United

States, that Congress had intention of

"unstinting adherence to Berne."

And I suppose that one might try
to argue that, when the position was taken
that we didn't need to amend our Copyright Act
because we had, through bits and pieces, we
had the equivalent of a making available
right, that we should be "unstinting" about
that as well.

The last comment, which might open a hornet's nest, is, one, there is a private international law problem with the making available right, which is: where does the act which gives rise to liability occur? Does it occur in the country from which the work is made available? Does it occur in the country to which the work is made available? Does it occur in both?

The ECJ in the Football Dataco case determined that, where a particular

country has been targeted for the communication, the work was certainly made available to that country, but, also, preserved the possibility that the country from which the work is made available might also be a locus of the making available right.

This is an important issue because of the question of enforceability. Because if you have any transnational making available, which you almost certainly do, you wouldn't want to conceive of the right in a way that would allow opportunistic restructuring of the offering of content.

So, it goes back to something that
we referred to earlier this morning with
respect to the reproduction right. If the
copies are being made on a server offshore,
does that elude effective copyright
enforcement or enjoyment of rights in the
United States? So, the "from/to" question is
one that I think also needs to be thought
about in the context of a making available

1	right or its equivalence in U.S. law.
2	MS. STRONG: Thank you.
3	Our final two, now three, we will
4	just go down the row this way. So, Mr.
5	DiMona, Mr. Schruers, and Professor Lunney.
6	MR. DiMONA: Thanks, Maria.
7	I just want to conclude my
8	participation by saying that we are in a world
9	that is awash in piracy today. And we have
10	creators who are struggling. I want to echo
11	a word that my colleague John Beiter said this
12	morning. Some writers, authors, and creators,
13	they need strong protection.
14	And as far as I am aware,
15	entertainment products are one of the only
16	positive balance of trade that the United
17	States has nowadays where we are actually
18	making more money from foreign sources than we
19	are spending. We need to protect our culture
20	in the future. We need to protect creators.
21	And my own personal view is that
22	we need very robust copyright rights in the

narrow exemptions. You know, I am in favor of exemptions as much as the next guy if there is a meritorious argument to be made. The copyright law is filled with exemptions where Congress looked at a particular situation and said, "You know, if you are paying this right, you don't have to pay that right." But that should be thought of and the case should be made for those.

A final comment I will make, to go back to your question, Maria, about how would you fix the law: should you write a very, very detailed public communication right with a bunch of subparts or should you just have a broad statement?

My sense is a broad statement is better, but really there is a fine line there. Because if Congress tries to write down every single possibility of a scenario, they are not going to be able to do it. And technology evolves so quickly that they will just miss a

1	few. Things happen no one can understand.
2	So, that is a risk there.
3	If, on the other hand, you go with
4	a broad statement and say it should cover
5	everything, then you run the risk, like the
6	court did in Cablevision, where they just made
7	one misinterpretation, and, all of a sudden,
8	you have got this loophole that you just can't
9	remedy.
10	So, I don't know exactly what to
11	do with that, but I think broadly-enunciated
12	principles with particular narrow exemptions
13	is probably my feeling, and I think the law
14	needs to be made more robust, not less. And
15	that's it. That is all I want to say on that.
16	MS. STRONG: Thank you.
17	Just for the record, I was asking
18	for examples outside the U.S. I wasn't saying
19	that the Congress was going to write a very
20	detailed list.
21	Mr. Schruers?
22	MR. SCHRUERS: So, one of the

other areas where the U.S. has a very strong, positive balance of trade is the export of digital services. It is one of our fastest-growing exports. And certainly, we wouldn't want to do anything to endanger that.

And indeed, other countries have noticed that, the fact that Spain, Germany, well, in the order of France, Germany, and Spain have all now implemented or are considering implementing ancillary right-like proposals which they can assign to domestic stakeholders to tax internet services. are exercising the quotation right in the Berne Convention. It shows that there is great interest in finding new sources of revenue from existing services. And we wouldn't want to see a making available right here in the United States do something similar.

And here we are at the end of the day, and I sort of figured at some point I would find what I was thinking of as the

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iCraveTV case. So, in WIPO we have been fighting for years now about the WIPO

Broadcast Treaty, which is sort of a perennial issue.

And the one case that was the problem that we need to fix, right -- there was always the iCraveTV case. That was held up to say this is why we need a WIPO Broadcast Treaty. Now that is either a good example or a bad example. It doesn't really matter.

Here I haven't even heard that example yet. So, I sort of came in today thinking like I am going to hear what the case is that is the problem, and then, I can go and read the case. And I am not sure where it is that a plaintiff brought a case, and then, could not recover because there was no making available right.

And when Jon Band pointed out on previous panels that there seem to be in many, if not all, of these case the reproduction right applying, I expected somebody to say,

1 "Well, ah, that wasn't the case in this case, 2 and that's why we need it." And I haven't 3 heard that. So, I feel like we are largely 4 5 responding to hypotheticals until I hear what 6 that case is. And if someone wants to email 7 me the citation, I would be happy to read it. 8 Professor Lunney? MS. STRONG: PROFESSOR LUNNEY: 9 Just a final 10 thought. Piracy, depending on how you define 11 it, certainly some people think it is rampant. 12 But when we look around the world at all the 13 different legal regimes that different 14 countries have adopted, no one has found the 15 silver bullet. No one has found the magical 16 language you can stick into your Copyright Act 17 that will shut down file sharing, whether 18 peer-to-peer or otherwise. 19 Europe has it. They still have 1350 petabytes a month of file sharing traffic 20 21 on their internet backbone. So, it doesn't 2.2 appear that this is really going to help

1	significantly, and I am concerned that it is
2	going to open the doors to some really
3	ambiguous if we add a broad making
4	available right, it is going to be very
5	unclear what exactly that means in the U.S.
6	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you very
7	much.
8	We are going to close it, but I
9	think Professor Ginsburg will have the last
10	word.
11	I will just note that we haven't
12	actually had any audience members sign up so
13	far to make any final remarks. So, audience
14	members, if you do want to make any final
15	remarks, please come to the podium.
16	Otherwise, we will close with Professor
17	Ginsburg and any other participants who have
18	final words.
19	PROFESSOR GINSBURG: I would like
20	to take the focus off of file sharing and
21	piracy because I think that one of the very
22	important features of a making available right

1 or an interpretation of the digital 2 distribution right as covering offers and 3 public performances, covering offers, is the affirmative side, which is licensing; that 4 5 there shouldn't be gaps in the panoply of 6 rights that get licensed. 7 And I think that we may have an issue about overlapping rights, and that needs 8 to be worked out. But I think that, given the 9 10 way copyrighted works are enjoyed by the 11 public, there are increasingly variations on 12 access models. And the WIPO Treaty says "may access." It is all about access. 13 14 So, I think we should think about 15 this not simply in the enforcement context, 16 but in the positive context of what set of 17 rights do we need in order effectively to 18 grant rights, so that people may enjoy 19 copyrighted works without the threat of being 20 labeled infringers.

MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you very much.

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1 I want to thank the panelists for 2 this session. Thank you very much. 3 And as the panelists depart, if anyone, as I said, would like to make comments 4 5 from the audience, please step up to the 6 podium, and we will start with our audience 7 participation session. 8 So, I just wanted to MR. BAND: respond to some of the comments that were made 9 10 in this last panel. 11 One is that there would be no 12 surer way to sort of mobilize public 13 opposition to the Copyright Act than to have 14 a direct infringement liability for linking. 15 I mean, that would be an absolutely horrible 16 idea and would completely discredit the 17 Copyright Act. 18 I mean, the only thing that I can 19 imagine that would discredit the Copyright Act 20 more or the copyright system more than direct 21 infringement for linking would be to try to 22 extend copyright term again beyond life plus

70. So, you know, that would probably be the only thing that would be a worse idea than having direct infringement for linking.

The second point is that, in terms of looking to foreign law for models, you know, yes, it is always good to look to foreign law for interesting approaches, but we should, again, be somewhat consistent to not only look to foreign examples for expansion of rights, but also for interesting exceptions and limitations.

And so, I note that the UK now is considering -- and I don't understand their parliamentary system -- but I understand that they very soon will now have in their copyright law all kinds of exceptions on contracting-out. In other words, that contractual limitations on a variety of exceptions will be null and avoid. I mean, they already have that in the EU Software Directive and some other places, but this would be in UK law with respect to libraries

1	and educational institutions, for a variety of
2	exceptions.
3	So, I think that that is something
4	I would recommend, looking at countries
5	contracting out.
6	Or, like in Canada, with statutory
7	damages, they have a limit on the total amount
8	of statutory damages per transaction for non-
9	commercial use. So, that I think is like
10	5,000 Canadian dollars. So, that would
11	significantly reduce the statutory damages
12	available in a non-commercial use situation.
13	MS. CLAGGETT: Thank you very
14	much.
15	Do we have any other participants
16	not participants audience members who
17	would like to provide any final remarks?
18	(No response.)
19	Okay. We definitely want to thank
20	all of the participants today. This has been
21	very, very helpful to us in terms of
22	exploration in further detail some of the

1	issues that were raised in the comments. As
2	I mentioned before, there is a possibility
3	that we might ask for further written comments
4	and, if so, we will issue an NOI that asks
5	some additional questions based on some of the
6	conversation that we received here today.
7	We expect to be able to post the
8	transcript of our proceedings in the next
9	several weeks, as well as a videotape of the
10	proceedings as well.
11	So, thank you, and we look forward
12	to working with everyone as we explore this
13	issue in further detail. Thank you very much.
14	(Whereupon, at 4:28 p.m., the
15	meeting was adjourned.)
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Court Reporter

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